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The purpose of this case study is to empirically investigate the phenomenon of initial public 
offerings (IPOs) by applying it to Tencent Holdings Limited (Tencent). Tencent is a Chinese 
internet and telecommunications value-added service provider that launched its IPO on 16 June 
2004.   
 
Tencent is China‟s largest internet firm and Asia‟s most valuable brand, boasting a current 
market capitalization of HK$1.224 trillion (US$157.9 billion). The origins of Tencent‟s success 
story trace back to its IPO decision, an important topic in the field of finance.         
 
The aim of this study is to investigate the structure of Tencent‟s IPO, its listing decision and 
determining an intrinsic value of its IPO shares on its listing date.  
 
It was found that Tencent‟s IPO extensively relates to academic literature surrounding IPO 
underpricing and valuing unlisted companies. The results reveal that Tencent left money on the 
table by underpricing its offer shares and exercised its over-allotment option as a form of price 
stabilization. It was further found that Tencent‟s underpricing was not influenced by competitor 
IPOs but rather by stringent IPO allotment policies and other signals of firm quality. It was also 
discovered that there may have been bias in the allocation of Tencent‟s shares.  
 
An investigation into Tencent‟s listing on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKEx) revealed that 
while its competitors listed on the NASDAQ Stock Market, there was a clear correlation between 
Tencent‟s operations and corporate structure to the HKEx listing and regulatory requirements. 
The decisive factors included domiciling in the British Virgin Island and Cayman Islands, the 
cost of listing on the HKEx Main Board versus the NASDAQ National Market as well as the 





The study was concluded with the application of a relative valuation and discounted cash flow 
(DCF) valuation. The relative valuation estimated a price range of HK$14.40 - HK$18.72 for 
Tencent‟s IPO shares, while the DCF estimated the intrinsic value of the shares to be HK$18.68. 
The analysis was comprehensive and in-depth and suggests that Tencent‟s IPO shares were five 
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IM – Instant Messenger/Messaging 
 
IP – Internet Protocol 
 
IPO – Initial Public Offering 
 




ISP – Internet Service Provider 
 
IVAS – Internet Value-Added Services  
 
IVRS – Interactive Voice Response   
 
JSE – Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
 
LAN – Local Area Network  
 
MIH – Myriad Investment Holdings 
 
MMORPG – Massive Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Games 
 
MMS – Multimedia Messaging Service  
 
MNC – Multinational Corporation 
 
MVAS – Mobile Value-Added Services 
 
MVL – Millennium Vocal Limited  
 
MXCN – Morgan Stanley Capital Index (also referred to as the MSCI China Index) 
 
NASDAQ – NASDAQ National Stock Market 
 
NPV – Net Present Value  
 
OTC – Over-The-Counter 
 
PHS – Portable Handyphone System 
 
PRC – The People‟s Republic of China 
 
R&D – Research and Development 
 
RTS – Real-Time Strategy Games 
 




SEHK – The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited 
 
SEO – Seasoned Equity Offering 
 
SEZ – Special Economic Zone  
 
SFC – The Securities and Futures Commission of Hong Kong 
 
SINET – China‟s Science Information NETwork 
 
SMS – Short Message Service 
 
SOX –  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
 
The Company – Tencent Holdings Limited  
 
TM – Tencent Messenger 
 
VAS – Value-Added Services  
 
VoIP – Voice over Internet Protocol 
 
WACC – Weighted Average Cost of Capital 
 
WAP – Wireless Application Protocol  
 
WFOE – Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprise 
 
WTO – World Trade Organization  
 





Active User Accounts – User accounts that have been accessed during a 30-day period.   
 
A-Shares – These are shares in Mainland China-based companies that are only available to 
Mainland Chinese citizens. These shares trade on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange only.  
 
Book Building – This is the process whereby an underwriter determines the offer price for IPO 
shares based on the level of demand from institutional investors. 
 
Bookrunner – This is the underwriter or lead manager of new equity, debt and security issues. In 
Tencent‟s case this was Goldman Sachs (Asia). 
 
B-shares – These are shares in Mainland China-based companies that can be purchased by 
foreign investors. Foreign investors can only purchase these shares by adhering to 
currency regulations. Shanghai B-shares can only be purchased for US dollar 
denominations while Shenzhen B-shares can only be purchased in Hong Kong dollar 
denominations. These shares are only available on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange respectively. 
 
Broadband – An internet connection allowing for large amounts of data to be transmitted at once. 
The speed of broadband in the PRC and Hong Kong at the time of Tencent‟s IPO was at 
least 1.5 Megabytes per second.  
 
China Mobile – China Mobile Communications Corporation and its affiliates, branches and 
subsidiaries.  
 
China Netcom – China Network Communication Group Corporation and its affiliates, branches 
and subsidiaries.  
 
China Telecom – China Telecommunications Corporation and its affiliates, branches and 
subsidiaries. 
 





Clawback Provision – This mandates a transfer of offer shares to the public tranche of an IPO if 
the overall demand for the IPO is high enough to meet the stipulated HEKx application 
thresholds.   
 
Cold IPO market – This is when IPO activity on the market is low and there demand for IPO 
offer shares is low.  
 
Cooling-Off Period – Also known as the pre-IPO quiet period. This prohibits the IPO company 
from publicly enhancing its name or encouraging favorable attitudes towards its offer 
shares for a specific time period before listing.  
 
Core Founders – These are the founding members of a company. In the case of Tencent the core 
founders are Ma Huateng, Zhang Zhidong, Zeng Liqing, Xu Chenye and Chen Yidan. 
 
Daily User Hours – The total amount of hours IM users remained logged into Tencent‟s QQ 
network. 
 
Digital Divide – The gap between those who have access to computers and internet and those 
who do not.  
 
Dividend Discount Model (DDM) –This is an alternative company valuation tool. It is also used 
to calculate a company‟s cost of equity as an alternative to the CAPM model when 
conducting a discounted cash flow valuation. 
 
Digital Satellite Link (DSL) – This family of technologies provides internet access by 
transmitting digital data. DSL operates at a speed ranging from 256 kilobytes per second 
to speeds in excess of 100 megabytes per second. 
 
Dotcom Bubble – An historical speculative bubble of the 1990‟s which peaked in the year 2000. 
It was fuelled by over-optimistic market sentiment surrounding internet and technology 
stocks. Overvalued internet and technology companies encouraged rapid exponential 
growth of equity markets over this period.  
 
Dotcom Crash – The collapse of the Dotcom Bubble resulting from the huge losses and poor 
financial performance of prior internet and technology company investments.  
 
Economic Value Added (EVA) – This is a measure of a company‟s financial performance, 




Freemium Pricing Model – This is a pricing model whereby a company offers basic product and 
services for free and then charges users a premium for additional enhanced content and 
features.  
 
Freeware – Software made available for free. 
 
General Packet Radio System (GPRS) – This is a packet-based wireless communication service 
that operates at a speed of between 56 kilobytes per second to 114 kilobytes per second. 
It provides continuous internet connectivity to mobile phone and computer users. 
 
Global Coordinator – Typically the global coordinator is referred to as the manager of the IPO, 
responsible for coordinating the activities of the lead manager and underwriter. In the 
case of Tencent the global coordinator, lead manager and underwriter was Goldman 
Sachs (Asia) LLC. 
 
Global System for Mobile Communication (GSM) – This is the standard for digital mobile 
communication. 
 
Greenshoe Provision – Also referred to as an over-allotment option, this permits the IPO 
underwriter to sell up to 15% more shares than originally allocated by the issuing 
company. 
 
HK$ – The official currency of Hong Kong 
 
Hot IPO – This is when demand for an IPO exceeds the amount of offer shares available. 
Typically the share price of the IPO firm rises considerably as it opens on the market.  
 
Hot IPO market – This is a market in which there is lots of IPO activity and demand for offer 
shares is high.  
 
H-Shares – Shares of a company incorporated in Mainland China and listed on the Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange. 
 
IDG Technology Venture Investments (IDG) –.One of two venture capital firms that initially 
invested US$1.1 million for a 20% stake in Tencent Holdings. 
 
Informed Investor – Informed investors are highly knowledgeable in the financial securities 




Institutional Investor – These are knowledgeable companies or organizations that trade in large 
amounts of securities. These companies or organizations receive preferential treatment 
and benefits.  
 
Internet Diffusion – The spreading of internet connectivity across a geographical area. 
 
Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN) – This is a network technology providing internet 
access by supporting the digital transfer of voice and data traffic simultaneously. This 
operates at a maximum speed of 128 kilobytes per second.  
 
Interactive Voice Response (IVRS) – This is a software application combining voice telephone 
input and touch tone keypad selection to provide responses in the form of voice 
messages, facsimiles, callback or emails.  
 
IPO Overpricing – The percentage decrease in the value of an offer share from its offer price to 
the closing price on the first day of listing. This is expressed as percentage. 
 
IPO Roadshow – This is when the IPO company travels around the country to present to 
analysts, fund managers and potential investors to generate excitement and interest in the 
IPO. 
 
IPO Underpricing – The percentage increase in the value of an offer share from its offer price to 
the closing price on the first day of listing. This is expressed as percentage. 
 
Lead Underwriter – Also referred to as the lead manager, this is usually an investment bank or a 
financial institution that works with an investment bank to organize an IPO. The lead 
underwriter assesses the issuing company to arrive at both a value for its offer shares and 
the quantity of offer shares to be sold. Once this syndicate is formed the shares are then 
sold to both institution and retail clients. In the case of Tencent the lead underwriter was 
Goldman Sachs (Asia).  
 
Leave/Leaving money on the table – In the context of IPOs, this is when the IPO company 
underprices its offer shares by refraining from taking full advantage of expected market 
demand for its shares. As a result the actual offer price is set lower than what the 
company could have expected to achieve, further stimulating market demand for these 
shares. 
 
Local Area Network (LAN) – This is a computer network that connects a variety of computers 




Lock-Up Period – This is a predetermined amount of time subsequent to an IPO, restricting 
controlling shareholders from selling their shares in the company. 
 
Log-In Flash – These are targeted advertisements that are displayed as soon as an online user 
logs-in to their respective online platforms. Typically these appear directly after the log-
in page and will either appear for a set duration of time or the user will have to click 
remove it.  
 
Listing Rules – The rules governing the listing of securities on the Stock Exchange of Hong 
Kong Limited (SEHK). These are amended frequently. 
 
Ma Huateng – The founder and CEO of Tencent Holdings Limited. Also known as Pony Ma. 
 
Mandarin Sea Investments (Mandarin Sea) – A wholly owned North American subsidiary of 
IDG Technology Venture Investments (IDG).  
 
MIH – Myriad Investment Holdings, a wholly owned subsidiary of South African multimedia 
conglomerate Naspers.  
 
Millennium Vocal Limited (MVL) – One of two venture capital firms that initially invested 
US$1.1 million for a 20% stake in Tencent Holdings. 
 
Multimedia Messaging Service (MMS) – This allows users to exchange multimedia through their 
mobile phones and other devices. 
 
Naspers – A South African multimedia conglomerate listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
under the ticker NPN.  Naspers originally purchased a 46.5% stake in Tencent in the 
year 2001. It currently owns holds a 34% stake in Tencent. 
 
NASDAQ National Market – An American stock exchange. 
 
Net Present Value (NPV) – The difference between the present value of cash inflows and cash 
outflows.  
 
Offer Price – The final Hong Kong dollar price per offer share (exclusive of brokerage, stock 
exchange trading fees, SFC transaction levy and investor compensation levy).  
 




Online Community – A group of users that communicate or interact with each other through the 
internet. 
 
Pacific Century Cyberworks Ltd – Pacific Century Cyberworks Limited was founded by Richard 
Li, son of Hong Kong business tycoon Li Ka Shing. It later became the PRC‟s leading 
telecoms operator by acquiring Hong Kong Telecom. 
 
P Chip Stock – Chinese companies listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, however they are 
incorporated in the Cayman Islands, British Virgin Islands (BVI) and Bermuda. These 
companies operate in Mainland China and are run by those in the private sector only.   
 
Portable Handyphone System.(PHS) – This is referred to as Xialingtong in the PRC. 
 
Price Stabilization – Tis is the process whereby IPO underwriters facilitate the distribution of 
securities on the exchange in an effort to ensure that the market price of the newly listed 
shares does not fall below the original offer price. 
 
QQ – Tencent‟s popular instant messaging software and company brand. 
 
QQ SKIN – The user interface, design and overall look of the QQ IM software.  
 
Realtime Century Technology (Realtime Century Technology Limited) – This is a BVI-
incorporated international business company established on 14 March 1997. It was a 
dormant company until it became a wholly-owned subsidiary of Tencent Holdings on 18 
December 2003. 
 
Red Chip Stock – Chinese companies incorporated internationally and listed on the Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange. These companies are controlled to some degree, or completely, by the 
Chinese government or a recognized Chinese government institution. 
 
Registered IM user accounts – Accounts held by IM users who have registered for the service. 
 
Registered users – Users who have signed-up to use an online service. 
 
Renminbi – The official currency of the People‟s Republic of China. 
 





Shenzhen Unicom – The Shenzhen division of Chinese mobile network China Unicom. 
 
Shidai Zhaoyang Technology (Shidai Zhaoyang Technology Limited) – Established in the PRC 
as a limited liability wholly owned subsidiary of Tencent Holdings Limited on 8 
February 2004. 
 
Shiji Kaixuan (Shenzhen Shiji Kaixuan Technology Company Limited) – Established in the PRC 
as a limited liability company on 13 January, 2004. 
 
Short Message Service (SMS) – This allows text messages to be transmitted through mobile 
phones. 
 
SIM card – This is an electronic card inserted into mobile handsets. It contains all personal 
mobile number of the user, identifying the network they belong to.  
 
Simultaneous Online User Accounts – All user accounts accessing an online service at the same 
time. 
 
Spamming – This entails using electronic message systems and platforms to send messages 
indiscriminately. This is commonly associated with online advertising.  
 
Special Economic Zone (SEZ) – These are granted special economic policies and tax benefits 
when compared to other economic zones within the PRC. 
 
Sponsor – This is an influential investor who stimulates and creates demand for a stock.  
 
System Messages – These are advertisements distributed in the form of a bulk message. These 
are usually in a picture format and give the user a choice to click on the picture and 
access more information about the respective product or service being advertised.  
 
Tax Avoidance – This is a legal practice, and makes use of legal methods to modify a businesses 
or individuals financial situation to lower their income tax owed. 
 
Tax Evasion – This is an illegal practice, whereby a business or individual avoids paying their 
true tax liability. This is a criminal offense subject to penalties and criminal charges. 
 
Tax Haven – This is a state, country or territory offering foreign individuals and businesses little 
or no tax liability in a politically and economically stable environment. Furthermore, 




Tax Holiday – A temporary reduction or elimination of tax. 
 
Tax-shield benefit – This reduces the cost of debt incurred by a company and increases as a 
company takes on greater amounts of debt.  
 
Tencent Computer (Shenzhen Tencent Computer Systems Company Limited) – Established in 
the PRC as a limited liability company on 11 November 1998. 
 
Tencent Technology (Tencent Technology Shenzhen Company Limited) – Established in the 
PRC as a limited liability wholly owned subsidiary of Tencent Holdings Limited on 24 
February 2000.  
 
Tencent Limited – This is a BVI-incorporated international business company established on 14 
March 1997. It was a dormant company until it became a wholly-owned subsidiary of 
Tencent Holdings on 18 December 2003.  
 
Tencent Holdings Limited – Also referred to as „the company‟, Tencent Holdings Limited was 
incorporated in the British Virgin Islands on 23 November 1999. It redomiciled to the 
Cayman Islands on 27 February 2004. 
 
The Central Clearing and Settlement System (CCAS) – Operated by the Hong Kong Securities 
Clearing Company Limited. 
 
Uninformed Investor – These investors have no knowledge of the securities markets or financial 
securities whatsoever. 
 
US$ – The official currency of the United States of America. 
 
Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprise (WFOE) – This definition is specifically applicable to PRC 
law. This is a Chinese investment vehicle in the form of a limited liability company that 
is funded by foreign investors. It is the most flexible form of foreign investment in 
China. Tencent‟s WFOEs are Shidai Zhaoyang Technology and Tencent Technology. 
 
Wireless Application Protocol (WAP) – This is an open, global specification allowing internet 









All information contained in this document pertains to Tencent‟s IPO listing on 16 June 2004. 
Unless otherwise stated all analysis, interpretation and conclusions are based only upon 
information that relates to the time period up to and on 16 June 2004.  
 
All information referred to within this document was obtained from Tencent‟s prospectus 
document, unless otherwise specifically stated. All other sources have been referenced according 













Chapter 1: Introduction 
1:1 
Chapter 1: Introduction
This dissertation analyzes Tencent Holdings Limited (Tencent) and its initial public offering 
(IPO) on 16 June 2004.   
An IPO is the first time a private company sells its shares to the public.  A private company 
could decide to IPO for numerous reasons. Typically, this is because the company wants to gain 
access to funding through capital markets. This can improve the company‟s image while 
motivating management and employees of the new publicly listed entity. These benefits create 
the opportunity for the company to grow organically and expand its operations, with the end goal 
of creating value for its shareholders.   
However, the newly listed entity will incur costs associated with going public. The IPO company 
will face stringent regulatory requirements from prospective exchanges. These include public 
market compliance costs as well as transparency and disclosure obligations. The company will 
also incur listing fees, both upfront on the day of listing and an annual listing fee each year. 
The largest cost incurred by the IPO company is the loss of control. By publically listing, the 
IPO company will be placed under greater scrutiny by various stakeholders. In order to create 
value for its stakeholders, the IPO company‟s operational and strategic flexibility will be limited. 
This is because management is expected to make decisions in the best interests of the company‟s 
stakeholders to ensure that this goal is achieved. 
There are many factors to take into consideration for an IPO to be successful. The timing of the 
IPO on the market is crucial to the level of demand achieved by the listing company. The best 
time for an IPO company to list is when the market is hot, with high volumes of IPO activity and 
consequential high demand from investors. If a private company was to launch its IPO in a cold 
market then the lack of IPO activity and poor demand would ensure the IPO company does not 
reach its intended levels of capital to be raised.  
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IPO underpricing is a common occurrence which affects the overall level of investment secured 
by the IPO company. This influences the performance of its share price in the long-run. By 
leaving money on the table the underwriters of the IPO company stimulate excess demand by 
pricing the IPO shares below market value. This encourages investors to participate in the IPO 
while mitigating the risk of uncertainty surrounding the level of demand and resultant success of 
the IPO.  
 
1.1 Tencent Holdings Limited  
 
South African multimedia conglomerate Naspers‟s (Myriad Investment Holdings) 34.0% 
investment in Tencent is one of the most successful corporate investments to date and has 
attracted strong international media attention.  
 
However, the origins of this financial success are specifically attributable to the Tencent IPO. 
Had it not been for Tencent‟s decision to publicly list, both Tencent and Naspers may not have 
achieved their current levels of commercial success. 
 
From failing to attract local private investment in its early years to launching its IPO amidst 
weak global market sentiment, Tencent overcame significant challenges in going public.   
 
Tencent was the first Chinese internet and telecommunications value-added service company to 
list on the Main Board of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKEx). In contrast, Tencent‟s 
competitors listed on the NASDAQ Stock Market (NASDAQ) four years prior to the launch of 
its IPO in 2004. This highlights issues around the stringent listing requirements for the HKEx 
and the unique challenges surrounding the listing procedures in the Hong Kong equity market. In 
addition, the timing of their listings meant that Tencent‟s competitors took advantage of the 2000 
Dotcom Bubble before it crashed later that year. 
 
In contrast, Tencent‟s IPO was surrounded by negative global market sentiment towards internet 
and technology stocks, whereby consequential underpricing was undertaken to stimulate investor 
demand. This achieved an oversubscription of 159 times its public tranche accompanied by a 17 
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times oversubscription in its placing tranche, generating overwhelming demand for its offer 
shares and exceeding analyst expectations. 
 
This study empirically investigates the phenomenon of initial public offerings (IPOs) by 
applying it to Tencent. It explores the structure of Tencent‟s IPO, its listing decision and 
determines an intrinsic value of its IPO shares on its listing date. As such, it explores academic 
literature surrounding IPO underpricing theory and theories on valuing unlisted companies. 
Furthermore, it applies IPO underpricing theory to Tencent and explores the effect of post-IPO 
subsequent events on Tencent‟s market performance for the period ending 30 June 2005. 
 
The full structure and approach of this dissertation is addressed in the following section. 
 
1.2 Structure  
 
This dissertation has been structured in the form of an IPO case study on Tencent. This approach 
ensures that the IPO phenomenon can be explored in-depth and understood in a real-life context 
by critically analyzing Tencent‟s IPO.  This provides an opportunity to derive value from this 
study using critical insight and analysis of Tencent as a company, the Hong Kong equity market 
and China‟s internet and telecommunications value-added service industry.  
 
By providing contextual information on Tencent and its IPO, the causal links between actual IPO 
activity and financial theories are established.  This case study ensures that these academic 
theories surrounding IPO underpricing and valuing unlisted companies can be tested and 
developed by applying them to this case. It provides the reader with sufficient information to 
conceptualize the IPO process from the perspective of Tencent and to explore pertinent IPO-
related issues in the same manner as industry analysts.  
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1.2.1 Research Methodology 
 
This section theoretically and practically justifies the suitability and adoption of the case study 
research method in achieving the research objectives of this dissertation. 
 
It uses academic literature as a basis to explore case study research in finance, assessing the 
suitability of this research method by applying various academic notions to the Tencent IPO. In 
emphasising its relevance, this section addresses the value of adopting the case study research 
method by highlighting practicality and skills development, simplicity and effectiveness as well 
its rich levels of insight. It further investigates the commonly misperceived pitfalls of this 
research method, disproving the misperceived lack of theory, reliability and validity of the case 
study method.  
 
1.2.2 A Critique of Academic Literature surrounding IPO Underpricing Theory and Valuing 
Unlisted Companies 
 
This section critically explores academic literature surrounding IPO underpricing theory and 
theories on valuing unlisted companies. This serves as a theoretical framework for the case. 
 
It investigates the occurrence of IPO underpricing in the Hong Kong equity market with 
emphasis on asymmetric information models, institutional explanations and theories surrounding 
ownership and control. Specifically, the underpricing theories explored are „The Winner‟s 
Curse‟, underpricing as a signal of firm quality, price stabilization, underpricing as a means to 
retain control and underpricing as a means to reduce agency costs.  
 
Academic literature suggests that the absence of public market exposure will affect the 
underlying valuation methodologies applied to unlisted companies. In order to ensure that one is 
able to determine the intrinsic value of an IPO company on its listing date, relevant 
considerations must be undertaken to ensure a fair and accurate result. This study explores this 
literature in the context of the valuation methods undertaken to value IPO firms and the effect of 
accounting data and firm-specific factors when conducting these valuations. 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
1:5 
 
1.2.3 The Case Background  
 
The case background provides an extensive, in-depth analysis into Tencent‟s company history 
and the Chinese internet and telecommunications value-added service industry. It explores the 
origins of the Tencent group, the evolution of its business model, company growth and its 
investment strategy leading up to its IPO listing date.  
 
This information was derived from various sources, including the China Daily newspaper‟s 
website, the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKEx) News, Tencent‟s IPO prospectus, Tencent‟s 
official company website, the JSE Stock Exchange News Service (SENS) and Naspers‟s Annual 
Report. 
 
The case constitutes an integral part of this dissertation, providing a comprehensive foundation in 
order to explore the various questions raised within this study.  The case culminates by exploring 
the intricacies surrounding the construct of Tencent‟s IPO offering and the premise behind the 
company‟s decision to list on 16 June 2004. 
 
1.2.4 The IPO Listing Decision 
 
This section is primarily based on insights gleaned from both case-related information and 
relevant IPO listing theories.  
Historical industry analysis has shown that the majority of Tencent‟s direct competitors publicly 
listed on the North American NASDAQ National Market in the 2000 financial year. This was 
during the Dotcom Bubble when global internet companies were achieving valuations far above 
realistic industry expectations at the time. Many of Tencent‟s direct Chinese competitors 
benefitted from this trend and listed on the NASDAQ Stock Market in that same year.  
 
This suggests two topics of importance surrounding Tencent‟s listing decision. Firstly, Tencent‟s 
decision to list comes four years after its industry peers. Secondly, the company‟s decision to list 
on the Main Board of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKEx), instead of the NASDAQ 
National Market as in the case of its competitors, is worthy of investigation.  




This may suggest that the company has bucked industry trends in favor of benefitting 
strategically from an alternative listing platform at a later point in time.  This study explores this 
notion to clarify and understand both the strategic and financial considerations behind Tencent‟s 
IPO listing decision.  
 
Specific relevant points addressed in this study include the differences in company registration 
between the British Virgin Islands (BVI) and the Cayman Islands, the differences in IPO fee 
structure behind the HKEx Main Board and NASDAQ National Market, the differences between 
IFRS and US GAAP and the effects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 on this listing decision. 
 
1.2.5 A Complex Valuation of Tencent Holdings Limited 
 
With Tencent‟s confirmed offer price of HK$3.70 per share, the company priced its offer shares 
at the top of its HK$2.77 – HK$3.70 price range. The significance of this was the ability to 
convert the offer price into feasible market demand for these shares. While Tencent‟s IPO shares 
were heavily oversubscribed, it is important to understand not only how Tencent decided on this 
offer price, but more specifically whether these shares were underpriced or overpriced in the 
market.  
In doing so, a meticulous analysis has been undertaken into the company‟s historical financial 
performance, its capital structure; and the past, present and future status of the industry climate.  
This study includes both a relative/comparable valuation of Tencent as well as a discounted cash 
flow (DCF) valuation using the unlevered free cash flow to the firm (FCFF) approach. Based on 
these valuation methods, it explores the relationship between the estimated intrinsic value of 
Tencent‟s offer shares and IPO underpricing theories.  
 
1.2.6 Underpricing the Offer Shares and Post-IPO Subsequent Events 
 
Based on first day market returns, Tencent‟s offer shares were underpriced by 12.2%. This 
section explores the likely reason for the occurrence of this underpricing. This is done by 
applying relevant IPO underpricing theories to Tencent‟s IPO.  
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These IPO underpricing theories are „The Winner‟s Curse‟, underpricing as a signal of firm 
quality, price stabilization, underpricing as a means to retain control and underpricing as a means 
to reduce agency costs. 
 
Furthermore, this section provides an overview of Tencent‟s market performance over the one-
year period ending 30 June 2005. It specifically explores the effects of certain post-IPO 
subsequent events and how these events have affected both trading volumes and consequently 
Tencent‟s share price over this period. 
 
The remainder of this dissertation is structured as follows: Chapter 2 explores the research 
methodology undertaken, substantiating the use of the case study research method for this 
dissertation. Chapter 3 is a literature review exploring IPO underpricing theory and theories on 
valuing an unlisted company. Chapter 4 is the case, setting context for the case study by 
providing extensive background information surrounding Tencent, its IPO deal and the Chinese 
value-added service industry. Chapter 5 explores Tencent‟s IPO listing decision and the 
differences between the HKEx and NASDAQ that may have influenced this decision. Chapter 6 
provides a complex valuation of Tencent‟s IPO offer shares as at 16 June 2004 using both a 
relative valuation and DCF valuation model. Chapter 7 applies IPO underpricing theories to 
Tencent‟s first day‟s market performance, while exploring the effects of post-IPO subsequent 
events on Tencent‟s share price for the period ending 30 June 2005. Chapter 8 concludes the case 
study.  
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Chapter 2: Research Methodology   
 
This dissertation has adopted the case study as the preferred research approach in exploring the 
phenomenon of IPOs.  The case study research method is defined as “an empirical inquiry that 
investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of 
evidence are used.” (Yin, 1984:23).   
 
In this context, the case study research approach ensures that one can effectively investigate and 
understand the IPO phenomenon by interpreting it within a real-life context. This is done by 
investigating Tencent‟s IPO listing decision (see Section 1.2). This provides a new perspective 
on IPOs, complimenting existing finance-based academic research; a clear strength of adopting 
this research method (Bengtsson and Larson, 2012: 6). Considering Tencent‟s current market 
position, the relevance of IPOs and their causal link to the success of past and present 
technology, telecommunications and  media (TMT) based companies, the case study research 
method ensures an extensive and in-depth investigation to achieve an holistic understanding of 
IPOs (Baharein and Noor, 2008:2).  
 
2.1 Case Study Research in Finance 
 
While the origins of case study research methods were initially established within the field of 
social sciences, it is clear from the above that it is a practical way to investigate complex 
phenomena in the world of finance (Stoner and Holland, 2004: 42). This viewpoint is supported 
by Bettner Robinson and McGuon (1994: 1, 11, 14) who believed that the adoption of case 
studies will help to shape the future direction of academic research in finance.   
 
Historically, case study based research methods are a rarity in finance, with lower submission 
rates in comparison to traditional research methods (Bengtsson and Larson, 2012: 3). Eisenhardt 
and Graebner (2007: 26) found that many researchers tend to refrain from adopting the case 




study approach because it heavily reduced the possibility of publishing. They attributed this to 
the skeptical views of reviewers and editors who were more inclined to nomothetic research 
methods and most likely did not fully understand the true essence of case studies. 
 
However, the popularity of case study research has increased over time (Stoner and Holland, 
2004: 3). This has been attributable to its frequent use in managerial and organisational 
accounting research, accompanied by the supportive climate of the United Kingdom and Europe 
for qualitative research methods in the fields of accounting and finance (Stoner and Holland, 
2004: 50). 
 
Applying case study methodology to finance-based research, in a 2012 study pertaining to the 
relevance of case studies in mergers and acquisitions (M&A), Bengtsson and Larson (2012:14) 
concluded that it was a powerful and underutilised research method. In this light, they further 
found that case studies provided a unique and valuable approach to M&A research.  
 
Stoner and Holland (2004: 50) also used this traditionally unconventional research method, 
applying it to their research in finance. This encouraged unique findings and helped to ensure the 
successful publication of their research paper. This dissertation has been structured along similar 
lines. Hence, it offers a unique and unconventional research approach to exploring IPOs. 
 
2.2 Assessing and Applying Case Study Research Methodology  
 
2.2.1 Assessing the Suitability of the Case Study Research Method 
 
In determining the suitability of the case study approach to the research objectives of this 
dissertation, Baxter and Jack (2008:2) have raised four primary questions. A case study approach 
is the most appropriate avenue of research methodology when (a) the focus of this research is to 
answer questions on “how” and “why” certain events have occurred, (b) it is not possible to 
influence the behaviors of those involved in the study, (c) the writer wants to reveal contextual 




conditions as they are believed to be relevant to the greater phenomenon or (d) when the 
boundaries between the linkages of a phenomenon and its context are unclear.  
In applying these guidelines, it is clear that this dissertation meets all four of these conditions 
appropriately. It explores both the “how” and “why” questions from multiple perspectives. This 
dissertation raises the question of how and why Tencent originated, how Tencent has evolved 
over time, why Tencent decided to IPO, how Tencent decided upon listing on the Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange (HKEx), how Tencent created sustainable value in its IPO shares and why 
Tencent priced its IPO shares at the levels it did. This approach comes full circle when linking 
this contextual case to both how and why the Tencent IPO case correlates with academic 
literature surrounding IPO underpricing theories and theories on valuing unlisted companies.  
 
Congruent with Baxter and Jack‟s (2008: 2) guidelines, it was not possible to influence or 
manipulate the behaviors of those involved in this study. This is because all data sources 
pertained to and were limited to the objective mediums as outlined in Section 1.2.3 only. This 
approach is supported by Rowley (2002: 3), who motivates that by using a variety of different 
sources, the case study approach goes beyond the norms associated with the limited range of 
sources to which other historical research methods are accustomed.  
 
Consequently, this dissertation uses a variety of sources in order to answer specific research 
questions. This is a key characteristic of the case study approach (Gillham, 2000: 1, 2). While it 
is evident that this dissertation makes use of a variety of both qualitative and quantitative 
sources, case study research methodology is best undertaken using a combination of both data 
types (Yin, 1981:1; Flyvbjerg, 2006: 27). The benefit of adopting this research method is that 
qualitative data ensures there is a greater understanding of the topic at hand, while 
simultaneously providing context and meaning to quantitative data (Gillham,2000: 10).  
 
Furthermore, based on the holistic findings of this dissertation, it is clear that the contextual 
conditions associated with Tencent‟s IPO are highly relevant to the IPO phenomenon in general. 
The Tencent story presents a unique case, providing a distinctive perspective and appreciation 
for IPOs. This goes beyond the norms of traditional IPO-based academic research. 




It aims not only to identify and clarify these linkages but also to prove the existent synergies 
between generalist IPO theory, academic literature and the Tencent IPO.  
 
By formulating a case study around Tencent‟s IPO, this enables one to investigate its IPO listing 
decision on a deeper and more complex level. In this context, the case study uses qualitative data 
effectively (together with quantitative data) to ensure direct exposure to the intricacies of 
Tencent‟s 2004 IPO deal. In this way, it provides an insider‟s view of the contextual situation at 
hand. This places greater emphasis on the ability to explore and investigate subject matter at 
levels that are potentially greater and more complex than what other traditional research methods 
may offer (Gillham, 2000:11). 
 
This being said, the case study approach allows for both the researcher and reader to explore the 
subject matter in its natural setting. It provides a platform to identify its link to general theories 
relevant to the subject matter, and encourages both parties to appreciate and understand the 
complexities of these processes (Cable, 1994: 3). As a case study, this dissertation provides an 
opportunity to research and compare Tencent‟s IPO to its competitor‟s IPO. This promotes 
further industry research surrounding the contributing factors that may or may not have caused 
differences in the outcomes of these IPOs. This motivates a basis for further research on this 
topic within the finance industry and yields value in this regard (Widdowson, 2011: 2). 
 
2.2.1.1 Description, Explanation, Prediction and Control  
 
Woodside (2010: 11) offers an additional perspective on the adoption of case studies as a 
research method. In doing so, he proposes evaluation criteria in which there are four main 
research objectives that would indicate if the case study method is most suitable. These 
objectives are: description, explanation, prediction and control.  
 
In formulating the case (as per Section 1.2.3), the description attribute sufficiently ensures that 
questions surrounding “who”, “what”, “where”, “when” and “how” are adequately met. Not only 
does the Tencent case ensure that this information is available, but it ensures that this 
information is presented in a manner that allows for sufficient explanation around “why” specific 




events or theories have arisen (see Section 1.2.4). In terms of the prediction objective, the 
descriptive and explanatory information presented within the case together provide the 
opportunity for effective forecasting (see Section 1.2.5). 
 
While forecasting here is explicitly with reference to financial forecasting, this requires a holistic 
approach to interpreting and predicting the future movements and progression of numerous 
contributing factors. These factors are important because they could have had an integral effect 
on the overall value placed on Tencent‟s IPO shares. In terms of control, the structure and overall 
context of the case study approach enables the researcher to influence the reader‟s interpretation 
of the topic at hand. Hence, the intended goals of this dissertation as stipulated in Section 1.2, 
paragraph two.  
 
Both Baxter and Jack (2008:2) and Woodside‟s (2010: 11) basis for criterion are further 
supported by Bengtsson and Larson (2012: 5) and (Crowe, 2011:4). They state that case studies 
are the most effective means of research strategy in answering “how” and “why” questions 
associated with research surrounding contemporary phenomenon. This ensures that existing 
academic theories are refined, while encouraging the development and interpretation of new 
academic theories relative to the topic.  
 
2.2.2 A Precautionary Methodological Measure 
 
Keeping with this notion, a fundamental characteristic of the case study research methodology is 
that one should not commit to using it with prior theoretical ideas in mind (Gillham, 2000:2). In 
doing so, this limits the true value of this research method. This is because it is nonsensical to 
apply generalist theories to case-specific data, as one must first formulate a complete 
understanding of the data relevant to the case. This is explicitly applied throughout this 
dissertation, and is evident throughout its structure.    
 
Chapter 3 provides a critique of academic literature surrounding IPO underpricing theory and 
valuing unlisted companies. This literature review is placed prior to the actual case study to 
expose the reader to various academic literature surrounding IPOs in general.  




The dissertation comes full circle in Chapter 7 where this academic literature is re-examined and 
applied to the case. This illustrates effective adherence to this fundamental characteristic 
highlighted above. 
 
It allows one to develop an understanding of the overall subject matter before establishing the 
link between these theories and the Tencent case. This ensures that the integrity of the 
dissertation remains intact, proving to adhere to this common practise throughout its structure. 
 
2.3 Value of Adopting the Case Study Research Method  
 
2.3.1 Practicality and Skills Development 
 
From an industry-related standpoint, it is common practice within finance to undertake the 
analysis and interpretation of an IPO company in the same direction as this dissertation. Both 
investment bankers and IPO investors will undertake significant amounts of research in 
investigating the IPO firm, with an essential goal to value its IPO shares (Gad, 2011:1).  
 
As will be evident throughout this case, investment banks play a key role in the IPO process, 
acting as underwriters. However, in order for an investment bank/s to manage the IPO, it needs 
to present to the IPO firm‟s board of directors to prove its eligibility (INC, 1999:1). This 
presentation typically addresses concerns around underwriting experience, a preliminary 
valuation of the IPO firm and the relevant logistical concerns surrounding the investment bank. 
 
Taking this into account, this dissertation‟s emphasis on the practical element provides a suitable 
proxy for the roles and responsibilities typically accustomed to this area within the finance 
industry. This exposes the reader to a variety of required industry-related skills. 
 
The first skill identified is the ability to research effectively. Without this, the investment bank is 
less likely to fully master an understanding of the industry, how other IPOs within the respective 
industry have performed and how this relates to the IPO company at hand. Furthermore, an 




accurate and substantiated preliminary valuation is less likely if this research is not succinct, 
relevant, impactful and of a generally high caliber. This notion is supported by Flyvbjerg 
(2006:6), who places strong emphasis on the importance of the case study in developing strong 
research skills, relating this to the importance of skills development for professionals across a 
broad range of industries.  Hence, the case study research approach provides a benefit to the 
researcher as an effective proxy for the type of research required by investment banks. 
 
The second skill identified focuses on the practical element of the research questions. This is 
where synthesising and interpreting case information will ensure that effective and relevant 
solutions are formed. Hence in light of undertaking the preliminary valuation, investment 
banking employees will need to interpret case information. This is to understand the IPO firm‟s 
industry, the historical significance and performance of IPOs within this industry and to use this 
together with company-specific information to formulate an accurate and justifiable preliminary 
valuation of the IPO firm. Hence, this is clearly represented through Chapter 6‟s complex 
valuation of Tencent‟s IPO.  
 
2.3.2 Simplicity and Effectiveness  
 
Throughout this dissertation there are multiple sections pertaining to complex information 
surrounding both IPOs in general, and with specific reference to Tencent‟s IPO. Academic 
literature is incorporated throughout, ensuring heightened levels of complexity. This is where the 
case study method holds a significant advantage over other traditional means of academic 
research. This is because it ensures that complexity can be simplified and understood by the 
reader (Bengtsson and Larson, 2012:6). This is supported by the findings of Eisenhardt and 
Graebner (2007:25), who deduced that the case study is one of the best forms of research 
methodologies as it promotes the synergy between qualitative evidence and mainstream 
deductive research. 
 
Siggelkow (2007:1) supports these findings, stating that it is the most unique cases which 
motivate the adoption of the case study over other research methods. Contextually, as Asia‟s 
most valuable brand, Tencent‟s current market success served as motivation in developing the 




respective research questions explored throughout this dissertation. This presented an 
opportunity not only to explore IPOs, but to create a conceptual argument behind Tencent‟s IPO 
process and to understand whether this proved to catalyse its success as China‟s largest internet 
firm boasting a market capitalization of HK$1.224 trillion (US$157.9 billion).    
 
2.3.3 Insight  
 
Traditional research methodology dictates a purely results-based analyses and interpretation of 
the research topic. In contrast, qualitative research methods, such as case study research, place 
emphasis on the processes leading to the outcomes/results instead. This is a critical motivating 
factor in choosing to use this research method in fulfillment of this dissertation‟s  
research objectives.  
Therefore, unlike traditional research methods, this dissertation does not use a results-based 
approach to create intellectual value. Instead, this intellectual value is created by placing sole 
emphasis on the following: the ability to interpret and understand the process behind Tencent‟s 
decision to list, the premise for Tencent‟s actions surrounding its exchange of choice, the price of 
Tencent‟s IPO shares and the multi-faceted subject matter surrounding Tencent‟s ability to 
achieve its intended IPO-related objectives. This provides a completely unique perspective on 
the topic at hand, in which rich insight creates an opportunity for one to develop a holistic 
understanding of the general IPO process and how this applies to Tencent. 
In order to successfully achieve this, significant emphasis has been placed on heightened levels 
of both insight and detail throughout this dissertation. This is because insight is deemed a key 
factor of success in case study research (Gerring, 2006: 7).The insight and detail evident 
throughout this dissertation provides a springboard for further areas of academic research 
surrounding both general IPO theories and individual subject areas which have contributed to 
Tencent‟s ability to list. This conveys the value within case study research, surpassing 
conventional research methods where such insight is not necessarily achievable (Rowley, 
2002:2). 
 




2.4 Pitfalls of Case Study Research  
 
According to Flyvbjerg (2006: 4, 5), there is a negative bias against case study research because 
it is typically misunderstood. These can be summarised into five common misunderstandings: 
theoretical, context-independent knowledge is more valuable than concrete, context-dependent 
knowledge; no generalizations can be drawn from a single case study; case studies are not 
suitable for hypothesis testing or theory building, but are limited only for generating hypotheses; 
case studies are biased towards the researcher‟s viewpoint, and that due to the specificity of case 
studies, it is difficult to summarise and develop general theories.  
 
Essentially, these pitfalls of the case study approach can be summarised into a lack of theory 





A common pitfall of case study research is the inability of researchers to ensure that their 
research remains within a defined scope (Baxter and Jack, 2008:3, 4). Researchers tend to 
present a topic that is too broad, which presents too many objectives to prove in one case study 
alone. This dissertation avoids this pitfall by defining its scope through the activities, time and 
place of the contextual topic under investigation. Therefore, this dissertation explores Tencent‟s 
IPO listing decision (activity) for the defined period dating 11 November 1998 to 16 June 2004 
(time) on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKEx) within the Chinese internet and 
telecommunications value-added service industry (place).  
 
This proves that this dissertation effectively binds the case and nullifies this pitfall. This refutes a 
challenging aspect of the case study research method in which many researchers are privy to a 
lack of selectivity in their case information.  
 
 




These researchers tend to incorrectly emphasise the descriptive element of the case and present 




While some perceive the case study to present heightened levels of subjectivity and bias in its 
approach, this is not true (Flyvbjerg, 2006: 20). Heightened levels of subjectivity and bias are 
considered risks applicable to all research areas, and are not exclusively linked to case studies or 
alternative methods of qualitative research. This is further justified by Stoner and Holland (2004: 
49), who show the commonality of subjectivity and bias across all research methods.  
 
Irrespective of methodology, it is clear that all research will naturally contain a certain degree of 
judgement which will need to be applied by the researcher. While one would assume that there is 
a risk of potential subjectivity and bias within this judgement, Cable (1994: 3) does not find that 
improper interpretation is a valid risk. Instead, he emphasises that the greatest likelihood of bias 
is caused by the incorrect application of research methods by the researcher.  
 
In this light, Stoner and Holland (2004:49) suggest that one should place trust in the researcher‟s 
judgement as it is likely to translate into value creation. This value is created through the likes of 
the analysis, key findings and conclusions of the research study. 
 
2.4.3 Validity  
 
Assessing the validity of the case study approach, one can turn to the learning process associated 
exclusively with this research method. Typically, Flyvbjerg (2006: 5) presents a view that by 
using context-independent research as the primary means of knowledge accumulation, the 
learning and development process of students, researchers and professionals stagnate. In this 
light, graduates typically report that theory and research are unrelated to the problems they face 
in practise and are generally irrelevant to their overall work roles (Bridges and Hallinger, 
2012:2).  




Harvard University has recognised this, placing an emphasis on case study learning as an integral 
part of development for both researchers and lecturers since 1870 (Garvin, 2003). This is because 
case studies serve three distinctive roles in skills development, while establishing a forum for 
discussion and debate (Garvin, 2003; Yin, 2013). Case studies help to develop diagnostic skills 
within the world‟s fast-paced environment, to develop persuasive arguments, and to think and act 
in ways that are essential in becoming an effective corporate leader (Garvin, 2003). These points 
substantiate the validity of case study research in both an academic and industry-related context 
(see Section 2.3.1), supporting the overall means of justification for the structure of this 




This chapter highlights the importance of case study research methodology, proving that 
researchers, academics and industry professionals will derive broad-based value from exposure 
to this research method. Taken together, these points of motivation justify the overall structure of 
this dissertation as a case study, providing a new outlook on real-life IPO events and their 
associated literature.  
Chapter 3: A Critique of Academic Literature 
3:1 
 
Chapter 3: A Critique of Academic 
Literature - IPO Underpricing Theory and 
Valuing Unlisted Companies 
 
This chapter aims to address the pertinent issues surrounding IPO underpricing and valuing 
unlisted companies. It explores the academic literature surrounding these important topics, 
analyzing the relevant IPO underpricing theories, the valuation methods undertaken to value IPO 
firms and the effects of accounting data and firm-specific factors when valuing IPO firms.  
 
3.1 IPO Underpricing Theory 
 
3.1.1 IPO Underpricing in the Hong Kong Equity Market 
 
Chan, Wei and Wang (2001) and Qiao (2008) explored IPO underpricing in China and the Hong 
Kong Stock Exchange. 
 
Using a sample space of 570 A-share
1
 IPOs and 39 B-share
2
 IPOs in China over the 1993 to 
1998 period Chan, Wei and Wang (2001) investigated how institutional factors in the Chinese 
equity markets affected IPO underpricing. Their study found that the level of A-share IPO 
underpricing is positively related to the number of days between the IPO share offering and the 
actual listing date. Furthermore, they also observed an inverse relationship between A-share 
underpricing and the number of offer shares made available by the issuing firm. Interestingly, the 
                                                          
1 A-shares are shares in mainland China-based companies that are only available to mainland Chinese citizens. These shares trade on the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange only.  
2 B-shares are shares in mainland China-based companies that can be purchased by foreign investors. Foreign investors can only purchase these 
2 B-shares are shares in mainland China-based companies that can be purchased by foreign investors. Foreign investors can only purchase these 
shares by adhering to currency regulations. Shanghai B-shares can only be purchased for US dollar denominations while Shenzhen B-shares can 
only be purchased in Hong Kong dollar denominations. These shares are only available on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange respectively.  




study concluded that there is a direct positive relationship between underpricing and the number 
of investors originating from the location of the Chinese IPO company. 
Qiao (2008) specifically explored the Hong Kong equity market to analyze the time series 
properties of underpriced IPO shares and the associated initial sales volumes. The study used 
data from IPOs on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange between November 1999 and December 
2005. Qiao (2008) found that in the Hong Kong equity market, IPO underpricing is directly 
influenced by the level of underpricing undertaken by previous IPOs within industry.  In contrast 
to the findings of Chan, Wei and Wang (2001); Qiao (2008) revealed that there is a direct 
positive relationship between underpricing and the level of IPO shares offered in the Hong Kong 
equity market. This notion was supported by a further finding suggesting that the occurrence of 
industry IPOs is clustered. In light of this, to remain competitive, each IPO firm will 
intentionally underprice its offer shares in order to promote demand and meet the intended levels 
of raised capital required.   
 
3.1.2 Asymmetric Information Theory: The Winner‟s Curse 
 
Studies by Rock (1986), Allen and Faulhaber (1989), Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) and 
Ljungqvist (2004) suggested that new share issues are underpriced in order to guarantee that 
uninformed investors participate in the purchase of offer shares. 
 
Rock (1986) termed this theory „The Winner‟s Curse‟, whereby asymmetric information ensures 
that informed investors will bid on attractively priced IPOs. This means that uninformed 
investors will not receive an allocation of attractively priced IPO offer shares, and will be left to 
bid on unattractively priced IPOs.  Rock (1986) found that the „Winner‟s Curse‟ is exacerbated 
by an oversubscription of offer shares prior to the listing date. Demand from informed investors 
will ensure effective rationing of IPO shares, causing uninformed investors to adjust their 
valuation of new shares downwards. This encourages uninformed investors to withhold 
participation in the bid for offer shares until such a time that the offer price has fallen to 
compensate for the allocation bias towards informed investors.   
 
 




Should these uninformed investors continue to yield negative returns over time, then markets 
will fail to continue functioning smoothly. This is because there are not enough informed 
investors to account for all IPO offer shares available within the market.  Thus, accounting for 
exchange regulations and limit restrictions, the issuing firm needs to ensure that it keeps the best 
interests of its uninformed investors in mind. If not, this would mean that the equity issue would 
fail to generate the intended level of funding, and would contradict the intended capital structure 
goals of the firm.   
 
By exploring general IPO markets in the 1980‟s, Rock (1986) found that some investors are 
better informed about the true value of IPO offer shares than both investment banks and the 
issuing firm itself. This is based on the premise that the knowledge of all market agents 
combined exceeds the expertise of the firm itself and its investment bank.  Thus, the more 
uncertainty surrounding the true offer price of IPO shares the more advantageous it is for 
informed investors. This inferred that the issuing firm would have to compensate for this by 
attractively pricing these offer shares at a deep discount to encourage participation from typically 
uninformed investors.     
 
Contrary to Rock‟s (1986) „Winner‟s Curse‟ theory on adverse selection, Vong (n.d.) showed 
that the adverse selection theory is insufficient to explain IPO underpricing in the Hong Kong 
equity market.  This is because of the new IPO share allocation regulations implemented by the 
Securities and Futures Commission in Hong Kong (SEHK) which ensure a more favorable 
allocation of IPO shares to smaller investor pools.  What this means is that a clawback provision 
will mandate a transfer of offer shares to the public tranche of an IPO if the overall demand for 
the IPO is high. As such, the public investment tranche is increased and a greater number of 
uninformed investors will have the opportunity to purchase shares in the IPO.  
 
By analyzing 324 Hong Kong-based IPO companies listed on the HKEx over the 2002 to 2007 
period, Vong (n.d.) found that as a result of the SEHK clawback provision smaller investors hold 
a larger level of initial excess returns from Hong Kong IPOs. The clawback provision leads 
uninformed investors to signal their private knowledge surrounding the IPO through their level 
of demand for the offer shares. Vong (n.d.) stated that this helps IPO companies to effectively 




price their offer shares and reduces the overall level of IPO underpricing. At the same time this 
ensures a diverse allocation of offer shares which will improve the quality of the aftermarket. 
 
3.1.3 Asymmetric Information Theory: Underpricing as a Signal of Firm Quality 
 
The origins of IPO signaling theory stem from Ibbotson (1975). He studied risk and performance 
associated with US IPO stocks over the period 1960 to 1969. While this study aimed to measure 
initial share price performance from the offering date until the day it went public, a secondary 
objective was to test for departures from market efficiency.  Ibbotson (1975) suggested possible 
reasons for this IPO underpricing; namely that deliberate IPO underpricing would „leave a good 
taste in investors‟ mouths‟. Ibbotson (1975) believed that this would encourage attractively 
priced shares upon a future equity issue. However, he further established that this was in clear 
violation of the efficient market framework.  
 
Over time additional IPO underpricing theories from Allen and Faulhaber (1989), Grinblatt and 
Hwang (1989), Denning, Ferris and Wolfe (1992) and Welch (1996), amongst others, have been 
structured around this signaling concept.  
 
Allen and Faulhaber (1989) considered risk-neutral IPO‟s within a generalized market to infer 
their theory. In agreement with Ibbotson (1975), Allen and Faulhaber (1989) stated that a good 
firm will purposely underprice their offer shares to signal superior prospects in the future. 
Ljungqvist (2004) agreed with this premise, as good firms will be able to „suffer‟ the loss upfront 
and recoup it later, with the contrary being applicable to bad firms. However, in reaching this 
conclusion Allen and Faulhaber (1989) had assumed that the IPO firm holds superior knowledge 
to that of the total agents within the market.  
Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) developed a two-parameter signaling model consistent with 
Ibbotson (1975) to explain new issue underpricing. This generalized model was based on a three-
date world and did not focus on a specific exchange. This study drew on the same conclusion as 
Ljungqvist (2004) and is consistent with the theory behind Allen and Faulhaber‟s (1989) model. 
Therefore, by leaving money on the table the issuing firm is directly signaling firm quality. 
Furthermore, both Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) and Ljungqvist (2004) suggested that by 




involving reputable investment bankers, underwriters, auditors and venture capitalists this will 
also signal a firm‟s quality.  
 
Denning, Ferris and Wolfe (1992) examined the signaling nature of IPO underpricing using a 
sample of all US-listed IPOs up until 1985 and their activities ending 1988. Using levels of 
owner retention, existence of debt and underwriter prestige to determine expected firm quality 
Denning, Ferris and Wolfe (1992) showed that there is a strong relationship between IPO 
underpricing and seasoned equity offerings (SEO).They also found that strong levels of 
underpricing do not translate into greater earnings per share (EPS) for the IPO firm. These 
overall findings were consistent with Allen and Faulhaber (1989) showing that underpricing can 
be used as an effective means to signal firm quality. 
 
Welch (1996) presented an IPO signaling model addressing the relationship between firm 
quality, underpricing and seasoned equity offerings (SEO).  The model aimed to demonstrate 
that signaling of a firm‟s quality is influenced by more than solely the occurrence of IPO 
underpricing. Hence, Welch (1996) highlighted shortcomings in Allen and Faulhaber‟s (1989) 
model which assumed that a firm‟s quality is only established directly after the IPO. Therefore, 
Welch (1996) incorporated the possibility and overall effects of an SEO and other endogenous 
events on an IPO firm‟s quality in the near future. Welch‟s (1996) findings showed that high-
quality firms wait longer before undertaking an SEO, while firms will experience higher after-
market returns the sooner that they launch an SEO.  
 
Ljungqvist (2004) drew on the trend in key findings between these studies, arguing that they do 
not contradict each other. Instead, Ljungqvist (2004) found that the commonality between these 
signaling models is pertinent to a company‟s listing.  
3.1.4 Institutional Theory: Price Support  
 
This theory, also known as price stabilization, as described by Ljungqvist (2004), is a non-
deliberate occurrence of underpricing acted upon by underwriters. Should the issuing firm‟s 
share price fall below expectations, underwriters of the IPO firm will act to stabilize the price of 
the offer shares for a period after the IPO market activity.  Essentially these underwriters are 




naturally incentivized to raise the offer price as this will translate into higher commissions 
earned. 
 
The origins of price stabilization lay in Ruud‟s (1993) statistical interpretation to disprove that 
IPO underpricing is deliberate. Ruud (1993) used data from the Standard & Poor‟s Daily Stock 
Price Records for the American Stock Exchange, New York Stock Exchange and Over-the-
Counter stocks (OTC) to analyze 463 US IPOs over the 1982 to 1983 period. From this data 
Ruud (1993) made a key finding that while IPO shares are priced at expected market values, 
underwriter price support/stabilization may be required to prevent stock prices from falling 
below the original offer price. Hence, this significantly alters the distribution of initial IPO stock 
returns, whereby stock prices are allowed to rise (hence no stabilization) but are prevented from 
falling until all respective offer shares had been sold.  
 
Chowdhry and Nanda (1996) formalize the trade-off between underpricing and after-market 
price stabilization. They found that stabilization is superior to underpricing when compensating 
uninformed investors for the effects of „The Winner‟s Curse‟ as theorized by Rock (1986). 
Through the use of mathematical modeling Chowdhry and Nanda (1996) acknowledged the 
premise supporting price stabilization in agreement with Ruud (1993). Hence, they showed that 
deliberate underpricing benefits both informed and uninformed investors, while price 
stabilization only aids the latter. This mitigates „The Winner‟s Curse‟ altogether.  
 
Furthermore, Chowdhry and Nanda (1996) concluded that the stabilization process should only 
be undertaken by large reputable investment banks. This is because stabilization is based on 
actual results and not forecasts. Therefore, an investment bank‟s access to extensive funding and 
its ability to weather losses ensure that there is credibility in the stabilization process.  
Additionally, they also believed that it is a natural occurrence for larger offerings to experience 
greater amounts of IPO underpricing in general. This is because the loss capacities of IPO firms 
are not proportional to the size of the offering. Therefore, because the cost of increasing this loss 
capacity rises extensively with the size of the offering, the IPO firm purposefully lowers its offer 
price to compensate for a shorter stabilization period. 
 




Asquith, Jones and Kieschnick (1996) supported the conclusions of Chowdhry and Nanda (1996) 
and found that the cross-sectional distribution of early IPO returns are representative of both 
price stabilization and underpricing when a mixture distribution is used to represent the cross-
sectional distribution of early IPO returns. These key findings refute earlier IPO underpricing 
theories which suggested that IPO returns are drawn from a common distribution. Thus the study 
proved that a mixture of two normal distributions more accurately represents the cross-sectional 
distribution of early IPO returns. 
 
3.1.5 Ownership & Control Theories of IPO Underpricing  
 
When a private company launches its IPO it is essentially separating ownership and control of 
the company. By allowing public investors to invest in the company this creates a potential 
agency problem between the IPO firm‟s management team and these public shareholders. This 
being because there is a conflict of interest between management‟s business decisions and the 
shareholders wanting management to make decisions that will maximize company value. As a 
result, IPO companies artificially underprice their shares to address ownership and control issues. 
This can be to avoid or encourage monitoring from public shareholders. 
 
Booth and Chua (1996) explored why ownership dispersion encourages IPO underpricing and 
the consequential oversubscription of offer shares. They believed that by underpricing the offer 
shares this encourages excess demand and oversubscription of IPO shares. In turn, the end result 
is that this achieves a liquid secondary market for these shares.  The impact of Booth and Chua‟s 
(1996) findings is that the underpricing will cause a rise in information costs for the investor and 
promotes higher equilibrium underpricing overall. However, the benefit to the IPO firm is that 
the oversubscription and creation of a liquid secondary market will ensure that maximum 
proceeds are generated from the IPO.    
 
3.1.5.1 Underpricing as a Means to Retain Control  
 
Brennan and Franks (1997) explored data from 69 UK-based IPOs. This study found that 
artificial underpricing not only ensures an oversubscription of IPO shares, but also a rationing of 




these shares. This allows the IPO firm to discriminate against share applicants and ensures 
complete managerial control by avoiding monitoring from outside parties. 
 
A key finding of Brennan and Franks (1997) suggested that IPO firms act upon purposeful 
shareholder discrimination to encourage a greater amount of smaller share applicants. The pair 
has termed this the „Reduced Monitoring Hypothesis‟, as doing so reduces the amount of 
scrutiny placed on the IPO firm‟s management team. In addition, Brennan and Franks (1997) 
also confirmed that the intentions surrounding a reduction of IPO monitoring can be linked to the 
issuing firm only wanting to target investors which will prove to be complimentary to its future 
acquisitions.  
 
Ljungqvist (2004) argued that there is an intuitive flaw in Brennan and Franks‟s (1997) „Reduced 
Monitoring Hypothesis‟. Ljungqvist (2004) stated that management should rather seek to 
minimize their level of internal managerial control of the firm. This is because the artificial 
underpricing actually generates agency costs for the firm in the form of lower IPO proceeds and 
a lower market value for their shares.  This implied that unless the private benefits incurred from 
using underpricing as a means to retain control outweigh the inherent agency costs of not 
underpricing the offer shares, then it is counterintuitive for the IPO firm to underprice its offer 
shares based on this premise.  
 
3.1.5.2 Underpricing as a Means to Reduce Agency Costs 
 
Contrary to Brennan and Franks (1997), Stoughton and Zechner (1998) explored the effects of 
IPO mechanisms, share ownership structure and the consequential role of both underpricing and 
rationing in determining the spread of IPO investors. They used an adjusted financial model 
based on the model undertaken by Admati, Pfleiderer and Zechner (1994) to explore how IPO 
underpricing can be used to reduce agency costs and enhance the overall value of the IPO firm. 
Consequently, a key finding of Stoughton and Zechner (1998) stated that an IPO firm‟s 
investment banker will intentionally aim to optimally allot the offer shares in favor of large 
institutional investors. This will ensure greater monitoring of the firm‟s business decisions and 
management methods which will eliminate agency costs and are likely to be value-enhancing. 




Ljungqvist (2004) argued that regardless of Stoughton and Zechner‟s (1998) reasons for 
underpricing an IPO firm‟s offer shares, an absence of effective monitoring from shareholders 
will essentially increase the IPO firm‟s agency costs. This means that regardless, the IPO firm 
will need to underprice its shares to compensate investors for higher agency costs. This is 
because there will be uncertainty surrounding management‟s actions in creating and sustaining 
shareholder value.  
 
3.2 Valuing Unlisted Companies  
 
3.2.1 Valuation Methods Undertaken to Value IPO Firms  
 
Testing the reliability of the DCF model in estimating the market value of a firm, Kaplan and 
Ruback (1995) compared the market value of highly leveraged transactions (HLTs) to valuations 
derived from applying the DCF model. 
 
Using a data sample of 51 HLTs from the 1983 to 1989 period, Kaplan and Ruback (1995) found 
that the DCF model performs on par with the relative valuation approach. Based on their results, 
the median estimates of the DCF model were within 10% of the market value of the data sample.  
However, Kaplan and Ruback (1995) also found that the relative valuation approach adds 
explanatory power to the DCF model.  The impact of these findings led them to recommend that 
a combination of both models should be used to achieve the best overall estimation of a firm‟s 
intrinsic value.  
 
Berkman, Bradbury and Ferguson (2000) compared the accuracy of the DCF and the relative 
valuation methods in valuing IPO firms. This study explored the application of these valuation 
models in the thinly traded New Zealand equity market, using data from forty-five IPO firms 
over the 1989 to 1995 period. In doing so, Berkman, Bradbury and Ferguson (2000) performed 
these valuations without accounting for firm-specific factors such as industry competitors or the 
risk and growth prospects of the IPO firm.  This was partially because the study was limited to a 
thinly traded market, preventing them from finding suitable comparable firms.  
 




Berkman, Bradbury and Ferguson (2000) suggested that there were fundamental errors in Kaplan 
and Ruback‟s (1995) study.  Firstly, they stated that because the operating cash flows of HLTs 
are stable, there was bias in the study‟s results. Furthermore, they also revealed that Kaplan and 
Ruback (1995) limited their DCF model by valuing the firm as a whole and not just valuing the 
equity component. Most importantly, Berkman, Bradbury and Ferguson (2000) stated that a 
fundamental error in Kaplan and Ruback‟s (1995) model was that they calculated the terminal 
value‟s cash flows and growth rates independently from each other. This is incorrect because 
both the cash flows and growth rates associated with the terminal value are dependent on the 
level of cash flow retention in the terminal year. 
 
By comparing their results to the actual market prices of the IPOs Berkman, Bradbury and 
Ferguson (2000) showed that both the DCF and relative valuation methods have a median 
absolute variation of approximately 20%.  They also discovered that industry-based valuations 
generate larger valuation errors, suggesting that market-based valuations are the most accurate 
measures to value an IPO firm overall.  On this notion, they concluded that by choosing a set of 
comparable firms to estimate betas or earnings multiples in thinly traded markets, these proxy 
variables can enhance a valuation model overall. 
 
In a similar light to Berkman, Bradbury and Ferguson‟s (2000) study, Demirakos, Strong and 
Walker (2004) aimed to determine whether choosing to use the relative valuation model or DCF 
model affected the forecast accuracy of target prices issued by investment analysts when 
controlling for influential factors.  By analyzing the predictive performance of these valuation 
models, Demirakos, Strong and Walker (2004) used two measures of target price accuracy and 
two measures of forecast error to deduce if there were significant differences in the valuation 
outcomes achieved by both models. By analyzing data from a sample of 490 UK-based equity 
research reports over the July 2002 to June 2004 period, their findings showed that analysts tend 
to primarily use the DCF model for smaller firms, high-risk firms, loss-making firms, firms with 
largely negative or positive sales growth and for firms which have a limited number of industry 
competitors. Without adjusting for these factors, they found that the relative valuation model 
outperforms the DCF model. However, after adjusting for these factors the opposite was true.   
 




Continuing the studies of Berkman, Bradbury and Ferguson (2000) as well as Demirakos, Strong 
and Walker (2004); Gelman (2006) used both a relative valuation and DCF analysis to 
investigate reasons for IPO underpricing and recreate the pre-IPO valuation process of 
investment banks. This study aimed to deduce which valuation method would yield the most 
accurate reflection of an IPO firm‟s share price one-month after listing.  Using a sample of forty-
one small cap IPO firms on the US-based Russell 2000 Index for the 2005 year, Gelman (2006) 
conducted a relative valuation and DCF analysis on both the top two and bottom two performing 
IPOs within the sample.  
 
Gelman‟s (2006) findings showed that in terms of the relative valuation, the price-earnings (P/E) 
multiple provides the best indication of an IPO firm‟s share price one month after listing. 
Gelman‟s (2006) second observation suggested that enterprise value-to-revenue (EV/R) is the 
second most useful multiple because it is suitable for IPO firms with negative earnings. After 
applying the DCF model, Gelman (2006) found that the performance of the model is highly 
dependent on the level of mispricing in the market. Gelman (2006) found that the DCF method 
significantly overvalues IPO firms when compared to a relative valuation. This was proven by a 
sensitivity analysis that showed the most accurate results were only achieved when applying the 
highest discount rate and the lowest EBITDA multiple suitable to each IPO firm. 
 
However, contradictory to her previous findings, Gelman (2006) found that when valuing the 
two most overpriced IPO shares in the sample, the combined use of the P/E multiple, EV/R  
multiple and the DCF model significantly improved the overall value placed on these IPO firms.  
 
Gelman‟s (2006) application of the relative valuation model and DCF model left less money on 
the table than what actually occurred in the 2005 year. Nonetheless, when valuing the two most 
accurately priced IPO firms in the sample, the performance of the underwriters could not be 
matched. This led Gelman (2006) to conclude that underwriters possess private qualitative 
outside information which causes them to price these IPO firms more accurately than others. 
 
Extending on Demirakos, Strong and Walker (2004) and Gelman‟s (2006) findings, 
Roosenboom (2007) incorporated firm-specific factors and aggregate stock market conditions to 




investigate how French underwriters valued IPO companies. This study aimed to investigate how 
underwriters select their IPO valuation methods, how these methods are combined to arrive at a 
fair value estimate for the IPO and how these underwriters set preliminary offer prices based on 
these fair value estimates.  By reviewing 228 market reports compiled by French underwriters 
and how they valued IPO stock listings on the Euronext Paris over the 1990 to 1999 period, 
Roosenboom (2007) found that underwriters typically conducted a multiples analysis to value 
these IPO firms. This was especially pertinent to technology firms, firms experiencing rapid 
growth and profitable firms.   
 
However, Roosenboom (2007) found that this changed according to the level of aggregate stock 
market returns and status of the stock market in general. It was evident that the DCF model and 
economic value add (EVA) model was frequently used when aggregate stock market returns 
were high or when the aggregate stock market was relatively volatile. This was because high 
aggregate market returns provided a window of opportunity for investors to purchase stock, 
placing greater reliance on the assumptions surrounding the DCF and EVA models. On the other 
hand, when the aggregate stock market was volatile the DCF and EVA models provided 
sufficient fundamental information required by investors at that time.  
 
Roosenboom (2007) extended his findings to the dividend discount model (DDM) which was 
observed to be the preferred valuation method when aggregate market returns were low.  The 
DDM model was also the preferred valuation method used by older firms in mature industries 
that typically planned to pay out large future dividends.  
 
Contrary to the findings of Demirakos, Strong and Walker (2004) and Roosenboom (2007); 
Deloof, De Maeseneire and Inghelbrecht (2009) found that the DCF model is the most popularly 
used valuation tool by investment banks when valuing IPOs. Deloof, De Maeseneire and 
Inghelbrecht (2009) extended Roosenboom‟s (2007) study by offering empirical evidence on the 
accuracy and bias of the implemented valuation methods. By analyzing 49 IPOs on the Euronext 
Brussels exchange over the 1993 to 2001 period, they investigated the valuation and pricing 
methods undertaken by investment banks when valuing IPOs.  
 




They found that the DCF model achieves an unbiased estimate of the IPO firm‟s intrinsic value 
when compared to other valuation methods. This was while the DCF, DDM and relative 
valuation methods all yielded similar accuracy levels when they were used to value the same IPO 
firm. This means that the DCF model is on an equal par with relative valuation models when 
valuing IPO firms. Deloof, De Maeseneire and Inghelbrecht (2009) predominantly attributed the 
higher adoption rate of the DCF model to to the lack of comparable competitors for IPO firms. 
They believed that this incentivizes investment banks to place greater importance on the DCF 
model and to pursue this model as an alternative valuation tool to a multiples analysis.  
Additionally Deloof, De Maeseneire and Inghelbrecht (2009) also found that the quality and 
objectives of the IPO firm‟s prospectus play a contributing factor in the valuation method 
undertaken by investment banks. 
 
3.2.2 The Effect of Accounting Data and Firm-Specific Factors when Valuing IPO Firms 
 
Kim and Ritter (1998) challenged the widely recommended notion that accounting information 
must be used in conjunction with comparable firm multiples to value IPOs. This study 
questioned the usefulness of the approach, claiming that it was standard practice in both an 
academic and industry context.  
 
Using a data sample of 190 domestic IPOs over the 1992 to 1993 period, Kim and Ritter (1998) 
priced these IPOs by comparing them to firms with comparable operating and financial 
performance history. In doing so, it was evident that the multiples of comparable firms were 
typically higher than the IPO firm. This was because of the contrasted use of market prices for 
comparable firms and offer prices for the IPO firm.  
 
Based on the results of their findings, Kim and Ritter (1998) deduced that historical data has an 
intrinsic limitation when valuing  an IPO firm by comparing the price-to-earnings (P/E), price-to-
sales (P/S), enterprise value-to-sales (EV/S) and enterprise value-to-operating cash flow (EV/CF) 
multiples. Their reason for this was because historical accounting data does not necessarily 
reflect the IPO firm‟s future performance. As a result, Kim and Ritter (1998) recommended that 
using earnings forecasts will considerably improve the overall accuracy of the valuation. 




This finding was supported by Deloof, De Maeseneire and Inghelbrecht‟s (2009) whereby they 
too concluded that the P/E and P/CF multiples will yield a more accurate result if one uses one-
year forecasted estimates in their model as opposed to using  accounting data of the IPO firm. 
However, the discrepancies between Kim and Ritter (1998) and Deloof, De Maeseneire and 
Inghelbrecht‟s (2009) models are that Kim and Ritter (1998) used actual academic estimates to 
support their findings whereas Deloof, De Maeseneire and Inghelbrecht (2009) used real industry 
estimations. Furthermore, Kim and Ritter (1998) generically applied the same valuation 
multiples across all industries. This meant that there was potential bias in their study as some 
industries would have placed greater emphasis on specific variables more so than others. 
 
Kim and Ritter (1998) also found that one should place great importance in adjusting for 
different profitability and growth factors between the comparable firm and the IPO firm. This is 
because these factors account for the specific attributes of the IPO firm, preventing relevant 
information from being ignored.   
 
Juxtaposed to Kim and Ritter (1998) and Deloof, De Maeseneire and Inghelbrecht‟s  (2009) 
findings; Beatty, Riffe and Thompson (2000) found that by combining accounting data with 
market characteristics this explains approximately 80% of  IPO offer prices. This was 
specifically in relation to accounting book value, revenue and earnings. By conducting a 
regression analysis on 2,577 US IPO firms, Beatty, Riffe and Thompson (2000) found that the 
explanatory power of their model was highly dependent on the design and form of the model. 
Accompanied by this, they also found that by incorporating economic factors such as the 
percentage ownership retained, market conditions and time factors this significantly increased 
the explanatory power of the model. 
 
Beatty, Riffe and Thompson (2000) extended their research to investigate the role of accounting 
information in determining the average filing price in the preliminary IPO prospectus. 
Furthermore, they explored the interrelationship between incorporating accounting data into the 
filing and offer prices of an IPO firm and how this affected first day stock returns.  In this 
context Beatty, Riffe and Thompson (2000) found that contrary to their expectations, accounting 
information plays a more prominent role in determining an IPO company‟s filing price and not 




the offer price. This means that when determining the filing price of its stock, IPO underwriters 
consider all accounting information and not just certain variables. Therefore, as per Gelman 
(2006) when determining the final IPO offer price all adjustments made by underwriters will 
encompass other private qualitative data.  
 
To test the effect of these findings on the first day stock returns of IPO firms Beatty, Riffe and 
Thompson (2000) found that by using the standard deviation of IPO returns as a proxy for risk; 
earnings, book value and revenues were strongly negatively correlated.  They also found that 
after adjusting for risk, market conditions and other residuals the IPO firm‟s earnings and book 
value assisted in explaining the first day IPO stock returns. This finding inferred that as an 
investor, accounting information is not actually fully considered when determining the offer 
price of an IPO company.   
 
Addressing Deloof, De Maeseneire and Inghelbrecht‟s (2009) comments surrounding a lack of 
comparable competitors for IPO firms, Bhojraj and Lee (2002) developed a systematic approach 
in selecting suitable comparable firms when valuing unlisted companies.  
 
While Bhojraj and Lee (2002) recognized that relative valuations are cost-effective and time-
efficient, they also recognized that valuation multiples fail to capture firm-specific information 
when choosing a suitable comparable firm. In response, they developed „warranted multiples‟ for 
each firm, compensating for information loss within these variables by incorporating the effects 
of cross-sectional variations in a firm‟s growth, profitability and risk characteristics. This 
allowed for the IPO company‟s potential comparable firms to be ranked in accordance to the 
overall similarities between the two companies. Furthermore, it provided a more objective 
method to identify comparable companies.  
By forecasting the enterprise value-to-sales (EVS) and price-to-book (P/B) multiple of 
comparable firms for a one to three-year period ahead, Bhojraj and Lee (2002) found that the 
warranted multiples approach significantly improves the outcomes of the traditional relative 
valuation model. This was especially prominent amongst stocks in the technology, biotechnology 
and telecommunication industries. As key findings of this study, Bhojraj and Lee (2002) found 
that the effectiveness of the warranted multiples approach was most prominent when valuing 




private and IPO firms.  In support of Kim and Ritter (1998) and Beatty, Riffe and Thompson 
(2000) they also found that an industry-based approach with firm-specific adjustments is most 
effective in capturing the true essence of valuation theory. Furthermore, while it is not possible 
to use historical „lagged‟ multiples for private and IPO firms, Bhojraj and Lee (2002) found that 
a company‟s own lagged multiples yield the greatest amount of explanatory power for the value 
of its current multiples. 
 
In the same manner, Koop and Li (2001) analyzed and assessed the potential roles of explanatory 
variables when valuing an IPO firm. To do this, they examined the pricing of IPO and seasoned 
equity offerings (SEO) firms using a stochastic frontier model.  This ensured that Koop and Li 
(2001) could effectively capture mispricing in the market by modeling the differences between 
both the maximum possible value of the IPO firm and the actual value at the time of the offering 
as a function of observable firm characteristics.  Based on a data sample of 2,969 IPO firms and 
3,771 SEO firms between 1985 and 1998, Koop and Li (2001) found that the market 
capitalization of IPO and SEO firms was positively related to net income, revenue, total assets 
and underwriter fees. The opposite was true in relation to debt levels. They also found that in the 
computer, communications, electronic equipment, scientific instrument and chemical product 
industries that firms with higher earnings potential had naturally higher valuations overall.  
 
Supporting the findings of Kim and Ritter (1998), Beatty, Riffe and Thompson (2000) and 
Bhojraj and Lee (2002); Koop and Li (2001) showed that accounting data such as profitability, 
the level of firm operations and company risk have large explanatory power when valuing IPO 
firms. They also established that underwriter reputation and windows of opportunity are not 
significant explanatory variables when valuing IPO and SEO firms.   
 
Bhagat and Rangan (2004) expanded on prior academic literature, examining the effects of 
income, sales, book equity, growth opportunities, insider retention and investment banker 
prestige on IPO firm value. In doing so, they apportioned a sample of 1,655 IPOs into three 
respective time periods.  
 
 




In an effort to determine data trends in IPO valuation methodologies prior to the Dotcom bubble, 
during its boom period and during the Dotcom crash; Bhagat and Rangan (2004) analyzed the 
periods dating 1986 to 1990, January 1997 to March 2000 and April 2000 to December 2001. 
 
A key finding of Bhagat and Rangan „s (2004) research showed that when they applied a set of 
IPO fundamentals to the various time periods under review, there was no statistical difference in 
their results. The only major difference between the time periods was that the influence of the 
income and sales variables changed according to the status of the markets. This was observed 
during the January 1997 to March 2000 boom period when results showed that a greater 
weighting was placed on income over sales when compared to the 1986 to 1990 period.  
 
Interpreting their results further, Bhagat and Rangan (2004) also found that by controlling these 
variables technology companies actually received a lower valuation than non-technology firms. 
This was while technology firms placed a greater weighting on income and insider retention. 
Contrastingly, when Bhagat and Rangan (2004) categorized these technology firms into internet 
and non-internet firms they found that there was no actual valuation difference between the two 
classes. However, here internet firms placed greater weighting on insider retention and 
investment banker prestige when compared with non-internet firms. 
 
It is clear that there are numerous theories supporting the rationale behind IPO underpricing in 
the market. It was revealed that there are unique underpricing trends in the Hong Kong equity 
market, while the SEHK IPO share allocation regulations nullify the effects of the „Winner‟s 
Curse‟ asymmetric information theory in the Hong Kong market altogether.  It was further 
suggested that within different markets analysts are inclined to favor using the DCF model, 
relative valuation model or a combination of both when valuing IPO firms. This choice is 
influenced by firm-specific and accounting data inputs that significantly affect the accuracy of 
these valuation models. These topics are explored throughout the remainder of this case study. 
 
 




3.3 Relevance of Academic Literature to the Tencent IPO Case 
 
3.3.1 IPO Underpricing Theories  
 
By highlighting the extensive theories of IPO underpricing, Section 3.1 proves that there are 
many potential means to which IPO underpricing may occur. Keeping in mind that while all IPO 
firms may not leave money on the table, the Tencent IPO effectively presents a compelling case 
to test these theories by applying them to a real-life IPO event. The uniqueness of the Tencent 
IPO over other IPO cases is not only its historical significance. Instead, it is the contextual 
background of Tencent‟s IPO, as a rising internet and telecommunications value-added service 
provider pre, during and post the Dotcom Bubble within the Chinese and Hong Kong financial 
markets.  
 
This context creates value in the case as it explores common IPO underpricing theories and tests 
the suitability of these theories to IPOs in China and Hong Kong. Section 3.1.1 shows that while 
asymmetric information theories, institutional theories as well as ownership and control theories 
of IPO underpricing are tested in Western IPO markets, there is little application to Asian 
markets (see Section 3.1.3, 3.1.4 and 3.1.5). Furthermore Chan, Wei and Wang (2001), Qiao 
(2008) and Vong (n.d.) have theorised the cause and effects of IPO underpricing in China and 
Hong Kong (see Section 3.1.1 and 3.1.2). This case study allows one to test these theories for 
similarities or differences when applied to the Tencent IPO. 
 
The structure of the case (see Section 1.2) ensures that this theoretical framework surrounding 
IPO underpricing is coherently explored. As such, the holistic nature of the case establishes the 
ability to interpret and modify existing theories on IPO underpricing, and to compliment and 
create new IPO underpricing theory.  
 
It ensures that one is able to assess the Tencent IPO in the same nature as Chan, Wei and Wang 
(2001) to investigate contributory underpricing factors in Chinese equity markets; Qiao (2008) in 
finding that a direct positive relationship exists between underpricing and number of shares on 
offer, that IPOs in the Hong Kong equity market are influenced by previous levels of 




underpricing and are typically clustered; and Vong (n.d.) who, aside from finding evidence of 
underpricing, discovered that HKEx regulations ensure equal distribution of IPO offer shares in 
this market. 
 
In this same way the practical assessment characteristics of the Tencent IPO case allows for one 
to explore the more commonly accepted IPO underpricing theories of Rock‟s (1986) „Winner‟s 
Curse‟, Ibbotson‟s (1975) signalling theory of IPO underpricing, Ruud‟s (1993) theory of price 
stabilization and ownership and control theories explored by Booth and Chua (1996), Brennan 
and Franks (1997) and Stoughton and Zechner (1998). 
 
 The same applies to the theoretical findings that supplement this existing theoretical framework. 
These include Allen and Faulhaber (1989), Grinblatt and Hwang (1989), Denning, Ferris and 
Wolfe (1992), Welch (1996), Chowdhry and Nanda (1996), Asquith, Jones and Kieschnick 
(1996) and Ljungqvist (2004). 
 
3.3.2 Valuing Unlisted Companies 
Academic literature shows that the valuation methods undertaken to value an IPO firm is a 
contentious issue in finance. As per Section 3.2.1, academic literature theorises around the 
choice between the discounted cash flow (DCF) and the relative valuation as the most 
appropriate means to valuing an IPO firm. Section 3.2.2 compliments these theories, in which 
additional academic literature theorises around the importance of accounting data and firm-
specific factors when undertaking an IPO valuation.  
 
3. 3.2.1 Valuation Methods Undertaken to Value IPO Firms 
 
The origin of this debate lies in the true essence of what an IPO represents – the first time a 
company offers its stock via a public exchange. Taking this into account, an IPO firm‟s lack of 
public market exposure creates inherent challenges when trying to assess the value of the IPO 
firm before it goes public.  
 
 




This case study has been structured with the approach to ensure that these valuation theories are 
directly tested. By constructing a case around Tencent, this level of rich insight and detailed 
information provides an effective platform for one to directly assess the validity of these 
valuation theories within the context of the Tencent IPO. 
 
Consequently, Chapter 6 illustrates the implementation of these valuation methodologies in 
achieving an overall price for Tencent‟s offer shares. 
 
This case study therefore directly explores the valuation theories of Kaplan and Ruback (1995), 
Berkman, Bradbury and Ferguson (2000), Demirakos, Strong and Walker (2004), Gelman 
(2006), Roosenboom (2007) and Deloof, De Maeseneire and Inghelbrecht (2009).  
 
In exploring this theoretical framework, the case addresses the various findings of the respective 
literature through the combined use of both the relative valuation and discounted cash flow 
(DCF) valuation methodologies (see Section 1.2.5). This is because while some valuation 
theories suggest both methodologies yield consistent results, others favor the relative valuation 
and vice-versa. This was particularly relevant in Demirakos, Strong and Walker‟s (2004) finding 
that the outperformance of the DCF model versus the relative valuation model was highly 
dependent on whether firm-specific factors were accounted for.  
 
As put forth by Deloof, De Maeseneire and Inghelbrecht (2009), investment banks typically 
favored the DCF model when valuing IPO firms. However, in order to ensure the correct 
application of the DCF valuation method, certain valuation data is required. Considering Tencent 
was an IPO firm lacking market exposure, the best approach to ensuring a cohesive and 
insightful valuation was to incorporate a relative valuation into Chapter 6. This approach was 
further supported by Gelman‟s (2007) theory that the relative valuation forms a complimentary 
relationship with the DCF model.  
 
In doing so, this draws on Berkman, Bradbury and Ferguson‟s (2000) study emphasising the 
advantages of proxy variables in enhancing a valuation model. In determining a method to find 
suitable proxy variables, the case uses Roosenboom‟s (2007) findings as stimulus to pursue a 




multiples analysis. This being because Tencent met all three of Roosenboom‟s (2007) conditions 
as a technology firm, a profitable firm or a firm experiencing rapid growth.  
 
At the same time, this approach tested the accuracy of DCF and relative valuation models, 
testing the theories imposed by Kaplan and Ruback (1995) and Deloof, De Maeseneire and 
Inghelbrecht (2009) that the performance of these models were on par; while Berkman, Bradbury 
and Ferguson (2000) disagreed. 
 
3. 3.2.2 Accounting Data and Firm-Specific Factors 
 
Theories surrounding accounting data and firm-specific factors when valuing IPO firms are 
explored extensively throughout this case study. Taking into account the nature of the case study 
research method (see Chapter 2) combined with the points illustrated in section 3.3.2.1 above, it 
is clear that Tencent‟s accounting data and firm-specific factors are thoroughly considered and 
applied throughout the case.  
 
This is particularly relevant in terms of the complex valuation undertaken in Chapter 6. Herewith 
the theories of Kim and Ritter (1998), Deloof, De Maeseneire and Inghelbrecht (2009), Beatty, 
Riffe and Thompson (2000), Bhojraj and Lee (2002), Koop and Li (2001) and Bhagat and 
Rangan (2004) provide a theoretical framework throughout this chapter.     
 
As theorised by of Bhojraj and Lee (2002), Section 6.1 ranks Tencent‟s potential comparable 
firms according to similarities in growth, profitability and risk characteristics (this is summarised 
in Table 6.7 of Section 6.1.8). This objective assessment method was further supported by Kim 
and Ritter (1998), Beatty, Riffe and Thompson (2000) and Koop and Li (2001) because this 
firm-specific information and accounting data has large explanatory power. This explanatory 








Section 6.2 builds on this approach, accounting for the suitability of certain valuation multiples 
in the context of Tencent‟s IPO. This section specifically adjusts for differences in probability 
and growth factors of Tencent‟s most comparable firm, as suggested by Kim and Ritter (1998). 




It is clear that there are numerous academic theories surrounding IPO underpricing, valuing an 
IPO and the effects of accounting data and firm-specific factors when valuing IPOs. This 
establishes a theoretical framework on which this dissertation is based. All of these topics of 
relevancy are consistently explored throughout by applying them to the real-life contextual case.  
As such, this dissertation has been structured to compliment and contribute to this theoretical 
framework.  
 
Chapter 4: The Case 
4:1 
 
Chapter 4:  Tencent Holdings Limited - The 
Case         
 
"When we were a small company, we needed to stand on the shoulders of giants to grow up… but 
copying others can't make you great. So the key is how to localize a great idea and create 
domestic innovation.” – Ma Huateng,  




It was 7 June 2004. Tencent Holdings Limited (Tencent) had just received approval, in principal, 
for an application to the Listing Committee of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKEx). Just less 
than six years ago, on 11 November 1998, Tencent Computer System Co (Tencent Computer) 
was founded by Ma Huateng (Pony Ma) with the help of his high school friend Zhang Zhidong, 
in Shenzhen, Guangdong, People‟s Republic of China (PRC).  
 
Tencent Computer was a limited liability company founded on 500, 000 RMB of registered 
capital. This registered capital constituted of 300, 000 RMB (60%) contributed from Ma 
Huateng‟s mother, Huang Huiqing, and 200, 000 RMB (40%) from Zhao Yonglin. Subsequent 
movements in the capital allocation of both Huiqing and Yonglin resulted in five core founders 
of Tencent Computer: Ma Huateng (47.5%), Zhang Zhidong (20%), Zeng Liqing (12.5%), Xu 
Chenye (10%) and Chen Yidan (10%).
4
 At this time, the five core founders proportionally 
increased the total registered capital of Tencent Computer to 1, 000,000 RMB. 
 
                                                          
3 Wang, X. 2009. A Mysterious Message Millionaire. Available: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2009-01/12/content_7388202.htm [2014, 
March 24]. 
 
4  Huang Huiqing transferred her 300, 000 RMB contribution to the following shareholders: 
   Ma Huateng – 112,500 RMB 
   Zeng Liqing – 62,500 RMB 
 
   Zhao Yonglin transferred his 200, 000 RMB contribution to the following shareholders: 
   Zhang Zidong – 100,000 RMB 
   Xu Chenye – 50,000 RMB 
   Chen Yidan – 50,000 RMB 
Chapter 4: The Case 
4:2 
 
It was not Ma Huateng‟s initial intention to establish what has commonly come to be known as 
Tencent. His core vision was to create and develop an instant messaging internet service for the 
Chinese market that would later be sold off to large corporate companies. After profiting from 
this venture, Ma Huateng did not foresee future growth potential for the firm itself and aimed to 
return to his corporate job. Ma approached four companies with his prototype, but none of them 
had confidence in him or the appeal, longevity and feasibility of the concept. As explained by 





Ironically, at the time of showcasing his concept, Ma Huateng approached current industry rival 
TOM.com as well as his previous employer China Motion.  Their rejections would lead to the 
development of China‟s leading provider of internet (IVAS) and mobile (MVAS) value-added 
services and its groundbreaking QQ instant messenger.   
 
4.1 Product and Service Offerings 
 
4.1.1 OICQ (QQ) Instant Messenger 
 
As a small company focusing on value–added software and systems integration services, Tencent 
first introduced its QQ instant messaging service, QQ99 beta build 0210 in the PRC on 10 
February 1999. The initial build of this instant messaging service was marketed as the „internet 
pager‟ or „buddy list‟, being the first of its kind in the Eastern market. QQ99 beta build 0210 
marked the first time that users were able to concurrently monitor other users‟ online presence, 
while communicating with each other in real-time. This earmarked the beginning of a 
revolutionary development in next generation commercial and personal communication software 
in Asia. 
 
The original concept for the QQ instant messaging service originated in 1996 from Israeli 
messaging solutions provider, Mirabilis Ltd (Mirabilis). Four young Israeli college students Yair 
                                                          
5 Sherman, S. & Westland, C. 2010. Red Wired: China‟s Internet Revolution. Available: 
http://books.google.co.za/books?id=vbqIAAAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false [2014, 
February 28]. 
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Goldfinger, Arik Vardi, Sefi Vigiser and Amnon Amir developed original software named ICQ 
(I Seek You).
6
  Two years later on 5 June 1998, America Online (AOL) purchased 100% of 




Considering the popularity and success of both the ICQ brand and concept in the United States of 
America and United Kingdom, both Ma Huateng and Zhang Zhidong took it upon themselves to 
develop a replica instant messaging platform known as OICQ (Open ICQ).  After AOL filed a 
complaint against Tencent, a court ruling in favor of AOL forced Ma Huateng to rebrand OICQ 




At this time, Ma Huateng approached prospective Chinese investors to invest in Tencent‟s QQ 
offering. However, this was to no avail. Resultantly, he released QQ into the Chinese market as a 
freeware offering. By May 2000 the service achieved a company milestone with 100 000 
simultaneous online QQ users (see Appendix A, Exhibit 3).  
 
Tencent continued to solidify its dominance in China‟s instant messaging marketspace. Over the 
next four years leading up to the official IPO listing date, Tencent introduced a variety of 
software updates and value-added services integral to the success of the QQ brand. This led to 
exponential growth in its QQ user base over this period (see Appendix A, Exhibit 3). 
 
November 2000 saw the official launch of Tencent‟s QQ2000 instant messaging platform. This 
version of QQ marked the introduction of e-commerce into the QQ platform by encompassing 
new features. These features include a web-based browser named Tencent Explorer, a news 
panel and the ability for one to change their QQ SKIN. The introduction of QQ 2000 solidified 
Tencent‟s position in the instant messaging market space even further, which by February 2001 




                                                          
6 Britannica. 2014. ICQ (Software). Encyclopedia Britannica.Available: http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1472953/ICQ [2014, March 
27].  
7 Hansell, S. 1998. America Online to Buy Internet Chat Service for $287 Million. The New York Times. Available: 
http://www.nytimes.com/1998/06/09/business/america-online-to-buy-internet-chat-service-for-287-million.html [2014, March 27]. 
8 National Aribtration Forum. 2000. American Online, Inc (Complainant) vs. Tencent Communications Corp (Respondent).Available: 
http://www.adrforum.com/domains/decisions/93668.htm [2014, March 24]. 
9 Tencent. 2001c. Tencent QQ awarded “Editor‟s choice” by Personal Computer magazine. Available: http://www.tencent.com/en-
us/at/pr/detail.shtml?id=at_2001_200102 [2014, March 24]. 
Chapter 4: The Case 
4:4 
 
One month later Tencent licensed the exclusive right to develop QQ branded products to 
Guangzhou Donice. This manufacturing and distribution company specialized in product 
development and international distribution of garments, souvenirs, toys and other products; 
ensuring retail exposure of the QQ brand in more than 20 countries.  
 
With added emphasis on existing and new value-added services, Tencent replaced and 
introduced a newly designed QQ membership card in May 2002. The rationale behind this 
decision was to encourage and promote users to adopt and purchase these value-added service 
offerings. To leverage this rollout initiative Tencent reached a cooperation agreement with 
Beijing Federal Software Co. Ltd. (Federal Software) as the sole agent for the supply of the new 
Tencent QQ card in China. Federal Software‟s market dominance and experience in software 
product marketing ensured the most effective means of availability for Chinese consumers. 
 
In an effort to build on its reputation Tencent introduced Tencent Messenger (TM) in December 
2003. The rationale behind Tencent Messenger was to provide a platform for internet users to 
communicate online with friends under an office environment. This platform deemphasized 
entertainment and recreation, focusing on QQ‟s primary software features and adapting them to 
be directly suitable and complimentary to a business environment.  
 
In the year of its IPO, Tencent released two updated versions of the QQ instant messenger 
platform, QQ2003III and QQ2004. While QQ2003III saw minor updates and changes to the 
platform, eight days prior to the IPO listing date Tencent released QQ2004 as a final push at the 
instant messaging market before going public.  
 
QQ2004 revolutionized Tencent‟s internet value-added service (IVAS) offerings, setting 
precedent for both local and international instant messaging (IM) competitors. With a focus on 
user experience QQ2004 emphasized usability, simplicity and practicality in its operative 
capacity. This updated version enhanced the QQ user experience by focusing on Tencent‟s 




                                                          
10 Tencent. 2004c. Interim Results: 2004. Available: http://www.tencent.com/en-us/content/ir/rp/2004/attachments/200401.pdf [2014, July 22].   
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4.1.2 Mobile Value-Added Services (MVAS) 
 
In April 1999 Tencent unveiled its mobile email service. An effective, fully operable email client 
allowed mobile users to fully access and operate their email accounts on their phones for the first 
time. This service enabled mobile phone users to send/receive emails and communicate with 





The launch of this service marked the beginning of a long-lasting partnership between Tencent 
and the Shenzhen division of Chinese mobile provider China Unicom (Shenzhen Unicom). In 
keeping up to date with industry changes, Tencent acted on this newly formed business 
relationship through the release of TIMS 2.0. TIMS 2.0 supported the change from pagers to 
mobile handsets through the release of the STK 2
nd
 generation SIM card. TIMS 2.0 enabled a 
QQ-GSM two-way communication for mobile phone users, making it possible for mobile phone 




As the Chinese pager market began to decline, Tencent and Shenzhen Unicom capitalized on the 
mobile phone market. This saw the introduction of Tencent‟s new mobile communications 
service Mobile QQ on International Telecom Day. As of 17 May 2000 Mobile QQ enabled 
mobile phone users to communicate with PC-based QQ users via Short Message Service (SMS) 
text messaging.  
 
By keeping up with this technological progression, Tencent‟s MVAS division became the 
company‟s primary revenue contributor. This collective effort also saw Tencent and China 
Unicom derive synergistic value from Mobile QQ. Herewith Tencent was the largest instant 
communications service provider in Asia with more than 10 million users. This was while China 
Unicom was regarded as the second largest telecom enterprise in the PRC, with more than 10 
million users in the PRC and more than 300,000 in Shenzhen alone.  
 
                                                          
11 Tencent. 2001a. Tencent launched email value-added service system in cooperation with SINET.Available: http://www.tencent.com/en-
us/at/pr/detail.shtml?id=at_2001_199907 [2014, March 24]. 
12 Tencent. 2001a. Tencent launched mobile email service in cooperation with Shenzhen Unicom.Available: http://www.tencent.com/en-
us/at/pr/detail.shtml?id=at_2001_199904 [2014, March 24]. 
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By April 2001 Mobile QQ was licensed to almost twenty mobile operators, including Beijing 
Mobile, Guangdong Mobile, Guangdong Unicom, Shanghai Mobile, Shanghai Unicom, 
Shenzhen Unicom and Zhejiang Unicom. During this time QQ featured its latest value-added 
service, QQ Club. Tencent termed the service to be „from the cyber users and for the cyber users‟ 
boasting a strong selection of resource-consuming services.
13
 This included faster speeds, more 
stable services, greater discounts and more comprehensive functions. 
 
4.1.3 Internet Value-Added Services (IVAS) 
 
In an effort to penetrate into the PC-based market space, Tencent jointly launched its email 
value-added service system with China‟s Science Information NETwork (SINET) in July 1999. 
In partnership with the Shenzhen Telecommunication Bureau (Shenzhen Telecom), both 
companies jointly implemented the SINET email service solely on a trial-basis. With its core 
focus on dial-up clients of internet service providers (ISP) this system enabled dial-up users to 
receive e-mail notifications, set up user-defined rules and show emails via the user‟s mobile 




Less than one year later, Tencent continued to build on its momentum in the value-added 
services market with the official launch of its free email service for existing and new ISPs. While 
this offering was exclusive to Shenzhen Telecom, it was also limited to a service capacity of five 
million users. This service capacity was expected to expand exponentially as technological 
innovation continued to reduce infrastructural costs in the future.   
 
2003 marked the turnaround year for Chinese internet companies since the Dotcom crash. As 
Tencent continued to grow its user base and enhance its appeal to the Chinese market this period 
saw growth in areas of online gaming, online advertising and mobile messaging. This industry 
growth benefitted Tencent‟s NASDAQ-listed competitors as their share prices increased.   
 
 
                                                          
13 Tencent. 2001b. Tencent participated in the Beijing Comdex 2001 Exhibition.Available: http://www.tencent.com/en-
us/at/pr/detail.shtml?id=at_2001_20010404 [2014, March 24]. 
14 Tencent. 2001a. Tencent launched email value-added service system in cooperation with SINET.Available: http://www.tencent.com/en-
us/at/pr/detail.shtml?id=at_2001_199907 [2014, March 24]. 
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Considering the recovery and growth of the Chinese internet and telecommunications industry, 
Tencent continued to design and develop new offerings. This allowed the company to enter into 
new market spaces and gain market share in untapped established markets.  
 
August 2003 marked Tencent‟s first attempt at capturing market share in the Massively 
Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Game (MMORPG) market space. Tencent exclusively created 
and developed QQ Game, an online trial operation providing solo and multiplayer gaming 
services. This was followed up by the launch of a test version of its internet entertainment portal 
website QQ.com in November 2003.  While the market itself was highly competitive, a 
spokesperson for Tencent, Lou Lili, explained that, “Our (Tencent) goal is to become a 
mainstream internet portal that focuses on entertainment…our customer base and messaging 




In December 2003 Tencent entered the MMORPG marketspace with „Sephiroth‟. This game was 
licensed from a Korean-based game development company known as Imazic of Korea. Tencent 
offered its users a choice to pay per hour of gameplay or to pay a monthly fee for unlimited 
gameplay hours. At that point in time Tencent had established an in-house MMORPG 
development team to develop its own MMORG games.   
 
QQ Game proved a fruitful venture for Tencent, effectively penetrating the MMORPG market 
space. Within nine months since its release QQ Game‟s user base exceeded company 




4.1.4 Commercial Enterprise Solutions 
 
In an effort to establish a first-mover competitive advantage in the enterprise IM market, Tencent 
launched its enterprise IM product „Tengzuntong‟ Real Time eXchange (RTX) in Kerry Center, 
Beijing on 9 September 2003.  
 
                                                          
15 China‟s Tencent take on Nasdaq Internet portals.2003. China Daily. 31 November. Available: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2003-
11/21/content_283657.htm [2014, March 21]. 
16  Tencent. 2004b. QQ Game‟s simultaneous online user accounts broke 300 thousand.Available: http://www.tencent.com/en-
us/at/pr/detail.shtml?id=at_2004_20040514 [2014, March 27]. 
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Tencent was the first company to release software in the enterprise market, providing and 
creating a new means of effective communication and operation for businesses. Tencent invested 
100 million RMB (US$12 million) to market and promote these RTX systems.  
 
While Tencent originally tried to penetrate the enterprise market with BQQ in December 2001, 
RTX set to redefine security, controllability and efficiency within enterprises. This initiative 
received support and praise from Tencent‟s partners: IBM, UFsoft, Kingdee, Hi-Tech Wealth, 
ChinaSuntek and Kingsoft.  Furthermore, research from a leading third-party consultancy firm at 
the time suggested that RTX could improve employee efficiency by 17% and save a business a 




To build on this competitive advantage, Tencent and IBM jointly signed a contract in Beijing 
China to officially declare a strategic cooperation between the two companies in the future. This 
agreement ensured joint entry into the Enterprise Instant Messaging (EIM) market, with Tencent 
leveraging its RTX offerings by integrating IBM‟s QuickPlace software. This saw Tencent 
expand its target market to medium and large enterprises and marked a significant step in the 
accelerated development of e-commerce in China.  
 
By the end of March 2004 Tencent‟s RTX division had over 90,000 registered users including 




4.2 Venture Capitalists & Foreign Investors 
 
Tencent realized exponential growth of 900% in its user base from 1 million in December 1999 
to 10 million by June 2000, but QQ infrastructural running costs eroded profitability. Tencent 
continued to operate at a loss in the year 2000 and this became a large concern for Ma Huateng.  
 
 
                                                          
17 Tencent. 2003. RTX is launched as the Real-Time-Enterprise solution.Available: http://www.tencent.com/en-
us/at/pr/detail.shtml?id=at_2003_20030909 [2014, March 24]. 
18 Pacific Epoch. 2004c. Tencent Enters Corporate Market; Investment Introduction Plan Launched in North China.Available: 
http://pacificepoch.com/china-investment-research/articles/tencent-enters-corporate-market-investment-introduction-plan-launched-in-no/ [2014, 
March 27].  
Chapter 4: The Case 
4:9 
 
While Tencent had failed to raise capital from potential investors in the past, PRC regulations 
further hindered Ma Huateng‟s attempts to raise borrowed capital through bank loan 
applications. As a last-ditch effort Tencent turned to foreign investment for funding. However, 
this too saw complications arising from further PRC regulatory constraints. 
 
4.2.1 PRC Regulations 
 
The year 2000 represented a time when stringent regulatory constraints implemented by the 
Chinese government exacerbated investment woes for value-added telecommunication service-
based companies within the PRC. These regulations restricted foreign companies and foreign-
invested enterprises that were incorporated in the PRC from owning or operating value-added 
telecommunication services in the ordinary course of business. Furthermore, these regulations 
also extended to both wireless services and internet content service providers. This placed 
increased pressure on Tencent and its competitors to find alternative legal means to circumvent 
these regulations. This would allow for potential foreign investment and aid these companies in 
staying competitive within their market environment.  
 
Tencent adjusted its corporate structure accordingly to circumvent regulatory constraints and 
encourage foreign investment. 
 
4.2.2 Corporate Structure (see Appendix A, Exhibit 6) 
 
Tencent Holdings Limited (the company) was incorporated in the British Virgin Islands (BVI) 
on 23 November 1999 and served as a holding company for its indirectly wholly foreign-owned 
enterprises (WFOE) recognized under PRC law.   
 
On 24 February 2000, the company incorporated Tencent Technology with a registered share 
capital of US$1,000,000. This was Tencent‟s first recognized WFOE in the PRC. Tencent 
Technology was the company‟s primary operating entity, responsible for software development 
and holding all principal intellectual property rights of the group. This WFOE was 100% owned 
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by the company until Tencent Limited
19
 became the 100% shareholder on 11 January, 2004.  
After China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) on 11 December 2001, the PRC 
government approved limited foreign investment in value-added telecommunications businesses. 
While these were limited to WTO documentation this included consulting & management 
services, software development and trading.   
 
Two years later this led to a definitive change in PRC legislation. On 11 December 2003 Chinese 
value-added telecommunications businesses were granted a maximum threshold of up to 50% 
foreign ownership in their companies. These laws extended into permitting foreign investment in 
the Chinese computer industry, extending to hardware & software development as well as 
computer technology and information services. However, these grants were subject to terms and 
conditions defined in the WFOE laws on business scope.  Chinese companies offering software 
implementation services were susceptible to being prohibited from foreign investment at the 
discretion of the PRC government. This extended to systems and software consulting services as 
well as systems analysis services. 
 
As Tencent‟s corporate structure previously stood, its efforts to seek foreign investment 






- Value-added services and paging services in basic telecommunication services: Foreign 
investments are permitted no later than Dec. 11, 2001 with the proportion of foreign investment 
not exceeding 30%. The proportion of foreign investment in joint venture shall not exceed 49% 
no later than Dec. 11, 2002, and shall be allowed to reach 50% no later than Dec. 11, 2003.  
 
- Mobile voice and data services in basic telecommunication services: Foreign investments are 
permitted no later than Dec. 11, 2001 with the proportion of foreign investment not exceeding 
25%. The proportion of foreign investment in joint venture shall not exceed 35% no later than 
                                                          
19 Tencent Limited is a BVI-incorporated international business company. While established on March 14, 1997, it was a dormant company until 
it became a wholly-owned subsidiary of Tencent Holdings on December 18, 2003. 
20 People‟s Republic of China. Ministry of Commerce. 2004.  Catalogue for the Guidance of Foreign Investment Industries. Available: 
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/policyrelease/gazette/200505/20050500093692.html [2014, March 31]. 
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Dec. 11, 2002, and shall be allowed to reach 49% no later than Dec. 11, 2004.  
 
- Domestic and international services in basic telecommunication services: Foreign investments 
will be permitted no later than Dec. 11, 2004 with the proportion of foreign investment not 
exceeding 25%. The proportion of foreign investment in joint venture shall not exceed 35% no 
later than Dec. 11, 2006, and shall be allowed to reach 49% no later than Dec. 11, 2007. 
 
Herewith Tencent‟s product and service portfolio inferred that all three of these regulations were 
applicable to the company.  This meant that Tencent could only offer a total interest stake of 
25% to foreign investors. Resultantly, Tencent adjusted its corporate structure to ensure it could 
raise additional unrestricted capital through foreign investment.  
 




This limited liability company was established in the PRC on 13 January 2004, with a registered 
share capital of 11 million RMB. Shiji Kaixuan saw capital contributions from Tencent‟s five 
core founders Ma Huateng (47.5%), Zhang Zidong (20%), Zeng Liqing (12.5%), Xu Chenye 
(10%) and Chen Yidan (10%). This company was formed with the same operational intent as 
Tencent Computer, both licensed to provide internet information services and other value-added 
telecommunication services. 
 
Shidai Zhaoyang Technology (Shidai Zhaoyang)  
 
This indirectly-owned WFOE was established in the PRC on 8 February 2004. It yielded a 
registered share capital of US$500,000 and encompassed a business model of a similar nature to 
Tencent Technology. Tencent indirectly owned 100% of the WFOE through its wholly-owned 
subsidiary, Realtime Century Technology Limited (Realtime Century Technology).
21
 
                                                          
21 Realtime Century Technology is a BVI-incorporated international business company. While established on 14 March 1997, it was a dormant 
company until it became a wholly-owned subsidiary of Tencent Holdings18 December 2003. 
 




Tencent Holdings, Tencent Technology and Shidai Zhaoyang Technology entered into 
contractual agreements with Shiji Kaixuan and Tencent Computer. Both entities provided 
internet value-added (IVAS) and mobile value-added (MVAS) services to the respective entities. 
These contractual agreements were in compliance with PRC laws and regulations, ensuring that 
Tencent as the parent company could raise its intended levels of capital funding without facing 
restrictions on the percentage owned by foreign companies.   
 
4.2.3 Millennium Vocal Limited (MVL) & IDG Technology Venture Investments (IDG)  
 
Circumventing PRC regulatory constraints, Ma Huateng created the opportunity for foreign 
venture capitalist firms to invest in Tencent. Acting quickly at the height of the Dotcom bubble, 
Ma Huateng convinced venture capital firms Millenium Vocal Ltd (MVL), a fully-owned 
subsidiary of Pacific Century Cyberworks Ltd (Hong Kong)
22
 and IDG Technology Venture 
Investments (North America) 
23
 to invest into the company.  
 
As a precondition to both the IDG and MVL investments, Tencent was required to attract a 
registered user base exceeding a minimum of four million users. This precondition was met by a 
multiple exceeding ten times both IDG and MVL‟s requirements (see Appendix A, Exhibit 3). 
Each venture capital firm was allotted shares in the company equivalent to their respective 
US$1.1 million investments. This equated to a 20% interest stake in Tencent for each party.  
 
4.2.4 Myriad Investment Holdings (MIH)  
 
By June 2001, both MVL and IDG faced increased pressure resulting from the Dotcom crash. 
This was accompanied by concerns over the sustainability of Tencent‟s business model. At this 
time many questions were raised concerning the longevity and level of profitability associated 
with the online instant messaging market space. Considering this time period represented a fickle 
                                                          
22 Pacific Century Cyberworks Limited was founded by Richard Li, son of Hong Kong business tycoon Li Ka Shing. It later became the PRC‟s 
leading telecom operator by acquiring Hong Kong Telecom 
 
23 Renamed as IDG Capital Partners, IDG is a China-focused venture investment firm founded in 1992. It has invested in more than 200 Chinese 
companies including the likes Sohu and Baidu 
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time for those invested in internet companies, both MVL and IDG were quick to sell-off their 
percentage holdings in Tencent.  
 
As a result, Myriad Investment Holdings (MIH), a subsidiary of South Africa‟s leading 
multinational media group Naspers Limited (Naspers), purchased a 46.5% interest stake in 
Tencent. According to Fritz Demopoulos, the CEO and Founder of Chinese travel search engine 
Qunar, “It was the most successful deal foreigners have ever made in China‟s internet sector.”
24
 
The entire purchase consideration (including costs directly attributable to the acquisition) was 
settled in cash, at a total consideration of R266 million (US$33.25 million).
25
  
The cash consideration translated into MIH purchasing:  
 
- 369,341 ordinary shares transferred from MVL 
- 243,500 ordinary shares transferred from IDG 
- 194,186 ordinary shares from Tencent‟s founders 
 
Subsequent to this acquisition MIH made an additional R8 million (US$1 million) cash 




Concurrently, IDG transferred its remaining interest of 89,833 shares to its wholly owned North 
American subsidiary, Mandarin Sea Investments (Mandarin Sea). IDG then converted all of its 
convertible notes into ordinary shares, transferring an additional 36,008 shares to Mandarin Sea. 
The total effect of these transactions ensured that both Tencent‟s founders and MIH each held 





                                                          




25 This was calculated as at the average exchange rate of R8/US$1 for the May 2001 period.  
 
26 Naspers. 2001. Naspers: 2001 Annual Financial Statements.Available: http://www.naspers.com/ann-results.html [2014, March 31]. 
27 Tencent Holdings Limited.2004. IPO Prospectus- Hong Kong Public Offering and International Placing. Available: 
http://globaldocuments.morningstar.com/documentlibrary/document/137bb96118b048a4.msdoc/original [2014, March 31]. 
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4.3 Creating Value for Our Users 
 
June 2001 represented a landmark month for Tencent. After three years of consecutive losses 
Tencent achieved financial break-even. Deemed as the first month to yield a potential profit 
since founding in November 1998, this represented a turning point for Tencent moving forward. 
In light of this, Tencent‟s financial statements indicated that the company achieved a profit 
representing 20.8% of revenues generated for the financial year ending 31 December 2001. 
 
While in a profitable position QQ‟s popularity continued to grow even further. Considering 
Tencent‟s costs were variable in accordance with its user base, this increased the company‟s 
operating costs. Since Tencent was founded on the concept of free account registration, the QQ 
account became a status symbol in China. Chinese social status became determinant on a user‟s 
QQ account number. This motivated single users to register multiple accounts at any given time, 
in search of the „most attractive‟ QQ account number. Not only did this lead to a 
misinterpretation of actual QQ users, but it placed concern around the company‟s level of 
infrastructure and the possibility of infrastructural expansion to accommodate for an increasing 
user base. In addition, given that the numbers 6 and 8 are considered lucky numbers in Chinese 





In order to combat these problems, Tencent began to deviate from its original pricing model, 
consequently charging QQ users a registration fee. This angered users and consequently led to a 
slight decline in QQ‟s user base. In recognition of this mistake Ma Huateng reverted from this 
decision, unrestricting all free accounts and re-instating the free registration process.  
Furthermore, as an alternative means to creating and generating additional revenues Tencent 
decided to charge for extraneous services such as avatars, virtual gifts and online services. This 
business decision came to accelerate Tencent‟s profitability in years to follow.  
 
 
                                                          
28 Wang, X. 2009. A Mysterious Message Millionaire. Available: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2009-01/12/content_7388202.htm 
[2014, March 24]. 
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4.4 The Chinese Economy (see Appendix A, Exhibit 2) 
 
Over the 1998 to 2003 financial period China‟s gross domestic product (GDP) grew by a 
compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 8.4%. Over this six-year period the Chinese inflation 
rate ranged between -1.40% and 1.13% (see Appendix A, Exhibit 2) while the per capita annual 
disposable income of Chinese households grew by 9.4% year-on-year. 
 
As China‟s population grew by 0.7% over this period, the subscriber base of Chinese internet, 
fixed line and mobile users grew on average by 106.8%, 24.7% and 60.8% from 1998 to 2003. 
China boasted the largest fixed line and mobile subscriber base in the world, with 263.3 million 
and 268.7 million subscribers in each industry, while its internet user base of 79.5 million users 
was the second largest in the world.  In 2003 China enhanced its internet infrastructure in an 
effort to bridge the digital divide and encourage internet diffusion across the country. The 2003 
year saw two million Chinese cable and DSL (Digital Satellite Link) users receive broadband 
access, three million receive ISDN (Integrated Services Digital Network) access and sixteen 




As at the end of the 2004 year the Asian Development Bank forecasted China‟s GDP growth as 
8.3% (2004), 8.5% (2005), 8.7% (2006), 8.9% (2007) and 9.8% (2008). It also forecasted 





4.5 The Competitive Landscape  
 
Tencent competed against four other companies in the Chinese internet and telecommunications 
value-added service industry – SINA Corp, Sohu.com, NetEase and TOM Online.  
 
Each competitor‟s company profile can be found in Appendix D, Exhibit 1. 
                                                          
29 Otani, S. 2005. The problems faced by China in devising an online landscape with Chinese characteristics.Available: 
https://etd.ohiolink.edu/rws_etd/document/get/ohiou1128721263/inline [2014, May 10]. 
30 Asian Development Bank. 2014. Asian Development Outlook.Available: http://www.adb.org/publications/series/asian-development-
outlook?page=1 [2014, July 19]. 
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4.5.1 QQ Instant Messenger  
 
As a pioneer of the Chinese IM market, QQ was a fundamental source of Tencent‟s annual 
revenues. QQ played a crucial role in the overall operational construct of Tencent‟s business 
model, providing a platform for Tencent to showcase and provide users with its extensive range 
of value-added product and service offerings.  As an effective service platform this created an 




Tencent set a precedent in the Chinese internet and telecommunications market by being the first 
company to apply the freemium model to the Chinese domestic IM market. This is a pricing 
model whereby a company offers basic products and services for free and then charges users a 
premium for additional enhanced content and features.  By applying the freemium pricing model 
to Tencent‟s Basic QQ service this ensured an effective two-fold approach for Tencent to capture 
the IM market. The Basic QQ service allowed users to enjoy the benefits of the service without 
having to commit financially. As a result, this attracted a larger potential target market for the 
company as opposed to charging a premium for the service. Through the registration process 
Tencent directly promoted its extraneous services to QQ users. Tencent users could then access a 
host of value-added services through one channel, which significantly reduced the risk of these 
users migrating to competing offerings.  
 
Tencent‟s Premium QQ service provided users with additional benefits for a small fee. This 
included the ability for the user to choose their own QQ account number, providing 
distinguishable indicators to visibly portray the user‟s premium status, the ability to store 
message logs on the QQ servers, additional storage space, additional chat room access and free 
access to exclusive value-added services. In addition, an entry-level premium service named QQ 
Xing was launched which charged users a very small monthly fee and provided enhanced 
security features, the ability to store message logs and storage space.  
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In a response to Tencent‟s position in the IM market SINA Corp, Sohu.com and NetEase 
released IM offerings in 2003. SINA instant messenger, Sohu.com‟s SQQ and NetEase‟s POPO 
failed to compete with QQ and did not affect Tencent‟s 74.3% stranglehold on the IM market.
 32
 
This forced Tencent‟s competitors to revert to other alternative measures to generate IVAS 
revenues and remain competitive in industry.  
 
Since peaking at 100,000 users for the first time in May 2000, Tencent‟s QQ user base had 
grown exponentially. By March 2004 Tencent had 291.3 million registered QQ users and 
approximately 90 million active QQ user accounts. It also had 6 million simultaneous online 
users, its largest number of simultaneous users achieved since founding (see Appendix A, 
Exhibit 3). The total average daily user hours of thr QQ community was 18.3 million (2001), 
28.6 million (2002) and 51.4 millon (2003).  Over this three-year period the average daily 
messages sent by QQ users were 413.9 million (2001), 386.4 million (2002) and 681.8 million 
(2003). By March 2004 the average daily user hours were 64.7 million and the average daily 
messages sent by QQ users were 848.8 million (see Appendix A, Exhibit 3). 
 
4.5.2 Mobile Value-Added Services (MVAS)  
 
Diversifying QQ into a mobile application transformed Tencent‟s MVAS division into its 
primary operating segment. By applying the same rollout strategy (as per Section 4.5.1) to its 
MVAS division, Tencent used the mobile QQ platform to introduce new MVAS and IVAS 
offerings to its users. As inter-related PC-based and mobile QQ applications, this ensured that the 
QQ community grew while encouraging greater consumer spending. 
 
Tencent‟s MVAS division contributed 77.3% (2001), 75.6% (2002) and 63.6% (2003) to the 
company‟s overall revenues generated over the 2001 to 2003 financial period (see Appendix A, 
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Exhibit 5). The MVAS division largely outperformed Tencent‟s IVAS division over the same 
financial period. Over the first quarter of the 2004 financial year Tencent„s total MVAS revenues 
exceed the previous year‟s performance by 69.4%.  
 
By March 2004 the MVAS division was the most competitive operating segment within industry. 
In order for Tencent and its competitors to ensure that their value-added service offerings 
reached their respective target markets, these companies had entered into contractual obligations 
with China‟s leading mobile operators. China Mobile and China Unicom had complete control of 
the Chinese cellular telephone market and used its billing and collection systems to profit off the 
product offerings of Tencent and its competitors. This was the only avenue for Tencent and its 
competitors to distribute its MVAS services nationally. These contractual relationships enhanced 
the revenue-generating capacity of Tencent and its competitors at the time.  
 
SINA Corp, Sohu.com, NetEase and TOM Online‟s MVAS divisions primarily provided 
content-driven short messaging services (SMS).
 33
 Collectively SMS content included news and 
information subscription services, mobile games and entertainment services, matchmaking 
services, ringtone and picture download services and email services.  
 
During this time Tencent and its competitors began to offer multi-media messaging services 
(MMS), interactive voice response services (IVRS) and wireless application protocol services 
(WAP). These new technologies were only recently introduced into the market and were 
designed for the next generation of smartphones. 
 
Collectively, China‟s value-added service and SMS revenues in the 2002 financial year were 
20,867,144,700 RMB (US$2,521,100,000). According to Tencent‟s prospectus, the industry was 
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expected to grow by 54% in 2003, recording total expected revenue of 32,134,624,800 RMB 
(US$3,882,400,000). Over the five-year period between the year 2002 and 2007 the total 
Chinese value-added services and SMS market was expected to grow at a CAGR of 43.3%. The 
total revenue generated by China‟s General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) industry in 2002 was 
206,925,000 RMB (US$25,000,000). This was expected to grow at a CAGR of 141.8% over the 
five-year period ending 31 December, 2007.    
 
As at 31 March 2004, Tencent had 12.8 million fee-based registered MVAS subscribers. 
 
4.5.3 Internet Value-Added Services (IVAS) 
 
SINA Corp, Sohu.com, NetEase and TOM Online used their web portals as effective revenue 
drivers. SINA.com, Sohu.com, 163.com and TOM.com provided content via various channels to 
ensure that a wide, diverse and multi-functional set of IVAS offerings were available to Chinese 
consumers.
34
 These web portals were each company‟s primary platform to promote and 
introduce existing and new IVAS product and service offerings onto the market.  
The IVAS services offered were predominantly content-driven and centered on fostering an 
online community.  Content included news, sports, finance, automobiles, women‟s lifestyle, 
shopping, real estate, entertainment, games, downloads, astrology, cartoons, information 
technology and various other topics of interest. To create an online community these companies 
also offered email, instant messaging (see Section 4.5.1), matchmaking, chat rooms, forums, 
message boards, alumni clubs and online gaming (MMORPG) services.  
 
The total efforts of the PC-based version of QQ Messenger ensured that Tencent‟s IVAS division 
contributed 1.9% (2001), 15.5% (2002) and 31.3% (2003) to its total revenues over the 2001 to 
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2003 financial period (see Appendix A, Exhibit 5). As Tencent‟s QQ user base rose 
exponentially over this period, this contributed largely to the company‟s revenue growth. 
Consequently, Tencent‟s first quarter 2004 IVAS revenues exceeded previous year‟s results by 
69.4%. These results encouraged the development and rollout of QQ2004 as well as additional 
IVAS product and service offerings. 
 
Tencent had 1.5 million registered IVAS subscribers by the end of the 2002 financial year. This 
increased by 360% to 6.9 million in 2003 and had grown to 7.3 million as at 31 March 2004.  
 
4.5.4 Online Advertising  
 
Online advertising represented a core division of Tencent and its competitors. Tencent‟s online 
advertising was generated via its QQ software client and QQ.com web portal. With prior 
consent, Tencent collected personal data from registered users to provide targeted advertising 
services to corporate clients. This ensured that the adverts were aimed directly at a client‟s target 
market by appealing to the specific wants and needs of Tencent‟s user base. These online 
advertising campaigns were marketed internally, but the sale of online advertising was 
outsourced to advertising agencies on a commission basis.  
 
SINA Corp, Sohu.com, NetEase and TOM Online all offered online advertising on their web 
portals only.
 35
 These competitors used banners, links, logos and buttons to advertise while 
Sohu.com also offered email marketing services. TOM Online was the only company to 
previously offer offline advertising services. However, since making the transition to online 
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Online advertising accounted for 0.5% of the total Chinese advertising market for the 2000, 2001 
and 2002 financial years (see Appendix A, Exhibit 4). While it was not a widely accepted 
advertising medium in China, it managed to capture 1% of total Chinese advertising revenues in 
the 2003 year. In this year China‟s online advertising revenues totaled 521,451,000 RMB 
(US$63,000,000). According to Tencent‟s prospectus, this was expected to grow at a CAGR of 
40.4% to 2,847,288,000 RMB (US$344,000,000) over the five-year period ending in 2008. 
 
4.5.5 Commercial Enterprise Solutions 
 
Tencent‟s RTX software package provided an internal IM network to Chinese enterprises. The 
major benefit of the RTX package was its interoperability with mobile networks, the QQ 
network and other existing RTX networks. Chinese enterprises could operate and manage their 
own internal IM network and use the RTX software package as an effective business 
communication tool. 
 
Aside from Tencent, only SINA Corp and TOM Online had pursued the Chinese commercial 
enterprise market. SINA Corp generated enterprise revenues via its paid search and directory 
listings, corporate email services, classified listings and e-learning. These were targeted at small 
and medium enterprises (SMEs) and government agencies.
37
  TOM Online provided internet-
related computer hardware and software to Chinese enterprises. While this division accounted 
for 17.9% of its 2003 revenues, TOM Online began to phase out the division in the second half 




4.5.6 Untapped Market Potential  
 
4.5.6.1 Online Gaming 
 
China‟s online gaming market was worth 38,000,000 RMB (US$4,591,035) in the year 2000.
39
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During the time period between the year 2000 and Tencent‟s release of QQ Game, Tencent‟s 
competitors attempted to enter the untapped online gaming market. In 2003 SINA Corp launched 
its first MMORPG „Lineage‟, but despite its success in Korea it received poor reception in the 
Chinese market.
 40
 During the same year Sohu.com launched its first MMORPG „Knight Online‟, 
but this failed to generate forecasted revenues.
41
 The most recent failed attempt was TOM 




Online gaming was a major revenue driver for NetEase which introduced “PristonTale” and 
„Westward Journey Online Version 2.0‟ in 2002.
43
  While „PristonTale‟ was an initial success, its 
user base declined. However, NetEase‟s most recent offering „Westward Journey Online Version 
2.0‟ achieved sustainable success, ranked by the „China Game Industry Report‟ as one of the Top 
10 Most Popular Domestic Developed Games in 2003. 
 
By the end of 2003, China‟s online gaming industry was worth 1,321,423,050 RMB 
(US$159,650,000). A study conducted by the International Data Corporation (IDC) stated that 
the Chinese online gaming industry was expected to grow at a CAGR of 38.8% over the five-




4.5.6.2 Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP)  
 
VoIP uses Internet Protocol (IP), intranets and extranets to deliver voice information as opposed 
to traditional telephone services operating on circuit-switched networks.
45
 As a packet-switched 
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VoIP was first introduced to the Chinese market in April 1999 as a telephony service and as a pc-
based computer-to-computer service. Within three years VoIP telephone traffic surpassed 
traditional fixed line telephone services.
38
 By 2003 China had one of the most advanced VoIP 
technology frameworks in the world with its VoIP technology superseding the infrastructural and 
service capabilities of both the USA and Japan.  
 
By May 2004 it was estimated that there were over 5 million VoIP telephony users worldwide.
47
 





4.5.6.3 Personal Handy-phone System (PHS) 
 
PHS is a low cost data communication service, using a wireless telephone that functions as both 
a cordless home telephone and a mobile device elsewhere.
49
 PHS handsets are compact and 
lightweight, with features ranging from color screens to the latest polyphonic ringtones.
 50
   It is 
commonly referred to as Xiaolington (XLT) in China, and was offered by both China Netcom 
and China Telecom.  
 
In 2003 China Netcom and China Telecom both launched PHS SMS services and expanded the 
data capabilities of their PHS networks.  As of June 2003 China‟s PHS market had 22.5 million 
subscribers and was expected to grow at an average of 1.5 million new subscribers per month.
51
 
Over the months of February and March 2004 PHS subscriber growth surpassed previous 
estimate with an additional 8 million new subscribers. As at the end of March 2004, there was a 
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Revenues 37 960 198 818 467 369
Year-on-Year Growth % - 423.8% 135.1%
Cost of Revenue (10,801) (49,856) (141,916)
Year-on-Year Growth % - 361.6% 184.7%
As a proportion of Revenues (%) 25.3% 26.3% 30.4%
At this time Tencent planned to introduce Mobile QQ and other value-added service offerings to 
the affordable PHS network. These value-added services were limited by infrastructural 
constraints, however Tencent admitted that it would expand its PHS efforts as China Netcom and 
China Telecom continued to develop PHS infrastructure in the near future. These additional 
value-added services were expected to replicate Tencent‟s existing product and service portfolio 
at the time.   
 
4.6 Historical Financial Performance Review (see Appendix A, Exhibit 5) 
 
4.6.1 Mobile Value-Added Services (MVAS) 
  
Table 4.1: MVAS Revenues over the 2001 to 2003 Financial Period 







Tencent‟s MVAS division was the company‟s largest revenue contributor over the 2001 to 2003 
financial period. Table 4.1 shows that in the 2003 financial year, the total revenue generated by 
the MVAS division grew by 135.1% to 467,369,000 RMB. This represented 63.6% of total 
company revenues in that year.  
 
This revenue growth was attributable to the 12.5% increase in Mobile QQ subscriptions. 
Tencent‟s Mobile QQ subscriptions rose from 5.6 million registered subscribers to 6.3 million 
registered subscribers over the 2002/2003 periods.  Tencent‟s MVAS revenue growth was also 
due to the expansion of its music and picture download services while it also generated greater 
revenues from its technical support service for which it charged a fee to China Mobile for. This 
was in relation to 161 Mobile Chat‟s growing subscriber base. 





Revenues 7 735 19 188 32 841
Year-on-Year Growth % - 148.1% 71.2%
Cost of Revenue (3,020) (6,970) (10,499)
Year-on-Year Growth % - 130.8% 50.6%
As a proportion of Revenues (%) 63.0% 33.6% 32.0%
RMB'000
2001 2002 2003
Revenues 2 437 4 282 5 057
Year-on-Year Growth % - 75.7% 18.1%
Cost of Revenue - - (1,644)
Year-on-Year Growth % - - -
As a proportion of Revenues (%) - - 32.5%
RMB'000
2001 2002 2003
Revenues 944 40 819 229 690
Year-on-Year Growth % - 4224.0% 462.7%
Cost of Revenue (4,223) (14,848) (75,489)
Year-on-Year Growth % - 251.6% 408.4%
As a proportion of Revenues (%) -286.8% 28.1% 32.9%
Table 4.1 shows that Tencent‟s MVAS costs grew by 184.7% to 141,916,000 RMB in the 2003 
year, accounting for 30.4% of Tencent‟s total MVAS revenues. Overall the MVAS division was 
the largest cost contributor out of Tencent‟s operating segments during the 2001 to 2003 
financial period. While fees charged by mobile operators increased in line with revenue growth, 
the rising costs were attributable to an increase in development and technical staff in the 2003 
year. This was because Tencent planned to launch new MVAS products and services, while 
improving existing offerings.   
 
4.6.2 Internet Value-Added Services (IVAS) 
    








Tencent‟s IVAS division was its second largest operating segment. Table 4.2 shows that there 
was a significant turnaround in the performance of Tencent‟s IVAS division as revenues grew 
462.7% to a total of 229,690,000 RMB in the 2003 financial year. This contributed 31.3% to 
Tencent‟s total revenues generated in that year. This revenue growth was a reflection of a 360% 
rise in registered QQ subscriptions. This user base grew in 2002 from 1.5 million to 6.9 million 
registered IVAS subscribers by the end of 2003. Tencent also realized growth in its Premium QQ 
and QQ Xing services over this period, while generating returns from its promotional efforts 
surrounding its community services and interactive entertainment offerings. 
 
The increased revenues led to a 408.4% rise in the cost of IVAS revenues. As the second largest 
cost contributor amongst Tencent‟s operating segments, costs of 75,489,000 RMB accounted for 
32.9% of Tencent‟s total IVAS revenues in the 2003 year. While the fees collected by mobile 
operators increased in alignment with revenue growth, the increase in costs was attributable to a 





Revenues 7 735 19 188 32 841
Year-on-Year Growth % - 148.1% 71.2%
Cost of Revenue (3,020) (6,970) (10,499)
Year-on-Year Growth % - 130.8% 50.6%
As a proportion of Revenues (%) 63.0% 33.6% 32.0%
rise in imbalance fees. This was caused by a large traffic imbalance on mobile networks because 
of the surge in users. To accommodate for the growth in QQ subscribers, Tencent hired 
additional staff and purchased additional content to keep its QQ.com web portal up to date. 
Tencent also incurred third party licensing costs in December 2003 for its MMORPG game titled 
„Sephiroth‟ (see Section 4.1.3).  
 
4.6.3 Online Advertising 
 








Table 4.3 shows that revenue growth in Tencent‟s online advertising division slowed down in the 
2003 year. Regardless, the online advertising division posted revenues of 32,841,000 RMB in the 
2003 year and was Tencent‟s third largest operating segment. The growth in online advertising 
revenues was attributable to the surge in both Mobile QQ and QQ members over the 2002/2003 
periods. This attracted a greater amount of customers, which was accompanied by Tencent‟s 
increased prices.  
 
The total cost of online advertising revenues increased by 50.6% from 6,970,000 RMB in 2002 
to a total of 10,499,000 RMB in the 2003. This was representative of 32% of online advertising 
revenues generated in the 2003 financial year. These costs were attributable to an increase in 
advertising volumes accompanied by raised advertising agency commissions. Tencent also hired 
development and technical staff to support the growth of this division. 
 





Revenues 2 437 4 282 5 057
Year-on-Year Growth % - 75.7% 18.1%
Cost of Revenue - - (1,644)
Year-on-Year Growth % - - -
As a proportion of Revenues (%) - - 32.5%
 4.6.4 Other- RTX & Trademark Licensing  
 







This was Tencent‟s smallest operating segment. Table 4.4 shows its revenues grew 18.1% to 
5,057,000 RMB in the 2003 financial year. This was attributable to the launch of RTX in 
September 2003 (see Section 4.1.4). However, this was offset by a decline in revenues associated 
with trademark licensing which Tencent reduced as it became more selective in this regard.  
 
As a new division, the total cost of revenues was 1,644,000 RMB in 2003. This represented 
32.5% of the total revenues generated by this department in the same year. These costs were 
directly associated with the commercialization of Tencent‟s RTX system and its associated sales 
and support staff. 
 
4.7 Historical IPO Activity in China’s Internet and Telecommunications 
Value-Added Service Industry 
 
The first IPO activity in China‟s internet and telecommunications industry occurred at the peak 
of the Dotcom bubble in the year 2000. A cluster of IPO activity occurred over the three-month 
period dating from April to July 2000. This period saw IPOs launched by SINA Corp, Sohu.com 
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SINA Corp 13 April 2000 US$15.00 - US$18.00
Sohu.com 12 July 2000 US$13.00 - US$16.00 
NetEase 30 June 2000 US$15.00 - US$16.00
TOM Online - NASDAQ 10 March 2004 US$13.56 - US$15.56
TOM Online - HKGEM 11 March 2004 HK$ 1.30 - HK$ 1.50
Competitor Actual Offer Price/                        
SINA Corp US$ 17.00 US$ 20.74 22% 0%
Sohu.com US$ 13.00 US$ 13.00 0% 0%
NetEase US$ 15.50 US$12.13 0% 27.8%
TOM Online - NASDAQ US$ 15.55 US$ 15.58 0.2% 0%
TOM Online - HKGEM HK$ 1.50 HK$ 1.40 0% 6.3%
Percentage              
Overpriced (%)
Percentage                     
Underpricing (%)
Closing Price                                          
on First Day of Listing
Competitor Date of IPO
Offer Price              
Range













These companies took advantage of the hot IPO market on the NASDAQ when internet-based 
companies were in great demand from investors.  
 
Table 4.5 shows that SINA Corp was the first IPO to launch amongst its competitor pool, with an 
offer price range of US$15.00 to US$18.00 per share. SINA Corp opened on the NASDAQ at 
US1$17.00 per share, closing at US$20.74 on its first day of trade. This translated into an 
effective first day‟s underpricing of 22%, being the largest level of underpricing amongst IPO 
activity in the industry prior to Tencent‟s IPO.  
 
NetEase opened at the midpoint of its US$15.00 to US$16.00 range at US$15.50 per share and 
was the only company amongst its competitors to have overpriced its shares and close the first 
day of trade 27.8% down to US$12.13 per share. This was a result of the Chinese portal space 
becoming overcrowded, while market sentiment surrounding the NetEase IPO was further 
damaged by Sohu.com‟s announcement that it would launch its IPO twelve days after.
53
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Underwriters of Sohu.com‟s IPO originally priced the offer shares at a range of US$13.00 to 
US$16.00 per share. Prior to the launch of NetEase‟s IPO, underwriters raised the price to a 
range of US$16.00 to US$19.00 per share.
54
 This was in response to the success of SINA Corp‟s 
IPO and the positive market sentiment surrounding internet stock investments up to that point.  
 
However, Sohu.com‟s underwriters were forced to revert back to the original US$13.00 to 
US$16.00 price range. This was in response to changing market sentiment and poor reception 
received by NetEase‟s IPO.
55
 Sohu.com‟s offer shares closed unchanged on its first day of listing 




In 2004 TOM Online dual-listed on both the NASDAQ and the Hong Kong Growth Enterprise 
Market (HKGEM). It opened on the NASDAQ one cent below the top of its offer price range, at 
US$15.55 per share. It closed its position with a 0.2% gain at US$15.58 per share.
57
  TOM 
Online‟s HKGEM listing was priced at the top of its offer price range, at HK$1.50 per share. The 
share underperformed on the Growth Enterprise Market (GEM), overpriced by 6.3% to close the 
first day of trade at HK$1.40 per share. This was attributable to investor worries surrounding 




4.8 The IPO Process  
 
A summation of Tencent‟s IPO comes from a quote by Teresa Ko, a partner at Freshfields 
Bruckhaus Deringer, the legal adviser of Goldman Sachs (Tencent‟s lead underwriter) during 
the time of the IPO, “This was a groundbreaking transaction in that it was the first ever Chinese 





                                                          
54 Clifford, B. 2000. Sohu lifts IPO price range.Available: http://www.marketwatch.com/story/sohu-lifts-ipo-price-range-sina-targets-shanghai 
[2014, August 21]. 
55 Clarke, T. 2000. Sohu.com receives lukewarm reception on Nasdaq debut.Available: http://www.financeasia.com/News/32497,sohucom-
receives-lukewarm-reception-on-nasdaq-debut.aspx [2014, August 21]. 
56 A Flat Open for Sohu.com. 2000. CNN Money. 12 July. Available: http://cnnfn.cnn.com/2000/07/12/companies/sohu/ [2014, August 5]. 
57 Gelsi, S. 2004. TOM Online Flat in Debut. Available: http://www.marketwatch.com/story/tom-online-ipo-flat-in-debut [2014, July 06]. 
58 Baijia, L. 2004b. Tom Online stock price ends flat.Available: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-03/12/content_314259.htm 
[2014, July 31]. 
59 Asia Law. 2009. Asia Law IPO Retrospective.Available http://www.asialaw.com/Article/1971955/IPO-
Retrospective.html?Print=true&Single=true [2014, April 01]. 




On 5 December 2003, it emerged that Naspers (MIH) began investigating the feasibility of a 
possible Tencent initial public offering (IPO) at some point in 2004.
60
 While details were limited, 
it was clear that this would depend on prevailing market conditions. At this time a potential 
listing was considered on the HKEx or alternatively the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE).
61
   
 
Regardless of the possible listing alternatives as per Naspers‟s JSE Stock Exchange News 
Service (SENS) announcement, a Chinese news publication the China Daily, reported the 
possibility of Tencent listing the IPO on the North American NASDAQ Stock Exchange.
62
 
While neither Tencent nor Naspers raised this possibility publically, there was speculation 
surrounding a NASDAQ listing as a result of previous industry IPO trends (see Section 4.7). In 
seeking clarity on Tencent‟s chosen listing platform, it was leaked via Chinese media that a 
Tencent „insider‟ confirmed the likelihood of the company deferring its NASDAQ listing for the 
HEKx. It was suggested that this was because Tencent‟s existing IFRS/HKFRS accounting 




On 27 February 2004, Tencent transferred its company registration from the British Virgin 
Islands (BVI) to the Cayman Islands in anticipation of its IPO listing on the HKEx. This decision 
avoided having to place a newly incorporated entity into the Cayman Islands and then having to 
use this new entity as an effective listing vehicle of the Group.  Had this happened, then the 
associated South African Capital Gains Tax (CGT) implications would have disadvantaged 
Naspers (MIH). As an additional benefit of Tencent‟s decision to redomicile to the Cayman 
Islands, the company did not have to transfer its existing contracts to the new Cayman Island 
company. 
 
                                                          
60 JSE SENS. 2003a. Naspers Limited – Announcement. 5 December. Available: 
http://data.moneyweb.co.za/moneyweb/sharedata/scripts/sens.asp?id=54173 [2014, March 31]. 
61 JSE SENS. 2003b. Plans for Tencent IPO lift Naspers‟ Share Price.8 December. Available: 
http://data.moneyweb.co.za/moneyweb/sharedata/scripts/sens.asp?id=54237 [2014, March 31]. 
62 Baijia, L. 2004a. Rising Stars Impact Net Industry. Available: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/cd/2004-02/04/content_302877.htm [2014, 
March 31].   
63 Pacific Epoch.2004b. Tencent Could Skip NASDAQ for HKEx Listing. Available: http://www.pacificepoch.com/china-investment-
research/articles/tencent-could-skip-nasdaq-for-hkse-listing [2014, March 31]. 
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To obtain the above-mentioned approval to list on the HKEx, Tencent had to issue and register 
its company prospectus with the Hong Kong Registrar of Companies. This company prospectus 
was submitted on Friday, 02 April 2004. 
In order to be eligible to list on the HKEx Main Board Tencent had to meet at least one of three 




- The Profit Test  
- The Market Capitalization/Revenue Test  
- The Market Capitalization/Revenue/Cash Flow Test  
 
 Tencent superseded all requirements pertaining to the Profit Test and Market 
Capitalization/Revenue/Cash Flow Test (see Appendix A, Exhibit 8).  
 











Table 4.6 summarizes Tencent‟s eligibility to meet the stipulated requirement of each financial 
test. Using this table in conjunction with Exhibit 8 of Appendix A, it was clear that Tencent‟s 
Tencent‟s trading record exceeded three financial years, its management team stayed consistent 
throughout this period and that there were no changes in ownership, continuity or control in its 
most recent audited financial year. Tencent‟s expected post-IPO market capitalization of between 
                                                          
64 HKEx.2004a. Chapter 8- Equity Securities: Qualifications for Listing. Available: 
https://www.hkex.com.hk/eng/rulesreg/listrules/mbrulesup/documents/ch%208.pdf [2014, April 02] 
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HK$4,655,376,920 and HK$6,451,561,462 exceeded the HK$200 million, HK$2 billion and 
HK$4 billion market cap threshold requirements of each test at the time of listing (see Appendix 
A, Exhibit 8).
65
   
 
As the main determinant of the Profit Test, Tencent‟s 2003 profit exceeded the required 
profitability level of HK$20 million by HK$283,958,490 
66
, while profits for both the 2001 and 
2002 financial years exceeded an aggregate required threshold of HK$30 million by 
HK$112,306,893.
67
 As the main determinants of the Market Capitalization/Revenue/Cash Flow 
Test, 2003 revenues exceeded the HK$500 million threshold by HK$1,933,556,60 
68
 while 
positive cash flow from operating activities was HK$348,898,157 more than the aggregate 
HK$100 million threshold over the past 3 years.
69
 However, Tencent did not meet the main 
stipulated requirement of the Market Capitalization/Revenue Test (see Appendix A, Exhibit 8).  
This was because its primary operating segment, the MVAS division, generated 
HK$440,914,150 
70
 which fell HK$59,085,849 short of the required HK$500 million threshold.  
 
Ten days after submitting its prospectus, Tencent entered into its pre-IPO quiet period or 
cooling-off period. This prohibited the company from publicly enhancing its name or 
encouraging favorable attitudes towards its offer shares.
71
 Any such prohibited activity was 
illegal up until the day the company listed, and such actions would have prevented the firm from 
listing.  
 
In keeping with legislative compliance, both Tencent and Naspers (MIH) decided not to sign a 
post-IPO non-competition deed.
 72
  The premise behind this decision was that the companies 
believed they had established a healthy business relationship. Both companies provided services 
to each other and entered into transactions together on an arm‟s length basis in accordance with 
                                                          
65 This range is calculated to encompass both possible outcomes of the IPO, accounting for the original amount of offer shares on offer, as well as 
the over-allotment option. 
66 [ (322,196,000 RMB / 1.06  = HK$3,039,584,90) – ( HK$20,000,000) = HK$283,958,490 ]  
67 [(10,216,000 RMB / 1.061 RMB) + (140,707,000 / 1.060513 RMB) – (HK$30,000,000) = HK$112,306,893]  
68  [ (734,957,000 RMB / 1.06 RMB) – HK$500,000,000 = HK$348,898,157 ]  
69 [((20,760,000 RMB /1.061 RMB) + (91,759,000 RMB /1.060513 RMB) + (363,377,000 RMB / 1.06 RMB)) – HK$100,000,000 = HK$3, 488, 
981, 57. 
70 [ 467,369,000 RMB / 1.06 RMB = HK$440,914,150 ]  
 
71 Pacific Epoch.2004d. Tencent in Pre-IPO Quiet Period – Internet Weekly. Available: http://pacificepoch.com/china-investment-
research/articles/tencent-in-pre-ipo-quiet-period-internet-weekly// [2014, March 31]. 
72 Tencent Holdings Limited.2004. IPO Prospectus- Hong Kong Public Offering and International Placing. Available: 
http://globaldocuments.morningstar.com/documentlibrary/document/137bb96118b048a4.msdoc/original [2014, April 07]. 
Chapter 4: The Case 
4:33 
 
regulatory requirements. Considering these transactions were conducted on commercial terms 
and ethical grounds to ensure that shareholders were satisfied, both parties agreed to enter into an 




Prior to Tencent‟s roadshow analysts said that the IPO was pitched at a range of 15 to 25 times 
the company‟s 2004 earnings.
73
 This was regarded as a wide valuation range considering the 
negative market sentiment surrounding internet and technology stocks at that time. Therefore, it 
was expected that the offer shares would be priced at the bottom end of the range at HK$2.77 per 
share. By the time Tencent began the roadshow, the range was considerably reduced to 
approximately 11.5 to 15.5 times earnings.
74
 This was attributable to improved market sentiment, 
a growing interest in Chinese internet stocks and an attractive yet realistic company valuation.
11
 
Hence, Tencent strategically built its book around a cheaper company valuation to ensure the 
offer was enticing enough to all types of investors.   
 
Tencent began its IPO roadshow on Monday, 10 May 2004. It presented to analysts, fund 
managers and potential investors about the company, its achievements, financial history, 
management‟s potential and the ability to grow in the future.
75
 In alignment with the pre-IPO 
quiet period this was undertaken in a private capacity. Most significant to the roadshow was 
senior management‟s promise that they would not sell any of their shares inside a 180-day period 
post the IPO listing date.
76
 While this lock-up period was a mandatory requirement of the HKEx, 
this would have stimulated greater investor confidence and surety on potential investments. This 
would have assured investors that Tencent‟s directors wouldn‟t simply convert their personal 
shares into cash by selling them off once the company was listed.  
 
Upon completing the roadshow, Tencent made copies of its prospectus publicly available along 
with both white and yellow application forms. This was for a limited four-day period extending 
                                                          
73 Horne, J. 2004a. Tencent launches pre-marketing.Available: http://www.financeasia.com/search/~/News/31880,tencent-launches-pre-
marketing.aspx  [2014, July 16].  
74 Horne, J. 2004b. Tencent gets top dollar.Available: http://www.financeasia.com/News/26962,tencent-gets-top-dollar.aspx [2014, July 16].  
75 Pacific Epoch. 2004e. Tencent Starts IPO Roadshow; To Raise US$200M – ChinaByte.Available: http://pacificepoch.com/china-investment-
research/articles/tencent-starts-ipo-roadshow-to-raise-us200m-chinabyte/ [2014, March 31].  
76 Pacific Epoch. 2004a. Ma Huateng: Acquisitions In Accordance With Prospectus; Senior Executives Will Not Cash Out In Six Months. 
Available: http://pacificepoch.com/china-investment-research/articles/ma-huateng-acquisitions-in-accordance-with-prospectus-senior-executives-
wil/ [2014, March 31]. 
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Offer Price Range HK$2.77 - HK$3.70
Nominal Value Per Share HK$0.0001 
Underwriters Goldman Sachs (Asia)
HSBC
Hong Kong Public Offering
Pool A 21 008 000
(Aggregate Subscription Price of                
HK$5,000,000 or Less)
Pool B 21 008 000
(Aggregate Subscription Price of                       
More Than HK$5,000,000 or Up                                
to the Value of Pool B)
Total Hong Kong Offer Shares Available 42 016 000
International Placing
Total International Placement Shares Available 378 144 500
Total Amount of Offer Shares Available 420 160 500
Goldman Sachs (Asia)
Global Coordinator, Bookrunner,                          
Lead Underwriter and Sponsor
from Monday, 7 June 2004 up until 12 noon on Thursday, 10 June 2004. This was the only time 
period available for potential investors to apply both manually, using white and yellow 
application forms, and electronically through the Central Clearing and Settlement System 
(CCASS).  
 
4.8.1 Structure of the Offering (see Appendix B, Exhibit 1, Exhibit 2, Exhibit 3) 
 
The offering was constructed in order for Tencent to gain access to further funding through the 
Hong Kong equity market. Tencent did not stipulate a minimum intended level of capital to be 
raised from the IPO. 
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There were two facets to the Tencent IPO offer shares. Table 4.7 shows that the offering 
consisted of both a Hong Kong Public Offering, and an International Placement:  
 
- Hong Kong Public Offering: 42,016,000 offer shares made available. 
(Approximately 10% of total issued share capital after completion of the offering) 
- International Placing: 378,144,500 offer shares made available. 
(Approximately 22.5% of total issued share capital after completion of the offering) 
 
The Hong Kong Offer Shares were further split into two pools:  
 
Pool A: Allocated on an equitable basis to those who applied for offer shares with an aggregate 




Pool B: Allocated on an equitable basis, to those who applied for offer shares with an aggregate 




Goldman Sachs (Asia) L.L.C (Goldman Sachs) was the global coordinator, lead underwriter, 
bookrunner and sponsor of Tencent‟s IPO.  Furthermore, Goldman Sachs was also the lead 
underwriter of the IPO along with the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited 
(HSBC). Both underwriters did not hold any shareholding interest in Tencent, neither did they 
have the right nor option to subscribe for offer shares in the company. This further extended to 
nominations, which were prohibited.   
 
Upon completion of the application period and share allocation procedure, it was further 
confirmed that no offer shares were allocated to connected persons of the company, and that 




                                                          
77 These values exclude brokerage fees (1%), Stock Exchange trading fees (0.005%), SFC transaction levies (0.005%) as well the investor 
compensation fees (0.002%) payable. 
78 These values exclude brokerage fees (1%), Stock Exchange trading fees (0.005%), SFC transaction levies (0.005%) as well the investor 
compensation fees (0.002%) payable. 
79 Tencent. 2004b. Hong Kong Public Offering and International Placing.Available: 
http://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/SEHK/2004/0607/LTN20040607055.pdf [2014, March 27]. 




The deal construct ensured that the underwriters would receive a gross commission of 4.0% of 
the aggregate offer price of both Hong Kong Offer Shares and International Placing shares.  
This excluded sub-underwriter commissions directly payable in their personal capacity.
 
It was 
further stated that at the discretion of Tencent the underwriters would receive a share incentive 
fee of 0.5% of the offer price of Hong Kong Offer Shares. Comparing this to the TOM Online 
IPO on the HKEx Growth Enterprise Market (GEM) in March 2004, the gross commission 




This suggests that Tencent‟s underwriters were well-compensated for their services and were set 
to earn a large commission provided that Tencent was a hot IPO. In preparing for the potential 
over-allotment of its offer shares, Goldman Sachs and Tencent included a greenshoe provision in 
the underwriting agreement exclusively for international investors (see 2.2 of Exhibit 2 in 
Appendix B).  
 
A greenshoe provision permits the underwriter to sell up to 15% more shares than originally 
planned for by the issuing company. This greenshoe provision allowed Tencent to issue and allot 
an additional 15% of the offer shares available, representing an aggregate of 63,024,000 












                                                          
80 TOM Online Prospectus. 2004. TOM Online- Listing on The Growth Enterprise Market of The Stock Exchange og Hong Kong Limited. 
Available: http://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/SEHK/2004/0629/LTN20040629049.htm [2014, April 09]. 
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Hong Kong Public Offering 42 016 000
Pool A 21 008 000
(Aggregate Subscription Price of                
HK$5,000,000 or Less)
Pool B 21 008 000
(Aggregate Subscription Price of More Than 
HK$5,000,000 or Up to the Value of Pool B)
Total Hong Kong Offer Shares Available 210 080 250
International Placing 378 144 500
Total International Placement Shares Available 210 080 250
Add: Over-Alloted Shares (15%) 63 024 000
Total Amount of Offer Shares Available
(Includes the Over-Allotment Option)
483 184 500



















Table 4.8 shows that the over-allotment option raised the total amount of offer shares to 
483,184,500. In order to obtain the additional 63,024,000 shares required to undertake the over-
allotment option, Goldman Sachs borrowed these shares from Ma Huateng‟s BVI-incorporated 
Advance Data Services Limited (Advance Data Services) through a stock borrowing 
arrangement (see point 2.4.1 of Exhibit 2 in Appendix B).  
 
These additional 63,024,000 shares were returned and redelivered to Advance Data Services 
after they were issued as per the over-allotment option.  Evidently, this stock borrowing 
agreement led to indirect benefits for Tencent. Thus, on 4 June 2004 Tencent signed a Deed of 
Indemnity that they would indemnify Advanced Data Services for any losses that arose if they 
were unable to recover from the stock borrowing arrangement.  
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After receiving the relevant applications from prospective investors, both Tencent‟s Hong Kong 
Offer Shares and International Placement Shares were oversubscribed.  Acting on this, Goldman 
Sachs fully exercised its over-allotment option on 05 July 2004 (see 2.1.1.1.1 of Exhibit 2 in 
Appendix B). This was the only stabilizing action taken by Goldman Sachs during the stabilizing 
period.
81
 Tencent‟s Hong Kong Offer Shares were 159 times oversubscribed while shares in the 
International Placement were 17 times oversubscribed, indicating strong investor confidence in 
Tencent and its future outlook.  
 
Exercising the over-allotment option allowed Tencent to raise greater amounts of capital by 
meeting excess demand for its shares and to achieve its primary objective surrounding the IPO 
decision. By granting the underwriter the option to purchase and short-sell an additional 15% of 
total offer shares, this allowed Goldman Sachs to cover their short position while stabilizing 
Tencent‟s share price simultaneously. The impact of this was that if the share price was 
consistently above Tencent‟s offer price, the underwriters could exercise the greenshoe provision 
and repurchase the additional 63,024,000 shares at the offer price. This would ensure that 
Tencent could raise additional capital while the underwriters do not lose money.  
 
On the contrary, a decline in the market price below the initial set offer price may alarm 
investors and encourage them to sell their shares. To stabilize the share price, Goldman Sachs 
would have had to exercise the option to repurchase the additional 63,024,000 shares at the 
original offer price. By repurchasing these shares and returning them to Tencent, the underwriter 
would have reduced the supply of Tencent shares on the market and effectively stabilized the 
share price from declining further.  
 
Translating the oversubscription of Hong Kong Offer Shares into numerical terms, of the 6,657 
applications received and approved 5,854 (87.9%) were in respect of Pool A offer shares while 
803 (12.1%) were in respect of Pool B offer shares. This approximated to a total demand of 
1,170,853,000 Pool A offer shares and 5,527,560,000 Pool B offer shares by prospective 
applicants.  
                                                          
81 Stabilization is the process whereby underwriters in some markets facilitate the distribution of securities on the exchange.  In this case, 
Goldman Sachs, being the Global Coordinator and acting as both an underwriter and on behalf of HSBC; may over-allot shares or effect 
transactions for the purpose of ensuring a market price higher than what could initially be achieved. This is for a limited time period and is non-
obligatory. The stabilization period ended on July 10 2004. 
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Overall, this represented an oversubscription of 55 times and 263 times the 21,008,000 Hong 
Kong Offer Shares allocated to each respective pool. With reference to point 1.1.2 of Exhibit 2 in 
Appendix B, at the time of reviewing the received applications there was no evidence indicating 
that any single applicant applied for an amount of Hong Kong Offer Shares exceeding the 
21,008,000 (50%) threshold per applicant. 
 
As a safeguard to exercising the over-allotment option, Tencent‟s prospectus indicated that a 
clawback mechanism was in-place to accommodate for potential oversubscription of offer 
shares. The clawback mechanism was a policy officially implemented by the Securities & 
Futures Commission of Hong Kong (SFC) and the HKEx in Practice Note 18 on 24 June 1998. 
This policy was compulsory for all IPO firms on the HKEx which comprised of both a placing 




















                                                          
82 SFC. 1998. SFC and Stock Exchange Issue Conclusions on Offer Mechanism Consultation.Available: 
http://www.sfc.hk/edistributionWeb/gateway/EN/news-and-announcements/news/doc?refNo=240298 [2014, July 11]. 
HKEx. 1998. The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited- Practice Note 18. Available: 
http://www.hkex.com.hk/eng/rulesreg/listrules/listguid/iporq/Documents/m_pn_18.pdf [2014, July 11]. 
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Hong Kong Public Offering 42 016 000
Pool A 21 008 000
(Aggregate Subscription Price of                
HK$5,000,000 or Less)
Pool B 21 008 000
(Aggregate Subscription Price of More Than 
HK$5,000,000 or Up to the Value of Pool B)
Add: Clawback Provision                                  168 064 250
Total Hong Kong Offer Shares Available 210 080 250
International Placing 378 144 500
Less: Clawback Provision                                  -168 064 250
Total International Placement Shares Available 210 080 250
Total Amount of Offer Shares Available              
(Excludes the Over-Allotment Option)
Add: Over-Alloted Shares (15%) 63 024 000
Total Amount of Offer Shares Available
(Includes the Over-Allotment Option)
483 184 500
420 160 500





















Exhibit 1 of Appendix B shows that if the number of offer shares applied for in the Hong Kong 
Public Offering was 100 times or more the amount initially allocated; the total number of offer 
shares available under the Hong Kong Public Offering would be increased to represent 
approximately 50% of the total number of offer shares available under the offering. This 50% 
translated into an equivalent 210,080,250 offer shares. Resultantly, Table 4.9 shows that this re-
allocation saw 168,064,250 offer shares transferred from the International Placement to the Hong 
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Kong Public Offering, generating an equivalent amount of 210,080,250 offer shares per each 
placement type.  
 
Should the level of investor interest have been less pronounced, there would have been a 
reduction in either the offer price range or the amount of offer shares made available (see 
Appendix B, Exhibit 1).
83
 While this would have been based on interest levels during the book 
building process, any action from the global coordinator in this regard may only have become 
public knowledge on the second last day before the end of the application process. Should this 
have been the case, this „late‟ announcement could have frustrated applicants within the Hong 
Kong Public Offering segment as they were prohibited from withdrawing their application once 
submitted. 
 
Juxtaposed to this precautionary announcement, the initial offering (excluding the over-allotment 
option) raised HK$1,554,593,850 (US$199,360,578) at the confirmed offer price of HK$3.70 per 
share. This saw a shareholder allocation apportioned 90% to institutional investors and the 
remaining 10% to retail investors. However, the over-allotment and the clawback provision 
ensured that the shares were equally redistributed, with 50% awarded to retail investors and 50% 
to institutional investors. The over-allotted shares raised an additional HK$233,188,800 
(US$29,904,051) raising total offer proceeds to HK$1,787,782,650 (US$229,264,629).   
 
In total, the IPO deal represented 3.75% of Tencent‟s existing issued share capital at the time, 
and an approximate 3.61% of its issued share capital inclusive of the over-allotment shares.
84
 For 
a comprehensive breakdown of Tencent‟s shareholding structure please refer to Appendix B, 





                                                          
83 Tencent Holdings Limited.2004. IPO Prospectus- Hong Kong Public Offering and International Placing. Available: 
http://globaldocuments.morningstar.com/documentlibrary/document/137bb96118b048a4.msdoc/original [2014, April 04]. 
84 Tencent. 2004b. Hong Kong Public Offering and International Placing.Available: 
http://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/SEHK/2004/0607/LTN20040607055.pdf [2014, March 27]. 
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4.9 Use of IPO Proceeds 
 
Tencent planned to allocate IPO proceeds to pursue and finance new strategic initiatives, expand 
its existing business and achieve organic growth.  
 
Of the original HK$1,554,593,850 (US$199,360,578) proceeds raised (exclusive of the over-
allotment option), 65% (HK$1,010,486,003 / US$129,584,376) was allocated to pursue and 
finance new strategic initiatives in the real-time communications, entertainment and internet 
sectors. 20% (HK$310,918,770 / US$39,872,116) was allocated for further development of 
current and future technologies, content licensing, improving customer service segments and 
upgrading billing and collection services. The remaining 15% (HK$233,189,077/ 
US$29,904,087) was allocated to fund working capital and other general corporate purposes.  
The additional over-allotment proceeds of HK$233,188,800 (US$29,904,051) was allocated to 
fund Tencent‟s working capital.   
 
Tencent‟s aim to diversify its operations ensured potential acquisitions of third-party technology 
developers and service providers. These ranged from VoIP technologies, mobile location-based 
technologies and business advertising rank technologies to MMORPG and real-time strategy 
(RTS) games as well as consumer-to-consumer (C2C) and business-to-consumer (B2C) IM-
enabled platforms. While Tencent did not make explicit mention of specific target companies, 
each acquisition would enhance and complement its existing product and catalogue.  
 
4.10 The Day of Listing 
 
On Wednesday, 16 June 2004 Tencent Holdings Limited (stock code: 700) was approved for 
listing on the HKEx. Trading commenced at 09:30 am opening at HK$4.375. The share peaked 
at HK$4.625 before closing at HK$4.150 on the same day.  
 
Tencent shares were the second most actively traded shares on the HKEx that day, with a volume 
of 2,198,875,000 shares traded.
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Chapter 5: The Listing Decision – A Strategic 
Rationale for the IPO 
 
Research by Ernst & Young (EY) indicates that those companies which achieve strong post-IPO 
performance link this success to treating the IPO as a transformation process and not simply as 
an isolated financing event (EY, 2013: 04). This is evident from the likes of Tencent which too 
has come to reap the rewards of its IPO offering over the past decade of listing.  
 
However, in order for an IPO decision to come to fruition successfully, a variety of strategic 
considerations must be accounted for. It is this strategic rationale which, combined with the 
company‟s pre-IPO policies and procedures will inevitably determine the success of this 
decision.  
 
5.1 HKEx vs NASDAQ: The Listing Decision  
 
Tencent filed for an IPO to raise further capital through the Hong Kong equity market. As per 
Section 4.9, these generated proceeds would be used to organically grow and expand the existing 
business through company acquisitions and strategic initiatives. In doing so, this would ensure 
that Tencent protected its market position and remained competitive in the Chinese internet and 
telecommunications industry.  
 
Table 4.5 in Section 4.7 shows that three out of four industry competitors favored the NASDAQ 
Stock Market to launch their IPOs. These entities listed on the NASDAQ during the peak of the 
Dotcom bubble in the year 2000. 
 
The fourth competitor, TOM Online launched its IPO in the same year as Tencent. Within one 
day of each other, TOM Online dual-listed on both the HKGEM and NASDAQ.   
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Entry Standard 1                        
The Income Standard
Entry Standard 2          
The Equity Standard                   
Entry Standard 3                                   
The Market Value Standard                        
✓
✓
Before examining the strategic rationale behind Tencent‟s listing decision it is important to 
assess Tencent‟s eligibility to list on the NASDAQ National Market. To be eligible to list on the 
NASDAQ National Market a company had to meet at least one of the entry standards in Table 
5.1. Entry standard 1 (the income standard) used pre-tax income from continuing operations as 
its primary factor of assessment. Entry standard 2 (the equity standard) used shareholders‟ equity 
as its primary factor of assessment, while entry standard 3 (the market value standard) used the 
market value of listed securities or the total assets and total revenue of the company as its 
primary factor of assessment (see Appendix C, Exhibit 1 for a detailed description of these 
standards). 
 
It is clear from Table 4.6 in Section 4.8 that Tencent met the HKEx‟s Profit Test and Market 
Capitalization/Revenue/Cash Flow Test to list on the Main Board of the exchange in the 2004 
year (also see Appendix A, Exhibit 8).  
 














Table 5.1 summarizes the NASDAQ National Market listing requirements and shows that 
Tencent, like its competitors four years prior, was completely eligible to launch an IPO on the 
NASDAQ in 2004 (see Appendix C, Exhibit 1).  




In light of Tencent‟s decision to list on the HKEx Main Board, it is therefore of relevance to 
explore this IPO listing decision and the strategic rationale behind Tencent‟s decision to defy 
historical industry IPO listing trends.  
 
5.2 British Virgin Islands (BVI) and The Cayman Islands 
 
5.2.1 Incorporating in the BVI 
 
The primary reason that PRC companies chose to incorporate in the BVI was because it was a 
tax haven, 
85





Based on the information in Section 4.8, it may be questioned why Tencent did not originally 
choose to simply incorporate in the Cayman Islands and thus avoid the subsequent complications 
surrounding its corporate structure altogether. This can be attributed to cost. The costs associated 
with incorporating a BVI company were approximately 20% lower than the costs associated with 
incorporating in the Cayman Islands (Schilder, 2011: 01).  
 
Ten percent of all foreign investments in China are from companies that are incorporated in the 
BVI (Tax Justice Network, 2011). In this context, many Chinese companies leave their monies in 
the BVI for an extended period of time. Once an appropriate time period has elapsed, this money 
is sent back into China in the guise of foreign investment. By ensuring an appropriate time 
period has elapsed, this guarantees that there are no capital gains tax (CGT) implications on these 
earnings. Should a Chinese company directly deposit money into China upon receiving it, this 
method would incur direct capital gains tax consequences.  
 
                                                          
85 Tax Haven – This is a state, country or territory offering foreign individuals and businesses little or no tax liability in a politically and 
economically stable environment. Furthermore, they too provide little or no financial information to tax authorities.  
 
86 Tax Avoidance – This is a legal practice, and makes use of legal methods to modify a businesses or individuals financial situation to lower their 
income tax owed. 
 
  Tax Evasion – This is an illegal practice, whereby a business or individual avoids paying their true tax liability. This is a criminal offense 
subject to penalties and criminal charges.  
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5.2.2 Redomiciling to the Cayman Islands 
 
At the time of Tencent‟s IPO, the listing regulations of the HKEx Main Board only permitted 
companies registered in Hong Kong, Mainland China, Bermuda and the Cayman Islands to list in 
on the exchange (HKEx, 2006; EY, 2009). This was because the legislation of these areas met 
with the HKEx‟s minimum required standards surrounding shareholder protection rights.  This 
meant that the shareholder protection rights of BVI legislation were not of the required HKEx 
standard and consequently Tencent was not permitted to list on the exchange.  
 
The transfer of Tencent‟s company registration from the BVI to the Cayman Islands represented 
a core strategic move in its efforts to go public. This decision further solidified the company‟s 
intentions to list on the HKEx as its exchange of choice, quashing earlier speculation associated 
with its potential listing platforms (see Section 4.8).  
 
Rule 19.05 in Chapter 19 of the HKEx Main Board Listing Rules specifies the following:  
The Exchange reserves the right, in its absolute discretion, to refuse a listing of securities of an 
overseas issuer if: - 
 
(a) it believes that it is not in the public interest to list them; or 
 
(b) the Exchange is not satisfied that the overseas issuer is incorporated or otherwise established 
in a jurisdiction where the standards of shareholder protection are at least equivalent to those 
provided in Hong Kong. 
                                                                                                                (HKEx, 2004b: 01) 
 
In reference to point (b), there were striking differences in the constitutional documents 
surrounding shareholder protection rights between the BVI Act and Cayman Island legislation.  
However, in accordance with rule 19.05(1) the HKEx drafted an alternative solution for overseas 
entities such those in Tencent‟s position:  
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Note: Where the Exchange believes that the jurisdiction in which the overseas issuer is 
incorporated is unable to provide standards of shareholder protection at least equivalent to 
those provided in Hong Kong, but that it is possible by means of varying the overseas issuer‟s 
constitutive documents to provide standards of shareholder protection equivalent to those 
provided in Hong Kong, then the Exchange may approve the listing of securities of the overseas 
issuer subject to the overseas issuer making such variations to its constitutive documents as the 
Exchange may require.” 
 
                                                                                                                (HKEx, 2004b: 01) 
 
Exhibit 2 of Appendix C provides a detailed description of the differences in shareholder 
protection rights between the BVI Act and Cayman Island Law. This exhibit includes possible 
alterations made by BVI-incorporated companies in order to comply with the provision to rule 
19.05(1) as above.
87
   
 
It is clear that at the time of the IPO process the above-mentioned regulations represented a 
source of risk to Tencent. Should the HKEx have invoked the provision to rule 19.05(1), this 
may have raised concerns for investors in terms of Tencent‟s shareholder protection policies. In 
addition, this could have led to delays in the IPO process, distorting Tencent‟s estimated timeline 
of events, and potentially affect overall investor demand.   
 
There was a possibility that the HKEx could have refused Tencent the right to list on the 
exchange, regardless of the necessary amendments in accordance with the provision to rule 
19.05(1) (see Appendix C, Exhibit 2). This would have led to further delays for Tencent‟s IPO as 
the company would have needed to list on an alternative, suitable exchange. Inevitably this could 
have affected market sentiment and the overall level of demand surrounding the IPO. While it is 
safe to assume that Tencent would likely have chosen the NASDAQ as an alternative measure, 
this too would have subjected the company to specific requirements and procedures which may 
also have led to further delays in launching the IPO.  
 
                                                          
87 These differences and suggested alterations are materially consistent with the practices of the SEHK, rule 19.05 and the provision to rule 19.05 
as per the HKEx Main Board listing rules in the 2004 year.  
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Note: The BVI Business Companies Act was implemented in 2004, shortly after the IPO. This Act 
addressed all concerns regarding minority shareholder protection as outlined by the HKEx.  The 
aim of this act was to align generally accepted international guidelines on minority shareholder 
protection with existing BVI-policies (Ogier, 2009: 01).  
 
5.3 HKEx vs NASDAQ: Comparing the Cost of Listing 
 
The analysis to follow accounts for the fee structures of the HKEx Main Board and the 
NASDAQ National Market at the time of Tencent‟s IPO. Fees are calculated based upon the 
midpoint of the offer price range, being HK$3.235 per offer share. This is because the actual 
offer price of HK$3.70 was not confirmed by the time Tencent made its decision to list on the 
HKEx. 
 
The following calculations are based on the initial listing fees and annual listing fees outlined in 
the listing rules and regulations of each respective exchange.  
 
The NASDAQ National Market data was retrieved from the 2003 „NASDAQ Rule 4000 Series‟ 
(SEC, 2003: 101 - 111). This series of rules and regulations remained effective until July 2006, 
upon which the NASDAQ Stock Market restructured its market tiers by introducing the 
NASDAQ Global Select Market (NASDAQ, 2014: 01). 
 
Research indicates that the applicable sections of the HKEx Main Board initial listing fees and 
annual listing fees have remained unchanged (HKEx, 2014a). While the HKEx began making 
amendments to the Main Board listing rules as at 31 March 2004, all amendments have not 
affected the amounts charged by the HKEx Main Board for its initial listing fees and annual 
listing fees. All amendments affecting the fee structure of the HKEx were specific to equity 
instruments and scenarios that were neither applicable nor material to Tencent‟s IPO decision 
and the associated listing fees (HKEx, 2008a; 2008b; 2009a; 2014b).  
 
These total fees have been calculated both exclusive of the over-allotment option and inclusive 
of the over-allotment option.  
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400 000 1 169 685 450 000 1 169 685
449 000 584 843 541 000 584 843
n/a 38 990 n/a 38 990
n/a n/a n/a n/a
849 000 1 793 518 991 000 1 793 518
Assessment Fee
For the purpose of comparison and uniformity, all NASDAQ-related fees have been converted from United 
States Dollars (US$) into Hong Kong Dollars (HK$) at the prevailing exchange rate as at Tencent's HKEx 
listing date, 16 June 2004. On this date US$1 equated to HK$7,7979.
Inclusive of the Over-Allotment Option   
(Midpoint Offer Price of HK$3.235 per Share)
Exclusive of the Over-Allotment Option 
(Midpoint Offer Price of HK$3.235 per Share)
Note
Non-Refundable Application Fee
HKEX                      
Main Board (HK$)
NASDAQ                 
National Market (HK$)
NASDAQ                 
National Market (HK$)
Equity Market Listing Fee
Annual Exchange Fee
HKEX                       
Main Board (HK$)
Table 5.2: Actual HKEx Main Board Listing Fee Structure and Estimated NASDAQ National  












Table 5.2 together with Exhibit 3 of Appendix C show that both exchanges charged IPO firms an 
initial equity market listing fee as well as an annual exchange fee. The NASDAQ charged listing 
applicants an additional non-refundable HK$38,990 (US$5,000) application fee, while neither 
exchange charged listing applicants an assessment fee.  
 
5.3.1 Exclusive of the Over-Allotment Shares 
 
Table 5.2 shows that Tencent would have paid a total of HK$849,000 to list on the HKEx Main 
Board assuming that its offer shares were priced at the midpoint of the offer price range, and that 
the over-allotment option was not exercised. Accounting for the initial 420,160,500 offer shares, 
this ensured that the total value of the equities listed approximated to (420,160,500 offer shares x 
HK$3.235 per share) HK$1,359,219,218. Applying this amount to the fee tables in Exhibit 3 of 
Appendix C, it is clear that this amount can be categorized in the „not exceeding – 1,500 million‟ 
category in relation to the HKEx equity market listing fees. Therefore, the corresponding initial 
fee that Tencent would have had to pay was HK$400,000. Applying this to the HKEx‟s annual 
exchange listing fees, it is clear from Exhibit 3 of Appendix C that the value of Tencent‟s offer 
shares could be categorized under the „not exceeding – 1,500 million‟ category. Therefore, the 
corresponding annual fee to be paid by Tencent was HK$449,000. 
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Table 5.2 shows that Tencent would pay a total of HK$1,793,518 (US$230,000) to list on the 
NASDAQ National Market assuming that its offer shares were priced at the midpoint of the offer 
price range, and that the over-allotment option was not exercised. In terms of the NASDAQ 
National Market, there were fewer thresholds applied in the fee calculation. However, IPO firms 
would incur a non-refundable application fee of HK$38,990 (US$5,000) over and above the 




Considering the volume of Tencent‟s offer shares, it would have been categorized in the „over 50 
million shares‟ category with respect to the NASDAQ‟s equity market listing fees. This 
translated into a total cost of HK$1,169,685 (US$150,000) at the time.
89
 In terms of the annual 
listing fee, Tencent‟s total number of shares outstanding superseded the NASDAQ‟s top tier of 
one hundred million shares. This meant that the company would have been categorized in the 
‟over 100 million shares‟ category as per Exhibit 3 of Appendix C, and would have paid an 




5.3.2 Inclusive of the Over-Allotment Shares 
 
Taking the additional 63,024,000 over-allotment shares into consideration, this increased the 
total amount of offer shares to 483,184,500. This meant that the total value of the equities listed 
would approximate to (483,184,500 offer shares x HK$3.235 per share) HK$1,563,101,858.  
 
Table 5.2 shows that Tencent would have had to pay a total of HK$991,000 to list on the HKEx 
Main Board assuming that its offer shares were priced at the midpoint of the offer price range, 
and that the over-allotment option was exercised. By including the over-allotment option, this 
increased the total value of the equities to be listed by approximately 15%. Applying this to the 
HKEx Main Board equity market listing fee tables in Exhibit 3 of Appendix C, this changed the 
categorization of Tencent‟s offer shares and increased its listing costs. Resultantly Tencent 
would have been categorized in the „not exceeding- 2,000 million‟ category and would have paid 
an initial equity market listing fee of HK$450,000. This was 12.5% higher than the HK$400,000 
                                                          
88 On 16 June 2004 US$ 1 equated to HK$ 7, 7979. Therefore, US$5,000 x HK$7, 7979 = HK$ 38,990. 
89 On 16 June 2004 US$ 1 equated to HK$ 7,7979. Therefore, US$150,000 x HK$7, 794789 = HK$ 1,169,685.. 
90 On 16 June 2004 US$ 1 equated to HK$ 7, 7979. Therefore, US$75,000 x HK$7, 7979 = HK$ 584,843. 
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equity market listing fee achieved without accounting for the over-allotment option. The same 
scenario applied when determining the HKEx annual listing fee. Table 5.2 shows that the over-
allotment option increased the HKEx annual listing fee by 20.49% from HK$449,000 to 
HK$541,000.  
 
Inclusive of the over-allotment option, the total fees payable by Tencent to list on the NASDAQ 
National Market were HK$1,793,518 (US$230,000). This was inclusive of the HK$38,990 
(US$5,000) non-refundable application fee.  
 
Exhibit 3 of Appendix C shows that the vast difference in fees charged by the respective 
exchanges was directly related to the classification systems used. The NASDAQ‟s simplistic 
classification system was based on the number of shares made available, as opposed to the HKEx 
which used a comprehensive tier system based on the value of the equities listed. Tencent‟s 
original 420,160,500 available offer shares showed that regardless of the over-allotment option 
the company would still have been classified in the top tier of the NASDAQ‟s equity market 
listing fee and annual exchange fee structures. Therefore, the NASDAQ equity market listing fee 
would remain at a total cost of HK$1,169,685 (US$150,000) while the annual listing fee would 
remain at HK$584,843 (US$75,000) as well.   
 
Accounting for the fee structures and associated scenarios above, it is clear that the collective 
listing fees charged by the HKEx Main Board were 80.98% to 111.25% lower than the total 
listing fees charged by the NASDAQ National Market. This shows that it was costly for Tencent 
to list on the NASDAQ National Market and indicates that as a strategic consideration, this 
would have played a large role in Tencent‟s listing decision. However, listing fees are not the 
predominant factor when choosing an exchange. Therefore, one needs to assess other regulatory 
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5.4 US GAAP and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
 
5.4.1 US GAAP 
 
Up until 15 November 2007, the NASDAQ did not allow IPO applicants to prepare their 
financial statements according to the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). 
Previously, all NASDAQ IPO applicants were to reconcile its financial statements prepared 
under IFRS with US GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) (NASDAQ, 2007:1). 
As mentioned in Section 4.8, should Tencent have applied to list on the NASDAQ National 
Market it would have had to comply with US GAAP accounting standards.  
 
The likes of the British Virgin Islands (BVI), Cayman Islands and Hong Kong have adopted 
IFRS as their primary standard to prepare financial statements (PWC, 2013: 8, 12, 158).
91
 This 
suggests that Tencent would have needed to re-prepare all of its audited financial statements to 
account for US GAAP if it was to list on the NASDAQ. This would have presented a problem 
with respect to both cost, and time delay.  
Should Tencent have elected to follow-through with a decision to list on the NASDAQ, the 
associated costs to re-prepare its financial statements according to US GAAP accounting 
standards would have exacerbated listing costs. This would have increased Tencent‟s 80.98% to 
111.25% HKEx cost-saving differential even further. A considerable time delay in redrafting the 
statements would also slow down the overall IPO process. At a time when technology IPOs were 
traditionally rebounding from a 3-year downturn (resulting from the 2000 Dotcom crash), this 
could have had a considerable effect on the potential demand for Tencent shares at the time 
(Schwartz & Stephens, 2006).  
 
 
5.4.2 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) 
 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was signed into United States law on 30 July 2002 (SEC, 2002: 01). A 
                                                          
91 In general Hong Kong companies are to prepare financial statements under local GAAP, Hong Kong Financial Reporting Standards (HKFRS). 
However, these have been converged with IFRS and there are/were no significant differences in accounting policy between IFRS and HKFRS in 
preparing Tencent‟s financial statements.  
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response to the white-collar crimes of multinational corporations (MNCs) in the late 90‟s, this 
US legislation created stringent requirements for businesses in the areas of corporate governance, 
financial disclosure and public accounting practices.  
 
As a result, all companies that applied to list or were currently listed in the USA would have 
needed to comply with these regulations. Tencent would have had to follow suit in order to be 
eligible to list on the NASDAQ. In light of this, Tencent‟s readiness to comply with the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act could have had a significant impact on the timing of its IPO in the market 
and the valuation received (PWC, 2004: 17). Compliance with the applicable sections in the Act 
would have been a laborious task likely to delay its IPO process.  
 
Law firm „Foley & Lardner‟ suggested that for companies generating revenues under $1 billion, 
the average annual cost of going public in accordance with Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2004 had 
increased by 123.1% from US$1.3 million to US$2.9 million (Schwartz & Stephens, 2006). It is 
evident from Exhibit 2 of Appendix D that Tencent had consistently achieved revenues under 
US$1 billion between 2001 and 2003.
92
 This suggested that it would have cost Tencent an 
additional HK$226,182,60 in order to be Sarbanes-Oxley compliant.
93
 
Over and above the cost, should Tencent not have adequately met the requirements of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, there could have been a lack of investment from potential investors as well 
as a lack of underwriter enthusiasm resulting from this added risk. 
 
Note: While the Sarbanes-Oxley Act did address specific regulatory requirements, there was 







                                                          
92 Tencent‟s highest revenue achieved during the 2001 to 2003 period was 734,957,000 RMB. At the average 2003 US$ to HK$ conversion rate 
of 8.2770 RMB to US$ 1, this translate to (734,957,000 RMB / 8.2770 RMB) = US$ 88,795,095. 
93 US$2.9 million x HK$7.7994 = HK$226, 182, 60. 





It is clear from the above that there were various factors that Tencent‟s management would have 
had to consider in deciding on its exchange of choice. While the HKEx Main Board listing fees 
were 80.98% to 111.25% cheaper than the NASDAQ National Market, listing fees are one of 
many factors to consider when choosing an exchange (EY, 2013:14). The regulatory 
complications of US GAAP accounting policies and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 encouraged 
additional costs for Tencent and potential time delays that would have affected both the company 
valuation and resultant demand of Tencent shares.  
 
Thus, it was evident that as a Chinese internet firm with extensive operations in the PRC, 
Tencent was already well suited to list on the HKEx. Not only was it cost-effective, but there 
was a clear connection between the HKEx and Tencent‟s business. This was attributable to the 
likes of the relevant listing and statutory regulations, a language and cultural link and the sheer 
popularity of Tencent and the QQ brand within Hong Kong and the PRC.   
 
These factors ensured that the HKEx listing process was financially feasible and timeously 
executed, reducing the overall risks that Tencent would have faced if it had chosen to list on the 
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Chapter 6: A Complex Valuation of the 
Tencent IPO 
 
Note: As a case study, this chapter is written from the perspective of an outside investor 
valuing Tencent on 16 June 2004.  It is written in the present tense because it is forward-
looking from a point in time during the 2004 year leading up to its IPO listing date. 
 
This valuation is based solely on company information available as at 16 June 2004. No 
other information has been reviewed, considered or incorporated into these valuation 
models whatsoever. This guarantees that the following chapter is unbiased and 
uninfluenced by any post-IPO company events or material that may affect or influence 
one’s judegment.  
 
The following chapter provides a valuation of Tencent Holdings Limited as at its IPO listing 
date. The purpose of this valuation is to establish, based on the case information, whether the 
IPO was fairly priced in accordance with Tencent‟s intrinsic value at the time of listing. In doing 
so, this provides insight into the true value of Tencent‟s offer shares and the likelihood 
occurrence of potential IPO underpricing.    
 
This valuation has been conducted in accordance with the relative/multiples approach, and the 
unlevered FCFF (Free Cash Flow to the Firm) discounted cash flow (DCF) approach. The two 
valuation methods complement each other in achieving the most accurate assessment of the 
IPO‟s intrinsic share value. The DCF valuation ensures that through assessing Tencent‟s cash 
flows, growth and risk characteristics it achieves the best estimated intrinsic value of the IPO 
shares. 
 
By comparing Tencent to its competitors on a variety of factors, it is possible to establish which 
competitor best replicates Tencent as a company. By calculating appropriate valuation metrics 
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for the proxy company and adjusting these for Tencent‟s firm-specific risk and growth factors, 
this relative valuation approach ensures that a suitable range in share prices can be established 
for Tencent.  
 
As Tencent was a private company prior to its IPO, certain market variables required under the 
DCF approach cannot be obtained, leaving the model incomplete. Once this suitable proxy 
company has been established, the relevant market-related variables can be substituted into the 
DCF valuation model for Tencent. This estimated intrinsic value can then be interpreted together 
with the price range determined under the relative valuation model.  
 
6.1 Relative Valuation: A Comparison between Tencent 
Holdings Limited and its Industry Competitors 
 
All companies within the competitor portfolio have financial years starting 1 January and ending 
31 December of each year. Importantly, prior to 2002 SINA Corp‟s financial year-end was from 
1 July to June 30. As of November 2002 its fiscal year-end was changed to 31 December. Upon 
this change, the associated 2002 financial results were restated and recompiled in accordance. 
This means that for comparative purposes all references to SINA Corp‟s 2001 financial results 
are in accordance to a financial year-end of 30 June and not 31 December as per the 2002 and 
2003 fiscal year-ends. 
 
Despite Tencent‟s market position within the Chinese internet space, it faces strong industry 
competition from SINA Corp, Sohu.com, NetEase and TOM Online (see Section 4.5). The 
following section provides a comparison of Tencent and each of these competitors across a range 
of characteristics with the goal of establishing the most suitable competitor(s) from which to 
compute a relative valuation for the company. 
 
 For a detailed summary of the background and history of each of these competitors, please see 
Appendix D, Exhibit 1. 
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In order to account for any exchange rate differences between Tencent and its industry peers, all 
data quoted as Chinese Renminbi has been converted to US Dollars.
94
 As Tencent‟s competitors 
are listed on the NASDAQ, it is a pre-requisite of the exchange for their financial statements to 
be quoted in US Dollars. Therefore, for comparable purposes all financial statements have been 
adjusted to reflect these amounts in US Dollars. 
 
6.1.1 Operating Segments  
 
Although Tencent has four operating segments, its three primary operating segments are MVAS, 
IVAS and online advertising. With inter-related product and service offerings, these effectively 
leverage each operating segment‟s market position by creating and influencing market demand. 
 
6.1.1.1 Mobile & Telecommunications Value-Added Services (MVAS) 
 
The core of this operating segment is Tencent‟s Mobile QQ offering. In addition, this operating 
segment provides mobile chat services, interactive voice response (IVR) services, ringback 
tones, mobile music download services, picture download services, mobile news and information 
content services as well as mobile games.   
 
6.1.1.2 Internet Value-Added Services (IVAS) 
 
Tencent‟s IM services are the core of its IVAS operating segment. These IM services comprise 
of three primary offerings, namely Basic QQ, Premium QQ and Tencent Messenger (see Section 
4.5.1). In addition, Tencent also offers QQ Mail, a supplementary email service integrated with 
the QQ platform. Furthermore, the IVAS segment provides community services through 
offerings such as the QQ.com Portal, QQ Dating, QQ Alumni Club and QQ E-card. This also 
includes entertainment services such as casual games, QQ Show (avatars) and MMORPG games. 
                                                          
94 Tencent‟s financial results for the 2001 to 2003 period were converted at the relevant World Bank nominal exchange rates for the US dollar to 
the Chinese Renminbi. This  equated to the following ratios: 
 
2001 – US$1 = 8.2771 RMB  
2002 – US$1 = 8.2770 RMB 
2003 – US$1 = 8.2770 RMB  
 
 




6.1.1.3 Online Advertising Services 
 
Based on the information in Section 4.5.4, Tencent advertises via its PC-based QQ IM offering 
and continues to increase advertising efforts on its QQ.com web portal.   
 
The PC-based QQ IM service provides an attractive and unique advertising platform for 
Tencent‟s clients. Namely, this is because it uses log-in flashes and system messages to 
differentiate itself from other online advertising entities.  
 
The concept of a log-in flash is that when QQ users login to the QQ network a targeted high-
resolution advert will appear for a limited time period (Tencent Prospectus, 2004: 88). The user 
will have to wait for the time period to elapse before they are able to use the QQ network. 
System messages are advertising messages that are sent-out to all QQ users at the same time. QQ 
will send a user-targeted IM message from its server to all active QQ users based on collected 
user data. This message, usually in picture format, gives the user the opportunity to click on the 
image to learn more about the product or service on offer (Tencent Prospectus, 2004: 88).  
 
6.1.1.4 Other Services 
 
These include Tencent‟s RTX Enterprise IM service offering (see Section 4.1.4) as well as 
trademark licensing revenues from co-branded QQ products, Q-Gen products and retail shows.    
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Tencent Holdings Ltd SINA Corp Sohu.com NetEase TOM Online
Internet Value-Added Services (IVAS)
IM services ✓ X ✓ ✓ X
Email services (QQ Mail) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Community Services
Web Portal (QQ.com) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Online Dating (QQ Dating) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ X
Alumni Club (QQ Alumni Club) ✓ X ✓ ✓ X
E-Card services (QQ E-Card) ✓ X ✓ ✓ X
Entertainment Services
Casual Games ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ X
Digital Avatars (QQ Show) ✓ X X X X
MMOG Games ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ X
Mobile IM (Mobile QQ) ✓ X X X X
Mobile Chat Services ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
IVR Services ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Ringback Tones ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Mobile Music & Picture Download Services ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Mobile News and Information Content Services ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Mobile Games ✓ ✓ ✓ X X
Online Advertising Services ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Other Servies
Enterprise IM Services (RTX) ✓ X X X X
Product and Brand Licensing ✓ X X X X
Overall                            
Percentage Match (%) 63.16% 78.95% 73.68% 42.11%
Mobile and Telecommuncations                                              
Value-Added Services (MVAS)
Table 6.1: Comparison of the Product and Service Offerings between the Operating Segments of 



















As per Table 6.1 above, it is evident that Sohu.com resembles Tencent the most with regards to 
its product and service offerings, while NetEase does so to a slightly lesser extent and SINA 
Corp and TOM Online much less so.  
 
While Table 6.1 shows the correlation between Tencent and Sohu.com‟s product and services, 
there are distinct differences in the range and depth of each entity‟s offerings.  
 
Tencent‟s primary offering, its IM services are unmatched by its respective competitors. While 
Sohu.com offers its SOQ IM service, the platform was only publicly released in the fourth 
quarter of the 2003 financial year (Sohu.com, 2003: 07). As an offering in its infancy stage it is 
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clear that Tencent‟s QQ offerings are vastly superior in terms of popularity and overall 
functionality. As a PC-only IM platform SOQ proves that Sohu.com‟s IM product offerings are 
not on par with Tencent. While Tencent offers Mobile QQ, there are no other vast differences 
between each company‟s MVAS offerings.  
 
In terms of the respective email services offered, Sohu.com charges its users a once-off 
registration fee as well as a monthly subscription fee granting mobile email access. Compared to 
Tencent‟s free QQ Mail service this highlights a further area of difference between the two 
company‟s‟ product and service offerings.   
 
Sohu.com emphasizes focus on its web portal, providing central access to the likes of community 
services and entertainment services similar to Tencent. Sohu.com‟s web portal contains greater 
amounts of content than Tencent‟s QQ.com, focusing largely on its unique online directory, 
search engine and e-commerce offerings. Collectively, Sohu.com‟s web portal has generated 
greater total online advertising revenues than Tencent. 
 
When analyzing these differences in terms of the revenue-generating properties of each 
company, there is little difference between Tencent and Sohu.com. Where Sohu.com generates e-
subscriptions and e-commerce revenues, Tencent benefits from premium IM services, RTX 
system and licensing agreements. However, when taking Tencent‟s Mobile QQ and QQ 
Premium services into consideration, it is clear that Tencent‟s product and service offerings are 
stronger.  
 
6.1.2 Place of Incorporation 
 
Although incorporated in the Cayman Islands, Tencent has two principal places of business - 
Admiralty, Hong Kong and its headquarters in Shenzhen, PRC. In terms of Tencent‟s 
competitors, it is important to account for their place of incorporation, headquarters location and 
the geographic segmentation of each competitor‟s operations. In this context, it is evident from 
Exhibit 1 of Appendix D that Tencent and all respective competitors are incorporated in the 
Cayman Islands, yet operate in the PRC (for a detailed explanation, see Section 5.2.2). 
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6.1.3 Creating Opportunities for International Expansion  
 
Tencent‟s primary operations are in Hong Kong and Mainland China. Prior to the IPO Tencent 
has positioned itself for potential future expansion into the United States, South Africa and the 
rest of Asia. 
 
It did so by registering the QQ mark and the penguin logo in Hong Kong, Taiwan and Japan, 
while filing associated trademark applications in Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, South Korea, 
South Africa and the United States (Tencent Prospectus, 2004: 94).It also filed additional 
trademark applications in Taiwan and Japan. 
 
While it is common for a company to exercise appropriate measures in order to secure its 
intellectual property, the relevant patent applications in the respective foreign countries hint at 
potential market expansion in future. By filing over 30 patent applications in the PRC and the 
United States alone, it appears that Tencent recognizes the potential threat posed by its 
competitors in the PRC and North American internet space. Therefore Tencent has taken the 
necessary legal and precautionary measures to both protect and diversify its market position. 
 
Naspers‟s (previously MIH) 46.5% ownership stake in Tencent has provided an effective 
opportunity for both parties to benefit from relevant licensing and cooperation agreements in 
untapped market spaces. This has ensured the potential for Tencent to penetrate into previously 
untapped markets in Indonesia, Thailand, Greece, Cyprus and South Africa. In addition, Naspers 
has used Tencent‟s services to leverage the product offerings of its affiliate companies, namely 
Mweb Thailand Limited (Mweb Thailand). Mweb Thailand agreed to pay Tencent 3 Baht per 
SMS message and 4.50 Baht per MMS message to use any of Tencent‟s licensed downloadable 
images (Tencent Prospectus, 2004: 133). 
 
The only company amongst Tencent‟s competitors to internationally expand its operations is 
SINA Corp. SINA Corp operates in a diverse portfolio of countries, namely China, Hong Kong, 
Taiwan and the United States. However, SINA Corp focusses its efforts on specifically targeting 
Chinese individuals living in these countries, and not on the general population. 
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Sohu.com, NetEase and TOM Online operate in the PRC and Hong Kong only.  
 
However, of these companies, Sohu.com is the only one to expand its patent and trademark 
applications abroad. Specifically, Sohu.com registered three service marks in the United States, 





While international trademark and patent applications are not fully conclusive evidence of a 
company‟s international expansion plans, they are integral in providing a company the 
opportunity to do so properly. Taking this into consideration, the activities of SINA Corp and 
Sohu.com surrounding this notion are most comparable to Tencent. While Tencent and 
Sohu.com may not act on these patents and trademarks, they reserve the right for these 
















                                                          
95 Sohu. 2003b. Sohu Annual Report 2003. Available: http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/ABEA-
4Z99DA/3131732366x0x662302/1B6ADA5A-25A6-4D51-ADFF-D665C74CC6AE/2003_Annual_Report.pdf [2014, April 16].    





Tencent's Revenues > Competitors by x%
Tencent's Revenues < Competitors by x%
Key
SINA Corp Sohu.com NetEase TOM Online
2001 350.0% 119.3% -42.4% 8.5%
2002 22.4% -9.6% -11.6% -5.7%
2003 28.7% -9.4% -22.6% -13.2%
 
It is observable from Figure 6.1 that during the 2001 to 2003 period, SINA Corp consistently 
generated year-on-year revenues exceeding all other industry competitors. 
 
Table 6.2: Revenue Differential between Tencent and its Four Main Competitors over the 2001 











Contrasting this with Tencent‟s revenues over this period, Table 6.2 shows that the difference 
between the two company‟s revenues translates into a range of deviations of between 22.3% and 
349.9%. The figures and tables show that in terms of revenue, Sohu.com and TOM Online 
closely resemble Tencent. On a comparable basis Sohu.com and TOM Online‟s past and most 















Tencent Holdings (US$) 5 929 31 788 88 795
Year-on-Year Revenue Growth (%) 436.14% 179.33%
Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) 286.99%
SINA Corp Revenue (US$) 26 683 38 894 114 285
Year-on-Year Revenue Growth (%) 45.76% 193.84%
Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) 106.96%
Sohu.com (US$) 13 000 28 729 80 425
Year-on-Year Revenue Growth (%) 120.99% 179.94%
Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) 148.73%
NetEase (US$) 3 417 28 088 68 758
Year-on-Year Revenue Growth (%) 722.01% 144.79%
Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) 348.58%
TOM Online (US$) 6 433 29 975 77 073
Year-on-Year Revenue Growth (%) 365.96% 157.12%
Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) 246.13%
(US$'000)















Table 6.3 shows that over time Sohu.com better replicated Tencent‟s revenues. This was because 
Sohu.com‟s 2003 revenues were 9.4% smaller than Tencent‟s as opposed to TOM Online‟s, 
which were 13.2% smaller.  
The 2003 financial year is the best indicator of Tencent‟s most recent financial performance. 
This means that a larger weighting has been placed on this factor when assessing which 
competitor best replicates Tencent on the basis of revenues.  
 
Therefore, the similarities in revenue growth patterns and the reduced revenue differential 
between Tencent and both Sohu.com and TOM Online suggests that both competitors are most 
comparable to Tencent on the basis of revenues.  
 
 




Tencent Holdings 63.23% 72.76% 68.77%
% Change - 9.5% -4.0%
SINA Corp 42.46% 60.12% 69.87%
% Change - 17.7% 9.8%
Sohu.com 27.59% 53.27% 68.66%
% Change - 25.7% 15.4%
NetEase -130.79% 67.56% 84.24%
% Change - 198.4% 16.7%
TOM Online -69.56% 17.02% 42.80%
% Change - 86.6% 25.8%
6.1.5 Gross Margins  
 














Figure 6.2 shows that over the 2001 to 2002 financial period Tencent earned gross margins that 
outperformed its industry peers. In the 2003 financial year Tencent was the only company to 
experience a decline in its gross margins when compared with previous years.   
 
Table 6.4: Summary of Gross Margins earned by Tencent and its Competitors over the 2001 to 
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Table 6.4 suggests that the ability of both Sohu.com and SINA Corp to retain a percentage of 
each dollar per sale was approximately equivalent to Tencent in the 2003 financial year. SINA 
Corp and Sohu.com earned an almost identical gross margin to Tencent. Sohu.com‟s 68.77% 
margin was the closest approximation to Tencent‟s in the 2003 year, while SINA Corp‟s 69.87% 
was 1.1% higher.  
 
Taking this into consideration, it would appear that both Sohu.com and SINA Corp are the most 
comparable competitors to Tencent on this basis.  
 

















Figure 6.3 shows that Tencent had the smallest asset base amongst its competitors in the 2001 to 
2003 financial period. On the contrary, Tencent posted the largest growth in total assets over this 
period, generating a CAGR of 196.4%.
96
   
 
                                                          
96 CAGR of Tencent‟s Total Assets for 2001 to 2003: [(69 556 / 7 918)^(1/2) – 1) x 100] = 196.39% 





Tencent Holdings 7 918 25 814 69 556
% Growth - 226% 169%
SINA Corp 133 122 130 479 289 897
% Growth - -2% 122%
Sohu.com 61 958 61 972 205 055
% Growth - 0.02% 231%
NetEase 81 530 74 840 215 870
% Growth - -8% 188%
TOM Online 25 626 25 574 67 376
% Growth - -0.2% 163%
Table 6.5: Summary of the Total Asset Base of Tencent and its Competitors over the 2001 to 













TOM Online‟s asset base is the most comparable to Tencent. The size of both company‟s asset 
base was approximately similar over the 2002 and 2003 financial years. While Table 6.5 shows 
that TOM Online‟s asset base was larger in the 2001 financial year, the overall trend in growth 
and size is the most comparable to Tencent in this three-year period.  
 
Based on the similarities in the total asset structure of TOM Online and Tencent, TOM Online is 
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Figure 6.4 shows that Tencent was the only company amongst its competitors to consistently 
generate a net profit over the 2001 to 2003 financial period. Hence, Figure 6.4 shows that 

















Tencent Holdings 1 234 17 000 38 927
% Change - 1278% 129%
SINA Corp (36 351) (4 949) 31 423
% Change - -86% -735%
Sohu.com (43 587) (1 036) 26 357
% Change - -98% -2644%
NetEase (28 173) 1 966 39 010
% Change - -107% 1884%
TOM Online (23 438) (8 743) 19 699












The 2003 year was an economically prosperous time for the entire value-added service industry, 
with all companies posting strong net profit results.  Figure 6.5 shows that at this time, both 
NetEase and Tencent represented the largest portion of the market, generating 25% of total 
industry net profits in that year. 
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SINA Corp Sohu.com NetEase TOM Online
Operating Segments X ✓ X X
Place of Incorporation ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Creating Opportunites for International Expansion ✓ ✓ X X
Revenues X ✓ X ✓
Gross Margins ✓ ✓ X X
Asset Structure X X X ✓
Net Profit / (Loss) No Correalation No Correalation No Correalation No Correalation
Overall Percentage Match (%) 42.9% 71.4% 14.3% 42.9%
While Tencent‟s competitors reduced their net losses over the 2002 year, NetEase was the first 
company to achieve a net profit over this three-year period. This being said, the largest reduction 
in overall company losses was posted by Sohu.com. Table 6.6 shows that Sohu.com reduced its 
losses by 98% over the 2002 year alone. 
 
Accounting for the above, this data proves that over the three-year period there was no 
competing company that was directly comparable to Tencent‟s net profit trend. While NetEase‟s 
financial performance improved considerably, it followed the same growth trend as SINA Corp, 
Sohu.com and TOM Online over this period. Therefore, there is no correlation amongst Tencent 
and its competitors in term of net profit performance over the 2001 to 2003 financial period.  
 
6.1.8 Conclusion  
 








Table 6.7 summarizes the relative comparisons drawn between Tencent and its competitors. 
Based on these results it is clear that overall Sohu.com correlates with 71.4% of Tencent on the 
assessed factors. Therefore Sohu.com will be used as the comparison company in the multiples 
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6.2 Relative Valuation: Multiples Analysis of Sohu.com 
 
The following section provides a multiples analysis of Tencent using Sohu.com as a suitable 
proxy company. 
 
A relative valuation values a company based on similar companies within industry. However, 
while companies may feature in the same competitor pool, there are numerous factors that make 
them different from one another. By converting the comparable company‟s financials into 
multiples this creates a commonality between both the target and comparable company. This 
provides a suitable basis for comparison.  
 
By adjusting these standardized multiples for the differences in growth and risk factors between 
the two companies, this ensures that one can deduce an estimated intrinsic value of the IPO in 
relation to the market value of similar companies at that time. 
 
6.2.1 Choice of Valuation Multiples 
 
In order to generate proxy valuation multiples for the valuation of Tencent, adjustments will be 
made to the price-to-earnings (P/E) ratio and  price-to-sales (P/S) ratio of the proxy firm 
(Sohu.com). This is to account for the differing risk and growth factors between it and Tencent. 
Internet companies are known to generate negative earnings for an extended period during their 
startup phase. Given that negative P/E ratios are meaningless, it has been suggested that P/S 
ratios are more appropriate for the valuation of such firms as sales are obviously always a 
positive number (Ho, Kim and Liao, 2011: 02). 
 
However, considering Tencent posted three consecutive years of positive earnings over the 2001 








Differences in Product and Service Portfolios ↑ ↑
Differences in Market Share ↑ ↑
Leverage ↑ −
Overall Growth Prospects ↑ ↑
Sohu.com
 
Table 6.8: Multiples Adjustment for the Effect of Differing Risk and Growth Factors between 








For the purposes of the relative valuation of Tencent, Sohu.com‟s multiples were adjusted up or 
down, in order to account for differences between the two companies. Table 6.8 summarizes the 
effect of these adjustments for the differences between Sohu.com and Tencent. 
 
6.2.1.1 Differences in Product and Service Portfolios 
 
As per Section 6.1.1, it is clear that Sohu.com‟s range of product and service offerings is smaller 
than Tencent‟s i.e. it is less comprehensive. As a result, Sohu.com‟s valuation metrics are 
adjusted upwards.   
 
6.2.1.2 Differences in Market Share 
 
 Tencent‟s IM service is its primary revenue driver. Thus, it is the key offering to consider within 
the company‟s competitive environment. As per Section 4.5.1, Sohu.com is a new market entrant 
to the Chinese IM market space. Sohu.com introduced its PC-only SQQ IM service in the fourth 
quarter (Q4) of the 2003 financial year. Considering Tencent‟s 74.3% stranglehold on the 




Tencent does not carry any form of long-term debt whatsoever. This is contrary to Sohu.com 




Unadjusted Multiple 75.9 32.0
Net Effect of Multiple Adjustments +2 +1.25
Adjusted Multiple 77.9 33.25
Sohu.com
which had US$90,000,000 (HK$701,811,000) of zero coupon convertible senior notes issued in 
a private placement to Merrill Lynch and Pierce, Fenner & Smith Incorporated (Sohu.com, 
2003b: 37). 
 
As a zero coupon debt instrument this means that Sohu.com does not incur an interest expense. 
There should also be no cash flow until maturity. However, this is an embedded option 
instrument, which means that the cash flow is not a certainty. No cash flow will be received by at 
the end of July 2023 if holders do not exercise the right for Sohu.com to repurchase all or a 
portion of the principal amount in 2007, 2013 and 2018 (Sohu.com, 2003b: 37).  
 
Therefore, Sohu.com‟s valuation metrics are adjusted to reflect Tencent‟s debt-free capital 
structure.  
 
6.2.1.4 Overall Growth Prospects 
 
Tencent‟s market position coupled with its debt-free capital structure and expected use of IPO 
proceeds suggested that the company had effectively positioned itself to reap further growth.  
 
Given past financial performance and future expectations, Tencent had greater industry growth 
prospects than Sohu.com. As a result, Sohu.com‟s valuation metrics have been adjusted upwards.  
 
6.2.2 Magnitude of Adjustments  
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Table 6.9 summarizes the overall effect of the different risk and growth adjustments on 
Sohu.com‟s valuation multiples.  
 
On the basis of the factors in Section 6.2.1 the net effect on the valuation metrics is the 
following:  
 
6.2.2.1 Price: Earnings (P/E) Ratio 
 
Tencent‟s diverse and profitable product and service range together with its dominant position in 
the IM market space suggest that its earnings potential is greater than Sohu.com. Tencent‟s 
overall growth prospects and long-run growth potential is also greater than Sohu.com. 
 
In assessing the leverage characteristics of both firms, Sohu.com‟s increased leverage has raised 
its exposure to systematic risk. As a zero coupon debt instrument, the majority of this systematic 
risk comprises of interest rate risk. Assuming that debt holders do not exercise their right to sell 
the shares back to Sohu.com, the debt instrument will only pay out the entire cash flow on 
maturity. This leaves the debt instrument exposed to volatile interest rate changes. Overall, this 
increases Sohu.com‟s required rate of return which reduces Sohu.com‟s P/E multiple. 
 
The net effect of these adjustments for risk and growth translates into an upward adjustment of 2 
to Sohu.com‟s P/E ratio. 
 
6.2.2.2 Price: Sales (P/S) Ratio 
 
Because the relationship between earnings growth and sales growth is not linear, different 
adjustments are made to Sohu.com‟s P/E and P/S multiplies. The same applies to the overall 
growth prospects and long-term growth potential of Tencent.  
 
It cannot be deduced whether Sohu.com‟s increased leverage affects its P/S multiple. To be 
prudent, no adjustment has been made to its P/S multiple on the basis of this factor.  
 






The net effect of these adjustments for risk and growth translates into an upward adjustment of 
1.25 to Sohu.com‟s P/S ratio. 
 
6.2.3 Calculations of Sohu.com and Tencent Holdings Limited’s Multiples  
 






Table 6.10 summarizes the results achieved from the calculations to follow. Sohu.com‟s adjusted 
valuation multiples (Tencent‟s proxy multiples) are multiplied by Tencent‟s most recent 
accounting data to determine the value per Tencent share on its IPO launch date.  
 
6.2.3.1 Price: Earnings (P/E) Ratio 
 
 
       Share Price      Sohu.com  
Earnings per Share Sohu.com  
(US$22.78 / US$0.30)  
 
= 75.9  
 
Adjusted Sohu.com P/E ratio (proxy for Tencent‟s P/E ratio) = 77.9 
Therefore, 77.9 times x [0.085 x 0.362478]  
= US$ 2.40  
97
  
                                                          
97 Average RMB to USD exchange rate for the 01 January 2004 to 31 March 2004 period:  
   (0.120877 + 0.120818 + 0.120783) = 0.362478 
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Total Share Price Range (HK$) HK$14.40 - US$18.72
Total Share Price Range (US$) US$1.85 - US$2.40
6.2.3.3 Price: Sales (P/S) Ratio 
 
       Share Price      Sohu.com 
   Sales per Share Sohu.com  
 
[US$22.78 / (US$25,935,000 / 36,377,836 shares)] 
US$13 / (0.7129341064) 
 
= 32.0  
Adjusted Sohu.com P/S ratio (proxy for Tencent‟s P/S ratio) = 33.25 
Therefore, 33.25 times x [(257,553,000 RMB / 1,680,641,260 shares) x 0.362478]  





6.2.4 Results  
 







Table 6.11 shows that Tencent‟s share price on its IPO listing date should be in the range of 
US$1.85 – US$2.40. Upon converting this US$ denominated range into the equivalent HK$ 
share price, this equates to a range of HK$14.40 - HK$18.72 per share.
99
 This shows that there is 
a small spread in the share prices achieved. 
 
                                                          
98 Average RMB to USD exchange rate for the 01 January 2004 to 31 March 2004 period:  
   (0.120877 + 0.120818 + 0.120783) = 0.362478 
 
99 This was converted in accordance with the HKD to USD exchange rate as at 16 June 2004. This equates to 1 HKD = 7.7979 USD.  
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There are serious complications in deriving a price range for Tencent‟s shares in the above 
manner, as the lack of uniformity between the financial performance and financial position of 
both the proxy company and the target company present the possibility for data loss. This means 
that specific business characteristics and prospects may be left unaccounted for, leaving the price 
range as a speculatory tool of assessment. 
 
6.3 Discounted Cash Flow Valuation: Free Cash Flow to the 
Firm  
 
A DCF valuation, based on a company‟s ability to generate future cash flows, estimates the 
intrinsic value of that company. This diverse, commonly used valuation technique is the most 
theoretically correct of all possible valuation tools. It is built on the concept that the value of a 
company is derived from value attached to the free cash flows attributable to that company‟s 
stakeholders. 
 
The DCF model uses assumptions and forecasts about the company‟s future performance to infer 
a projection of its future free cash flows generated over the period of assessment. This is 
normally a five-year projection period, but in some cases is a ten-year period. The free cash flow 
projections are then discounted under the net present value (NPV) method using an appropriate 
discount rate. Typically this discount rate is the weighted average cost of capital (WACC). As a 
result, the future cash flows have been converted to represent an amount equivalent to the 
valuation date. A terminal value representing the value of the company at the end of the 
projection period is also calculated. This terminal value takes into account the forecasted stable 
terminal growth rate of the company after the five-year/ten-year period considered.   
 
These amounts are then summed together to represent the company‟s enterprise value. This 
represents the total collective value of the company‟s debt and equity. To calculate the true value 
of equity, debt is subtracted from the enterprise value and other cash items are re-added. This 
new equity figure is divided by the company‟s outstanding shares to represent this value on a per 
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share basis. This indicates the attractiveness of the share, in terms of whether it is undervalued or 
overvalued on the valuation date. 
 
Traditionally there are two possible methods when conducting a DCF valuation. These are the 
unlevered cash flow approach, known as the Free Cash Flow to the Firm (FCFF) method and the 
levered cash flow approach, known as the Free Cash Flow to Equity (FCFE) method. The main 
difference between these two methods is that the unlevered FCFF approach accounts for cash 
flow projections prior to the impact of both debt and cash. Alternatively, the levered FCFE 
approach accounts for free cash flows after considering both debt and cash. This means that the 
FCFF approach aims to value a company holistically.  
 
The FCFE approach only values the company‟s equity portion and does not allow for flexibility 
when assessing the impact of different capital structures on a company‟s value. Hence, while this 
is possible under the unlevered FCFF approach, the capital structure consideration is already 
incorporated into the levered FCFE valuation. 
 
When performing a DCF valuation, it is important to keep in mind that the model is sensitive to 
the various input assumptions and resultant forecasts undertaken. The model is heavily-reliant on 
forward-looking projections that are sound in the context of that company‟s operations. This can 
affect the accuracy of the overall estimated intrinsic value derived and makes the DCF model 
susceptible to error. Should these assumptions and forecasts be largely unjustified and incorrect, 
this will result in an inaccurate valuation.  
 
6.3.1 The Discount Rate 
 
While the WACC is forward-looking and represents a company‟s optimal target capital structure, 
Tencent‟s actual capital structure is being used as a proxy. This is because it is expected that 
Tencent will not take on debt in the future and that its equity-only capital structure is its optimal 
capital structure in the future. 
 
In accordance with Miller and Modigliani‟s „Trade-off Theory of Leverage‟, if a company takes 
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on debt it will gain an interest tax shield benefit (Modigliani and Miller, 1958: 294). This reduces 
the cost of debt (Kd) and suggests that a business should choose to take on debt in order to 
maximize company value. The greater the amount of debt taken on by the company, the larger 
the tax shield benefit obtained. However, this benefit is limited by the potential for bankruptcy 
associated with higher debt levels.  
 
Based on the information in Section 6.3.1.4.1, Tencent‟s average effective tax rate is 10.66%. 
Taking this into consideration, this rate is low when compared on a relative basis to the Chinese 
Enterprise Income Tax (EIT) rate of 15% and Hong Kong‟s corporate tax rate of 17.5%. This 
translates into a small tax shield benefit for Tencent and creates less of an incentive for the 
company to take on debt in the future.  
 
Prior to the IPO, Tencent had a large cash pile (see Appendix D, Exhibit 2). As per Tencent‟s 
prospectus, the proceeds from the IPO were expected to ensure that the company would have 
raised sufficient levels of cash in anticipation of future business prospects (Tencent Prospectus, 
2004: 31).   
 
Taking the low interest tax shield benefit and large cash piles into account, it is expected that 
Tencent will not take on debt in the future. This is aligned with other analyst forecasts at this 
time, which for the same reasons disregard debt as a future item of concern for Tencent in their 
own valuations. 
 
The WACC is calculated using the following assumptions: 
 
6.3.1.1 Market Value of Equity (MVE)  
 
Considering Tencent is being valued on its IPO listing date, the company‟s shares are not 
publicly traded, hence no market value of equity can be observed on this date. Instead, the 
market value of equity has been approximated using the confirmed HK$3.70 offer price as a 
proxy for Tencent‟s shares.  
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The total shares outstanding are inclusive of the IPO offer shares. However, the over-allotment 
option (63,024,000 additional shares) has not been accounted for in this calculation, as the option 
was not exercised until 05 July 2004 (i.e. after the IPO listing date). 
 
Market capitalization as at 16 June 2004:   
 
Total shares outstanding: 1,680,641,260 Shares
100
 
Determined offer price: HK$3.70 per share 
 
1,680,641,260 Shares x HK$3.70 per share 
 
MVE = HK$ 6,218,372,662  
 
For the purposes of the Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) valuation, the market capitalization has 
been converted into an appropriate prevailing Chinese Renminbi (RMB) amount to be consistent 
with the reported figures from Tencent‟s financial statements. These figures were presented in 
the Chinese Renminbi (RMB) currency.
101
   
 
This is in accordance with the 1 RMB/ HK$0.94156 HKD exchange rate prevailing on 15 June 
2004. 
Therefore, (HK$ 6,218,372,662 / 0.94156) = 6,604,329,689 RMB 
 
MVE = 6,604,329,689 RMB  
 
6.3.1.2  Cost of Equity (KE)  
 
To calculate the cost of equity, one can consider using the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) or 
the dividend discount model (DDM).  
                                                          
100 Regardless of Tencent exercising the clawback mechanism, this did not have an effect on the total number of Tencent shares outstanding as 
per 16 June, 2004. The clawback mechanism entailed redistribution amongst Hong Kong Offer Shares and International Placement Shares. 
However, this did not affect the overall total number of shares outstanding on this date.  
101 Note: there is potential for exchange loss or exchange gain upon converting the relevant currencies.  
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6.3.1.2.1 The Dividend Discount Model (DDM) 
 
Ke = (D1/ P) + g 
 
The DDM method is built around the concept that the current market price of a company‟s share 
is directly affected by the future expected dividends of the company. While this method is easy 
to use, its fundamental problem is that it does not account for risk.  
 
The DDM model can be applied to both private and public companies that pay dividends. This 
includes private and public companies that may not be paying dividends at the time, but are 
expected to in the future. 
 
6.3.1.2.2 The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 
 
Ke = Rf + β (Rm – Rf)  
 
The CAPM model measures systematic risk in the market and relates expected return to this risk. 
To compensate investors for taking on the risk, the model incorporates the time value of money 
(Rf) and risk (+ β (Rm – Rf)) into its formula. Therefore the expected return (Ke) should equal the 
risk-free return plus a risk premium. 
 
The CAPM model is based on the following assumptions:  
1/ All investors have homogenous expectations about asset returns and variances. 
2/ Investors can borrow at the risk-free rate. 
3/ All assets are marketable and perfectly divisible. 
4/ There are no transactions costs incurred and there is no restriction on short sales. 
 
The CAPM model can be applied to both listed and unlisted companies. For an unlisted company 
it is applied using indirect and approximate methods. It is most suitable for listed companies as it 
requires several market-related variables such as a measure of company share return volatility 
relative to the market (β) and market return (Rm). These values are only applicable to listed 
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entities, and can be derived from the exposure of the entity to its relevant financial market. 
The DDM model is not a suitable method to use to value Tencent‟s IPO. As an IPO firm Tencent 
does not have a public share price (market price), and so the DDM model cannot be applied. 
Considering the aim of this chapter is to calculate Tencent‟s market price on its IPO date, this 
proves that in this context the DDM model is based on circular logic.  
 
Essentially, one of the biggest factors surrounding the IPO is the concept of risk. The CAPM 
model accounts for this risk, and is thus an effective medium to gauge the company‟s cost of 
equity. While Tencent is not a listed firm, the relevant beta value has been derived from the basis 
of the relative valuation in which a suitable competitor firm, Sohu.com represents Tencent as a 
proxy. Additionally, while the market return and resultant risk premium are based around 
estimates, through analytical reasoning and supporting evidence these variables can be derived.  
Therefore, in light of the above the CAPM model is the most appropriate option in determining 
Tencent‟s cost of equity.   
 
6.3.1.3 CAPM  
 
6.3.1.3.1 Risk-free Rate (Rf) 
 
The 4.82% 10-Year Exchange Fund Note (EFN) 4124 issued on Wednesday 02 June 2004 has 
been chosen as the appropriate risk-free rate.  
 
Leading up to 16 June 2004, Exchange Fund Notes have been the only Hong Kong Government 
Bonds available on the market, representing a benchmark risk-free return for other bond issuers 
and long-term investors (HKCMA, 2004: 15). EFNs were typically denominated in 2, 3,4,5,7 
and 10-year maturities. The EFN 4124 was the most current and recent government bond issue 
relevant to the time period under review, and was trading at 4.56% (HKMA, 2004: 01). 
 
For the purpose of valuing Tencent prior to its IPO, the relevant risk-free rate (Rf) is therefore 
taken to be 4.56%. 
 
Chapter 6: A Complex Valuation of the Tencent IPO 
6:29 
 
Raw         
Beta
Tax        
rate
Share         
Price
Number of             
Shares 
MV of             
Equity 
MV of                  
Debt (BV)
Unlevered            
Beta
Sohu.com (US$) 1.347 20.15% 22.45 36 378 US$ 816,686 US$ 916,575 0.710
1988 -27.8% 1994 15.7% 2000 -5.4%
1989 6.7% 1995 4.5% 2001 -21.5%
1990 14.6% 1996 22.1% 2002 -14.4%
1991 31.1% 1997 -18.0% 2003 24.6%
1992 41.4% 1998 1.6% 2004 16.7%
1993 48.6% 1999 51.7%
8.80%Geometric Mean for the 1988 - 2004 Period
6.3.1.3.2 Beta (β) 
 
Considering that Tencent is unlisted, there is no corresponding beta value prior to the IPO. 
Therefore, based on Section 6.1, a beta for Tencent is approximated by using Sohu.com‟s beta as 
a proxy. However, Sohu.com‟s debt structure comprises of zero coupon convertible senior notes, 
whereas Tencent does not have and is not expected to have any long-term debt. 
 






β = 0.710 
 
Table 6.12 shows that  Sohu.com‟s raw beta of 1.347 is unlevered to remove the leverage 
component within the beta value, this ensures that Sohu.com‟s beta proxy only reflects market 
risk.  
 
6.3.1.3.3 Market Portfolio Return (Rm)  
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The Hang Seng Index (HSI) is the most widely quoted gauge of the Hong Kong stock market 
(HSI, 2014: 01). HSI data dates back to 24 November 1969, providing a comprehensive, lengthy 
time period to deduce the relevant market return and market risk premium required as inputs into 
the CAPM model and the overall DCF valuation process.  
 
The HSI is a free-float adjusted index which largely reflects the investment climate in Hong 
Kong and the PRC. It accounts for ordinary Hong Kong companies, H Share companies, Red 
chip companies and other Hong Kong listed Mainland Companies (HSI, 2014: 01).
102
 These 
companies are categorized into one of four main classes: finance, utilities, properties and 
commerce & industry.  
 
The actual market return achieved on the HSI is calculated using a geometric mean (GM). The 
geometric mean is used because it is mean reverting and reflects the power of compounding over 
time. As the performance of the HSI (and other indices) is dependent on its previous 
performance, the GM provides the most accurate representation of the index‟s actual historical 
performance during the 1988 to 2004 period.  
 
6.3.1.3.3.1 Alternative Indices Considered 
 
The most suitable alternative to the HSI is the Hang Seng Composite Index Series (HSCI) which 
covers a total of 95% of the total market capitalization of those companies listed on the HKEx 
Main Board (HSCI, 2014: 1). This market index encompasses all spectrums of market 
capitalization on the HKEx namely large cap, mid cap and small cap stocks in respective 
76.29%, 18.23% and 5.49% proportions.  
 
                                                          
102  
H-Shares – Shares of a company incorporated in mainland China and listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. 
 
B-Shares – Shares in companies based in mainland China trading on either the Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock Exchanges.  
 
Red Chip Stock – Chinese companies incorporated internationally and listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. These companies are controlled 
to some degree, or completely, by the Chinese government or a recognized Chinese government institution.  
 
P Chip Stock – Chinese companies listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, however they are incorporated in the Cayman Islands, British 
Virgin Islands (BVI) and Bermuda. These companies operate in mainland China and are run by those in the private sector only.   
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However, launching on 3 October 2001, the index is relatively new and does not yield a 
comprehensive time period upon to calculate an effective market return.  
 
The Morgan Stanley China Index was also considered. Also known as the MSCI China Index 
(MXCN), it comprises of large cap and mid cap stocks with exposure to Chinese H shares, B 
shares, Red Chip stocks and P Chip stocks such as Tencent (MSCI,2014:1). In total, the MXCN 
covers approximately 85% of Chinese equities. However, this index proved unsuitable as it does 
not cover small cap stocks.  Hence, it does not provide an accurate spread to represent all firm 
sizes in the Chinese market.  
The MXCN is relatively new and historical data only relates back to the launch date of July 
1999.  
 
6.3.1.3.4 Market Risk Premium (Rm – Rf)  
 
The market risk premium is calculated as the difference between the Market Return (Rm) and 
Risk-free Rate (Rf). This equates to 4.24% 
 
= 8.80% - 4.56%  
= 4.24% 
 
6.3.1.3.5 Market Value of Debt (MVD)  
 
Tencent‟s financial statements indicate that the company does not carry any form of interest-
bearing debt whatsoever. For the reasons outlined in Section 6.3.1 this is not expected to change. 
 
The market value of debt is therefore zero.  
 
MVD = 0 RMB 
 
 




Profit before Tax 10,216 143,765 338,209
Taxation (@ 15%) (1,532) (21,565) (50,731)
Total Effect - - -
Income Not Subject to Tax - - (129)
Expenses Not Deductible - - 34
Total Taxation (399) (27,841) (29,446)
Effective Tax Rate 3.91% 19.37% 8.71%
Average Effective Tax Rate 10.66%
Unrecognised Tax Losses 
Sustained by the Group.
1,133 150 -
Utilisation of Previously 
Unrecognised Tax Losses - (436) -
Reversal of Effects of Tax 
Holiday and other 
Exemptions Applicable to 
Group Entities. 
- 12,231 56,003
Deferred Tax Assets Not 
Recognised
- - 36,491
Effects of Tax Holiday and 
other Exemptions 
Applicable to Group 
Entities. 
- (12,231) (56,003)
Tencent Holdings Limited- Average Effective Tax Rate
Year ended December 31,
Effects of Different Tax 
Rates Applicable to 
Different Group Entities
(2,665) (5,990) (15,111)
6.3.1.4 Cost of Debt (KD)  
 
As the firm does not and is not expected to take on debt, as indicated above in Sections 6.3.1 and 
5.3.1.3.5 its cost of debt is zero. 
 
Kd = 0% 
 
6.3.1.4.1 Tax Rate (Tc) 
 
While it is not strictly necessary to calculate a tax rate given that Tencent has no debt, Tencent‟s 
tax situation provides insight into its debt-free capital structure (see Section 6.3.1).    
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Tc = 10.66% 
 
Table 6.14 represents Tencent‟s average effective tax rate after removing the effects of tax 
holidays and other tax exemptions applicable to the group‟s entities. This is indicative of 
Tencent‟s future tax obligations over the forecasted period.  
 
Tencent derives majority of its revenues in the PRC. PRC companies are typically subject to a 
30% Enterprise Income Tax (EIT) and an additional 3% local income tax.  However, Tencent is 
incorporated in a defined „Special Economic Zone‟ (SEZ) of the PRC and is granted certain tax 
benefits. Considering the complexities in Tencent‟s corporate structure (see Section 4.2.2), 
Tencent Computer, Tencent Technology, Shiji Kaixuan and Shidai Zhaoyang Technology are 
subject to a reduced EIT rate of 15% (Tencent Prospectus, 2004: 105). 
 
Over the 2001 to 2003 period, the Hong Kong corporate tax rate remained at 16% and this has 
increased to 17.5% in the 2004 year (KPMG, 2007: 03). Aside from this, Tencent is not subject 
to income tax or capital gains tax (CGT) in the Cayman Islands and neither are its intermediate 
holding companies in the BVI. This is attributable to relevant laws of the Cayman Islands and 
BVI at the time.  
 
Tencent Computer and Tencent Technology received tax holiday benefits over the 2001 to 2003 
period. Tencent Computer was exempt from EIT in the 2002 financial year and was subject to a 
50% reduction in EIT in the 2003 year. This was according to the provision in the tax circular 
„Shendishuierhan [2002] No. 128‟ (Tencent Prospectus, 2004: 105).  Tencent Technology was 
classified as a „foreign-invested enterprise with production sales income‟ and was exempt from 
EIT in the 2003 financial year as per the tax circular „Shendishuiwaihan [2003] No. 143‟ 
(Tencent Prospectus, 2004: 105). 
 
6.3.1.5 Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC)  
 
[(MVE / (MVE + MV D)) x KE] + [(MVD / (MVE + MVD)) x ((KD (1 – Tc))] 
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Market Value of Equity (HK$) HK$ 6,218,372,662
Outstanding Shares 1 680 641 260
Share Price (HK$) HK$ 3.7
Market Value of Equity (RMB) 6,604,329,689 RMB
Market Value of Debt 0
% Equity Weighting 100%
% Debt Weighting 0%
Cost of Debt  (Cd):
Cost of Debt (Pre-Tax) 0.0%
Effective Tax Rate 10.66%
Cost of Debt (After-Tax) (Cd) 0.0%
Cost of Equity (Ce):
CAPM Model
Risk-free rate (Rf) 4.56%
Beta 0.71
Market Return: Hang Seng Index (Rm) 8.80%
  - Risk-free rate (Rf) 4.56%
  - Market Risk Premium (Rm - Rf) 4.24%
CAPM Cost of Equity (Ce) 7.57%
WACC 7.57%
Weighting of Equity (WE) = 100% 
Weighting of Debt (WD) = 0% 
 






















WACCTencent = 7.57% 
 
Considering Tencent is not expected to carry any form of debt, both its market value of debt and 
cost of debt are zero. As shown in Table 6.15, this means that Tencent‟s WACC replicates its 
current capital structure, being the cost of equity only.  
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6.3.2 Forward-looking Growth Rate Assumptions for the Following 
Five-Year Period 
 
Growth rate assumptions play a vital role in deducing an accurate forecast of the target 
company‟s future free cash flows. Should one poorly interpret the growth characteristics of the 
company, this will directly lead to an inaccurate estimate of the target company‟s intrinsic value.  
 
Growth rate assumptions focus holistically on the economic environment, market environment 
and internal company environment of the target company. By assessing the current and future 
potential status of these interrelated factors, the growth levels most likely to be achieved by the 
target company can be estimated. Both qualitative and quantitative factors need to be taken into 
consideration, as an all-encompassing approach will ensure good forward-looking projections 
and an accurate forecast of the company‟s future free cash flows. 
 
6.3.2.1 Growth Forecasts: The Chinese Economy 
 
6.3.2.1.1 China’s Macroeconomic Environment  
 
Historically. China‟s political and economic transformation has realized a largely growing GDP 
since 1970 (Otani, 2005: 09). This is illustrated by the economic and industry data in Section 4.4, 
signaling both the development and growth of the Chinese economy and its increasing 
technological adoption rate over the 1998 to 2003 financial period.   
 
As per Section 4.4, the Asian Development Bank‟s forecasted GDP growth estimates 
substantially outweighed inflationary expectations over the 2004 to 2008 financial period. This 
mitigates the potential decline in the value of the Renminbi brought upon by China‟s expected 
GDP growth.   Interpreting the historical and forecasted economic data in Section 4.4, it appears 
that the Chinese economy will continue to expand over the next five years. As industries grow 
and productivity increases, income levels in China will rise. This is likely to substantially 
increase the rate of technological adoption in China‟s internet, fixed line and mobile industries. 
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Overall, this should drive significant company growth in the Chinese internet and 
telecommunication industry.  
 
China‟s accelerated infrastructural development should continue to enhance internet penetration 
rates and encourage greater levels of internet diffusion in the near future. With the development 
and introduction of DSL and ISDN infrastructure in China there is a strong likelihood that 
internet accessibility and user connectivity costs will decline. This means that as DSL and ISDN 
internet technologies become the industry standard, older existing technologies should become 
more affordable. As this comes into fruition this will effectively bridge China‟s digital divide, 
closing the gap between those who have internet access and those who previously did not have 
access or could not afford to do so.   
 




VoIP technology is a form of disruptive technology, creating a new market and value network 
that has the capabilities of disrupting and replacing existing markets. As a telephony service, 
VoIP has the potential to erode market share of China‟s existing mobile and fixed line 
telecommunication companies: China Mobile, China Unicom, China Netcom and China 
Telecom. As a pc-based computer-to-computer service, this puts QQ at risk in terms of its 
longevity and relevance in the internet and mobile value-added service market.  
 
The expected growth in VoIP telephony users in Section 4.5.6.2 shows that VoIP technology is a 
significant threat to Tencent‟s future growth potential. This is because Tencent‟s successful 
business model is traditionally centered on leveraging off its mobile and PC-based IM offerings 
and using them to cross-sell its value-added services. While these forecasts were not conclusive, 
it is more likely than not that Tencent will create and pursue opportunities in an untapped VoIP 
value-added service segment to accommodate for the rising industry. 
 
 
Chapter 6: A Complex Valuation of the Tencent IPO 
6:37 
 
This is further substantiated from an excerpt by a publication titled „VoIP Development in 
China‟ stating that, “VoIP telephone services provide an opportunity for internet service 
providers to earn higher profits… This new opportunity has fostered a new class of ISPs in 
China: internet telephone service providers” (Hu and Wang, 2004: 30).  Tencent‟s business 
model and strategic relationship with China‟s mobile and telecommunication providers would 
suggest that it is likely it can make an effective transition into the Chinese VoIP industry. 
Tencent could then develop IM infused VoIP platforms for both mobile and pc users. In 
alignment with its current business model, Tencent could then use these platforms to leverage-off 





Taking the information in Section 4.5.6.3 into account, it is clear that Chinese mobile operators 
are making concerted attempts to effectively launch PHS services to Chinese citizens.  
As a low cost alternative to China‟s mobile phone market, PHS technology presents a valuable 
opportunity for Tencent to diversify its product and service offerings amidst the competitive 
environment. By introducing Mobile QQ to the PHS platform, this immediately establishes a 
relationship between the PHS user and the QQ brand. Once this relationship is established, this 
can secure brand loyalty and expand Tencent‟s market reach into other areas of its value-added 
service offerings.  
 
6.3.2.2 Growth Rate Forecasts: Internal Company Growth  
 
6.3.2.2.1 Mobile Value-Added Services (MVAS)  
  
As per Section 4.5.2, China Mobile and China Unicom have control over the Chinese MVAS 
industry. Considering that there is no viable alternative, the profitability of Tencent and its 
competitor‟s MVAS divisions are directly affected by these mobile operators.  
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In August 2003 China Mobile enforced both policy changes and regulatory measures to ban 
companies from offering fee-based services that were not classified as wireless services (CDC 
Corporation, 2007:35). One month later, China Mobile withheld a total of HK$140,560,000 
(US$18,019,820) owed to SINA Corp, Sohu.com and NetEase as well as HK$48,530,000 
(US$6,221,556) owed to TOM Online.  This delay in payment was because China Mobile said 
that these companies provided pornographic content to Chinese users. This was believed to be in 
contravention of China Mobile‟s company guidelines (Hui, 2003: 01).  
 
This sequence of events highlights the potentially volatile nature of China‟s MVAS industry in 
the future. While it is in both parties‟ interests to cooperate and support each other‟s operations, 
there is no guarantee that events such as the above could not occur.  
 
As per Section 4.2.2, all of Tencent‟s MVAS revenues are derived from Tencent Computer and 
Shiji Kaixuan. Contractual obligations between these subsidiaries and China Mobile and China 
Unicom have typically secured Tencent‟s MVAS revenues and promoted its MVAS offerings 
across China. As a company, amongst its competitors, relying on these billing and collection 
services, the volatility involved in this distribution method is potentially unsustainable in the 
future for the reasons cited above. 
 
Tencent incurs the following MVAS costs from China Mobile and China Unicom: 
    
- A portion of MVAS revenues (fees) are collected from end-users and paid over to China 
Mobile and China Unicom. 
 
Historically this ranged between 12% and 15% of the overall fees collected over the 2001 to 
2003 financial period.  
 
- Imbalance fees are charged by mobile operators when the quantity of messages that are 
sent/received on Tencent‟s platforms exceed the number of messages sent/received on the 
network operator‟s platform.  
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Historically Tencent has always paid these balance fees, ranging between 0.04 RMB and 0.08 
RMB per SMS and 0.20 RMB – 0.25 RMB per MMS. 
 
These fees can increase at the discretion of mobile operators, and this could adversely affect the 
financial performance of Tencent‟s MVAS division in the future. This being said, Infrastructural 
development is vital to accommodate for the growing mobile user base and resultant increase in 
demand for MVAS offerings. Essentially, this cost would have to be transferred to Tencent by 
raising the above mentioned fee structure. 
 
Consideration also needs to be made for the susceptible nature of the MVAS industry to Chinese 
governmental policy changes. This has the potential to prohibit and restrict growth in China‟s 
MVAS industry and is considered when forecasting growth levels of Tencent‟s MVAS division.     
 
While it is important to consider these factors in forecasting Tencent‟s growth rates over the 
five-year period ending in 2008, it must be stated that collectively all companies within 
Tencent‟s competitor pool are affected by the status and construct of the  MVAS industry.  
 
6.3.2.2.2 Internet Value-Added Services (IVAS) 
 
As per Section 4.4, China boasts the second largest internet population in the world. As a result, 
this growing industry will affect the forecasted growth of Tencent‟s IVAS division. 
 
The following factors have been considered when forecasting Tencent‟s IVAS revenue growth 
over the 2004 to 2008 financial period:  
 
6.3.2.2.2.1 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) (see Section 4.2.1, 3.2.2 and Section 4.2.3)  
 
While FDI has worked favorably for Tencent in acquiring investors (see Section 4.2.3 and 
Section 4.2.4) the Chinese government‟s liberalization and deregulation movement towards FDI 
exposes Tencent and its competitors to the threat of new market entrants. 
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This means that Western multinational corporations (MNCs) are able to bring technologies, 
skills and knowledge from their local industries to disrupt the Chinese value-added 
telecommunications service industry. Tencent recognizes Microsoft‟s MSN Messenger, Yahoo! 
Messenger and AOL‟s Instant Messenger (AIM) as potential threats to its position in the instant 
messaging market. These companies have the potential to influence the future direction of 
China‟s internet and telecommunications industry.  
 
Consideration must also be made for strategic-based FDI investment by Western MNCs with one 
or more of Tencent‟s competitors. Even though FDI is limited up to a 50% investment threshold 
(see Section 4.2.2), it has the potential to threaten Tencent‟s overall market position and 
company growth. While there is no evidence of this occurring at this time, Tencent‟s unique 
industry position and business model could suggest this its competitors may consider this option.  
 
6.3.2.2.2.2 Operating Expenditure and Payment Systems  
 
Due to low credit card penetration rates, Tencent and its competitors collect IVAS revenues via 
contractual obligations with Chinese telecommunication operators and Chinese mobile operators. 
These contractual obligations are an effective substitute for online payment systems as they are 
still in the early stages of development.   
 
These costs incurred by Tencent are structured in the same manner as the MVAS costs incurred 
in Section 6.3.2.2.1. 
 
In order for Tencent and its competitors to sufficiently provide IVAS services, they need to have 
the relevant infrastructural and resultant bandwidth capabilities required to do so. In the past 
Tencent has leased its bandwidth from data centers, however it also owns network servers within 
these data centers.  
 
The benefit of the IVAS industry is that with its expected growth, Tencent and its competitors 
may not necessarily have to spend large amounts of CAPEX. The reason here is because these 
companies can lease further bandwidth as opposed to spending CAPEX on a greater amount of 
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network servers. Up to this point Tencent has done so by paying a custody fee to ensure that its 
servers are run off premises and maintained correctly. 
 
6.3.2.2.2.3 Third-Party Content  
 
Tencent‟s product and service content is outsourced from third party content providers. This is to 
ensure that its product and service offerings are kept relevant and innovative in the marketplace. 
This was particularly made prevalent by the fact that its contractual agreements with third-party 
content providers are both short-term and non-exclusive. These contracts can also be terminated 
at any time by either party (Tencent Prospectus, 2004: 26).  
 
While Tencent‟s core business focus is its IM offerings, there is a strong reliance on content 
providers and content generated for its complimentary value-added product and service 
offerings.  
 
The nature of these contracts suggests that Tencent did not have any way of protecting itself or 
deriving a competitive advantage against its competitors. The non-exclusivity clause infers that 
the same content provider can be used by a variety of Tencent‟s competitors. While it would not 
necessarily be in a competitor‟s best interests to essentially use the same content provider, it is 
likely that this may have occurred or may occur in the near future. 
 
This would mean that in terms of the relevant value-added product and service offerings of 
Tencent and its competitors, the competitive landscape will be defined by first-mover advantage 
and customer loyalty. Regardless of the relationship of these content providers with competing 
companies, there is also a limit as to what content is relevant to a specific time period, subject or 
event. Hence, it is expected that within the next five years the industry will reach this point. 
 
6.3.2.2.3 Online Advertising 
 
While Section 4.5.4 shows that online advertising has represented a small percentage of China‟s 
total advertising revenues in the past, this is likely to significantly change in the near future. 




As the technological adoption rate in China continues to grow, technology will become more 
integrated into the lifestyles of Chinese consumers. In this manner, traditional advertisers will 
have to turn to newly emerging media to stay relevant. This was the case with TOM Online, 
which restructured its advertising offerings from traditional offline advertising to online 
advertising in the year 2003.   
 
However, as a relatively new industry the online advertising market is likely to face stringent 
Chinese regulatory requirements in the near future. This is likely to have a direct effect on the 
overall levels of growth experienced by China‟s online advertising industry and the associated 
growth in online advertising of Tencent and its competitors.  
 
There is also a potential risk surrounding the balance of enabling a user to derive value from an 
online advert versus spamming the user. Spamming entails using electronic message systems and 
platforms to send advertising indiscriminately. Should spamming be prevalent, this may have an 
effect on the user base and growth of online advertising for Tencent and its competitors.  
 
As a response to spamming, users could start to use advertising blockers. Advertising blockers 
can prevent advertisements from being displayed on a user‟s device. This may negatively impact 
online advertising adoption rates and could directly affect the longevity and growth potential of 
Tencent and its competitor‟s online advertising segments (Wang, 2003: 01). 
 
6.3.2.2.4 Future Business Acquisitions  
 
As per Section 4.9, Tencent‟s planned use of IPO proceeds would see future acquisitions of 
companies involved in the technological development of its real-time communication, 
entertainment and internet offerings.  
 
These acquisitions have the potential to drive Tencent‟s growth prospects and achieve larger 
levels of organic growth over a period of time. Essentially, these acquisitions would lead to 
technological development in the following fields:  




- Video streaming, voice over IP (VoIP), interactive voice response (IVR) technologies and 
services, wireless presence and voice dialog technologies, push-to-talk mobile data network 
services, mobile location based technologies and enterprise real-time collaboration technologies 
and applications. These are all considered core IM and related value-added services. 
 
- Instant messaging (IM)-enabled consumer-to-consumer (C2C) and business-to-consumer (B2C) 
platforms. 
 
- Casual games, mobile games, MMORPG games, RTS games and other value-added service 
content. These would be used to enhance Tencent‟s IM-enabled QQ Game portal. 
 
- Building online social networking communities and online vertical information websites. This 
includes the potential acquisition of business advertising rank technologies to expand Tencent‟s 
online advertising business. 
 
However, there is downside risk involved with acquiring technology companies.  If Tencent 
performs inadequate technical due diligence it may be discovered at a later point that the 
acquired technology did not perform as expected. There is also potential that the acquired 
company may not have had clear intellectual entitlement to the technology (Daunt, 2002: 04). 
Most importantly, the main reason that these potential acquisitions may fail is because Tencent‟s 
management may overlook the corporate culture fit between the two companies. 
 
The benefits surrounding these acquisitions are likely to ensure that Tencent can leverage off 
complimentary technologies and achieve greater levels of company growth in the future. 
Expanding its product and service offerings will improve the distribution capacity of Tencent. As 
such, this increases the company‟s target market and may expand its customer base. 
Furthermore, by having access to technological infrastructure and the relevant intellectual 
property rights associated with these acquisitions, this is likely to secure and improve Tencent‟s 
market position. 




2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Revenues 37960 198 818 467 369 630 948 883 327 1 254 325 2 006 920 3 532 179
Year-on-Year Growth (%) - 423.8% 135.1% 35.0% 40.0% 42.0% 60.0% 76.0%
Cost of Revenue (10 801) (49 856) (141 916) (232 742) (360 750) (660 173) (1 089 286) (1 982 501)
Year-on-Year Growth (%) - 361.6% 184.7% 64.0% 55.0% 83.0% 65.0% 82.0%
As a proportion of Revenues (%) 28.5% 25.1% 30.4% 36.9% 40.8% 52.6% 54.3% 56.1%
Total Profit 27 159 148 962 325 453 398 206 522 577 594 152 917 634 1 549 678
Year-on-Year Profit Growth (%) - 448.5% 118.5% 22.4% 31.2% 13.7% 54.4% 68.9%
Mobile & Telecommunication 
(RMB'000)
Consideration for these acquisitions has been made when forecasting Tencent‟s expected 
company growth over the 2004 to 2008 financial period. It must be stated that no specific 
company targets were publically provided by Tencent during the period leading up to its IPO. 
 
6.3.3 Growth Forecasts: Income Statement Assumptions  
 
6.3.3.1 Mobile & Telecommunication Value-Added Services (MVAS)  
(Forecasted CAGR of revenue generated for the 2003 to 2008 financial period = 49.86%) 
(Forecasted CAGR of net profit generated for the 2003 to 2008 financial period = 36.36%)  
 









6.3.3.1.1 Revenues  
 
The MVAS division is forecasted as Tencent‟s largest revenue contributor over the five-year 
period. 
 
2004 & 2005 Forecasts 
 
Amidst industry growth, it is likely that Tencent will aim to strengthen its brand and improve its 
existing MVAS products and services in the 2004 year. As per the user statistics in Section 4.5.2, 
by the end of the first quarter of Tencent‟s 2004 financial year its mobile subscribers increased 
by 103.2% to 12.8 million registered subscribers.  
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When this three-month growth is compared to the previous year‟s 12.5% annual subscriber 
growth as per Section 4.6.1 this is indicative of accelerated technological adoption and mobile 
penetration rates in China.  
 
Accounting for this, it is expected that this trend will continue in the foreseeable future and that 
Tencent will achieve positive levels of growth in its MVAS division over the 2004 financial 
year. It is likely that Tencent will aim to continue building its brand and essentially increase the 
value of its goodwill further. In doing so, it is expected that Tencent will expand on its MVAS 
product and service offerings in the 2004 financial year, making use of its large cash pile to 
supplement its MVAS media and content licensing agreements. This will ensure that the brand 
maintains its appeal to the Chinese populace as mobile penetration rates continue to rise and 
technological adoption spreads across the PRC.    
 
Leading into the 2005 financial year, competition amongst Tencent and its competitors is 
expected to intensify. As the industry continues to grow, it is likely that Tencent will follow the 
same expected strategies as outlined for the 2004 financial year. As per Section 4.5.2, the large 
expected segmental growth within industry suggests that it is susceptible to large technological 
changes in the near future. This being said, Section 4.5.6 shows that it is likely for Tencent to 
diversify its position in the MVAS industry by introducing value-added services into the VoIP 
and PHS markets. However, it is expected that Tencent‟s VoIP and PHS value-added services 




The 2006 financial year is likely to be termed as a transformational year for Tencent‟s MVAS 
division. It is expected that Tencent will use a considerable portion of its IPO proceeds to 
diversify and rollout MVAS offerings for new platforms and technologies. In reference to 
Section 4.9, Tencent is likely to acquire businesses and form strategic relationships with other 
businesses during this financial year. These acquisitions could range from any of the MVAS 
technologies mentioned in Section 6.3.2.2.4. 
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The premise behind this assumption is that while Tencent has outlined the possible fields of 
expansion in its IPO prospectus, Section 4.9 states that no specific companies were mentioned by 
Tencent at the time. By the 2006 year this would have allowed Tencent to pursue R&D efforts to 
develop in-house technologies and gave the company adequate time to understand the industry in 
light of technological changes, the sensitivity of adoption rates, the competitive environment, 
expected growth and the general industry outlook. This means that Tencent can make 
substantiated business acquisitions with credible synergies to compliment both its existing 
corporate culture and strategic outlook.  
 
VoIP and PHS R&D efforts are likely to prove fruitful in the 2006 year. This is because it is 
expected that Tencent will release Mobile QQ and other related value-added services for both 
platforms in this year. These efforts will ensure that Tencent evolves its business model and stays 
relevant in the highly-competitive MVAS market environment. However, with the acquisition of 
new businesses and launch of new offerings there is a likelihood Tencent could incur teething 
problems. While Tencent would have aimed to test the market by introducing beta versions of its 
offerings, these services may still need to be debugged and may not operate as intended. This 
would affect the overall receptiveness of these offerings and distort the true profitability 
contained within these investments at that point in time.  
 
Taking the holistic overview of these factors into consideration, Tencent‟s MVAS division is 
likely to experience a decline in profitability in the 2006 financial year in anticipation of 
sustained periods of high-growth over the 2007 and 2008 financial years. 
 
2007 & 2008 Forecasts 
 
The 2007 and 2008 financial years are expected to signify a new period of high growth for 
Tencent and its MVAS division. In light of the transformational efforts to be undertaken in the 
2006 financial year, the sacrificed decline in profitability should stand in deep contrast to the 
company‟s financial performance over this two-year period and beyond.  
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The 2007 financial year should realize significant returns for Tencent with regards to its acquired 
technologies, VoIP and PHS offerings. This is in alignment with the continual increase in mobile 
penetration and the growing PHS and mobile VoIP markets. By the 2007 financial year, this 
would have allowed significant time for Tencent to debug and improve these products and 
service offerings in the continual process of ensuring that they effectively meet user demands. 
By the 2008 financial year these products and services are expected to be fully received by a 
majority of new and existing VoIP and PHS users. 
 
Revenue growth surrounding Tencent‟s general MVAS offerings is likely to substantially grow 
in the 2007 and 2008 financial years. As Tencent uses its 2006 acquisitions to rollout new 
products and services, this will substantially increase user activity and MVAS revenues. These 
offerings will also attract new users which should further enhance MVAS revenues in these 
years.   
 
This growth is expected to be a result of a push by Tencent to increase QQ‟s brand exposure 
combined with accelerated technological development in China. As technologies improve and 
become more accessible in China this causes a trickle-down effect. As suggested by Section 4.4 
this means that the digital divide shrinks and more of the Chinese populace is able to afford and 
access technology. Therefore, the lower-income populace will be able to use cheaper forms of 
mobile technologies (i.e. VoIP and PHS) while concurrently developing a relationship with the 
QQ brand. This relationship can then be carried over to other and improved forms of mobile 
technology.  
 
Overall, while the growth in 2007 and 2008 revenues are attributable to similar factors, the 
magnitude of growth achieved in 2008 is fully expected to supersede Tencent‟s forecasted 
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6.3.3.1.2 Cost of Revenues  
 
Refer to Table 6.16 
 
As per Section 4.5.2 and Section 4.6 it is clear that historically Tencent‟s MVAS costs have 
increased in line with revenue growth. In this manner, Section 6.3.3.1.1 shows that Tencent‟s 
overall MVAS subscriber growth is expected to exponentially increase over the 2004 to 2008 
financial period. 
2004 & 2005 Forecasts 
 
As Tencent‟s subscriber base grows in the 2004 financial year its mobile partners will collect a 
larger portion of MVAS revenues. As indicated in Section 6.3.2.2.1 the revenue-sharing fees 
charged by mobile networks typically range between 12% and 15% of Tencent‟s revenues. This 
range is likely to be unchanged in the 2004 financial year. With the 103.2% increase in Tencent‟s 
mobile subscribers, this should encourage an increase in imbalance fees paid by Tencent in the 
2004 financial year. This is because the quantity of messages that are likely to be sent via 
Tencent‟s Mobile QQ platform are expected to exceed those sent via the platforms of network 
operators.   
 
Using 2003 costing data as per Section 4.6.1, it is expected that Tencent will incur additional 
MVAS employment costs in the 2004 year. This is to effectively accommodate for the surge in 
registered subscribers.  
 
The associated structure of Tencent‟s 2005 MVAS costs are expected to replicate those of the 
2004 financial year. The magnitude of these costs will increase in relation to 2005 revenue 
forecasts, and this is largely driven by continual anticipated growth in Tencent‟s registered 
mobile subscribers. This encourages an upwards revision of expected imbalance fees, while staff 
costs have been revised downwards from previous year estimates.  
 
The expenditure related to content-driven MVAS offerings has been factored into both financial 
years above and is likely to increase year-on-year over this period.  





As a transformational year for Tencent, the 2006 financial year should comprise of a different 
cost structure to the preceding two years of forecasts.  As the competitive landscape intensifies, it 
is expected that Tencent‟s MVAS division will realize a smaller growth of MVAS subscribers in 
this year. This is because the increased competition is likely to dilute the market.  Accounting for 
this, it is expected that the fees charged by mobile operators will increase in the 2006 financial 
year. This would mean that the initial 12% to 15% revenue-share range and imbalance fees are 
expected to increase (see Section 6.3.2.2.1).  
 
Considering the relative newness of Tencent‟s assumed business acquisitions in the 2006 
financial year, it is highly unlikely that the company will rollout new products and services in the 
2006 year alone. Juxtaposed to this, Tencent is expected to realize a large increase in MVAS 
costs as it introduces its VoIP and PHS offerings into the marketplace for the first time. 
Herewith, it is expected that PHS network operators (China Netcom and China Unicom) will 
charge Tencent with PHS-related revenue-sharing and imbalance fee expenditure. Tencent‟s 
VoIP offerings are also expected to incur revenue-sharing and imbalance fee expenditure in this 
regard.  
 
2007 & 2008 Forecasts 
 
Over the 2007 and 2008 financial years, Tencent‟s MVAS costs are expected to rise 
considerably. This is in relation to the expected surge in MVAS revenues over this period.  
 
The rollout of new MVAS offerings together with the expected increases in VoIP and PHS 
adoption rates should encourage a larger MVAS user base and a consequential rise in MVAS 
costs. Together, it is expected that the trickle-down effect referred to in Section 6.3.3.1.1 will 
ensure that these costs will raise considerably as revenues consistently grow over the 2007 and 
2008 years. This means that Tencent should realize an increase in revenue-sharing and imbalance 
fees paid to mobile operators in connection with MVAS offerings on traditional mobile, VoIP 
and PHS platforms. The expansion of Tencent‟s MVAS platforms has also encouraged a revised 




Value-Added Services (IVAS) (RMB'000)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Revenues 944 40 819 229 690 319 269 462 940 712 928 1 261 882 2 460 671
Year-on-Year Growth (%) - 4224.0% 462.7% 39.0% 45.0% 54.0% 77.0% 95.0%
Cost of Revenue (4 223) (11 848) (75 489) (116 253) (188 330) (423 742) (796 636) (1 513 608)
Year-on-Year Growth (%) - 180.6% 537.1% 54.0% 62.0% 125.0% 88.0% 90.0%
As a proportion of Revenues (%) -447.4% 29.0% 32.9% 36.4% 40.7% 59.4% 63.1% 61.5%
Total Profit -3 279 28 971 154 201 203 016 274 610 289 185 465 247 947 063
Year-on-Year Profit Growth (%) - -983.5% 432.3% 31.7% 35.3% 5.3% 60.9% 103.6%
costs estimate surrounding content-related expenses. These expenses have been revised upwards 
in response to the introduction of PHS and VoIP value-added services amongst traditional 
mobile platforms.  
 
 
While holistically Tencent is expected to incur the same costs from the 2006 year in both the 
2007 and 2008 financial years, the magnitude of cost growth in the 2008 year is expected to be 
significantly larger.  
 
6.3.3.2 Internet Value-Added Services (IVAS)  
(Forecasted CAGR of revenue generated for the 2003 to 2008 financial period = 60.69%) 
(Forecasted CAGR of net profit generated for the 2003 to 2008 financial period = 43.77%) 
 










As indicated in Section 4.5.1 QQ instant messenger plays an integral role in driving Tencent‟s 
revenues in its MVAS and IVAS divisions. Keeping this in mind, it must be stated that Tencent‟s 
IVAS offerings include both the PC-based version of QQ instant messenger and additional 
internet-based product and service offerings.  
 
The IVAS division is forecasted as Tencent‟s fastest growing segment over the five-year period.  
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2004 & 2005 Forecasts 
 
As per Section 6.3.2.1, increased Chinese infrastructural development is likely to cause internet 
diffusion and a reduction in China‟s digital divide.  
 
Section 4.5.3 shows that within the first quarter of the 2004 financial year the quantity of 
Tencent‟s registered IVAS subscribers have increased by 5.8% to 7,3 million. During the same 
three months, total registered QQ user accounts grew by 13.7% to 291.3 million registered 
accounts while internet usage time increased by 25.9% to an average of 64.7  million hours.  
The statistical inferences drawn from this data suggest that this has expanded Tencent‟s IVAS 
and IM target markets, and is likely to encourage user-driven revenue growth over the 2004 to 
2008 financial years. 
 
Considering the positive growing trend in both internet adoption and the use of Tencent‟s IVAS 
and IM services, these statistics further substantiate a consistent expected rise in IVAS 
subscribers and QQ members over the 2004 and 2005 financial years. Herewith it is expected 
that users will make use of Tencent‟s IVAS community and entertainment offerings, increasing 
overall revenues generated in this period. Additionally, historical revenue trends in Section 4.6 
infer that this will also encourage increased adoption rates of Tencent‟s fee-based Premium QQ 
and QQ Xing IM services. However, in light of Section 6.3.2.2.2.1 it is likely that that the 
offerings of Yahoo! MSN and AOL will reduce Tencent‟s 74.3% dominance of the Chinese IM 
market. This is expected to reduce the full growth potential of Tencent‟s IVAS and IM revenues 
as previously outlined. In contrast, the IM offerings of Tencent‟s Chinese competitors (see 
Section 4.5.1) are not expected to have an effect on Tencent‟s IM market share. This is because 
they have failed to compete with QQ in the past and this trend should continue amidst Tencent‟s 
efforts to recapture lost market share from Western MNCs.  
 
Section 4.1.3 indicates that Tencent had aims at the beginning of the 2004 financial year to 
become a market leader in China‟s online gaming space. Therefore, in order to compete directly 
with NetEase in this area of the IVAS market, it is expected that Tencent will license and 
introduce additional online game offerings over the 2004 and 2005 financial years.  
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This will further enhance revenue growth in this segment and increase its competitive position in 




As was the case with Tencent‟s forecasted growth in MVAS revenues (see Section 6.3.3.1.1), the 
2006 financial year is expected to transform Tencent‟s IVAS offerings and encourage large 
company growth rates in the near future. 
 
With the combined efforts of Western MNCs and Chinese competitor companies, it is expected 
that Tencent‟s market share in the IM and total IVAS market space is likely to be under 
considerable threat in the 2006 year. While the expected number of IVAS and QQ subscribers is 
likely to rise in the 2006 year, the growth in these subscriber bases is likely to decline when 
compared to both the 2004 and 2005 financial years. It is expected that Tencent will prevent this 
by making sufficient use of its IPO proceeds in the 2006 financial year. 
 
 In this manner, the diversification of its IVAS offerings expands Tencent‟s target market and 
creates opportunity to generate larger quantities of revenues in untapped IVAS market areas. As 
per Section 6.3.2.2.4 it is expected that Tencent will devote its IPO proceeds and additional cash 
reserves to acquire existing business in the IVAS and IM market. For the same reasons outlined 
in Section 6.3.3.1.1, the timing of these acquisitions ensures that Tencent can make substantiated 
complimentary acquisitions with enough credible synergies to ensure that both parties benefit 
holistically. 
 
At the same time it is expected that Tencent‟s IVAS R&D efforts will complimentarily assist 
these acquired businesses in achieving IVAS revenue growth in the 2006 financial year and 
beyond. Therefore it is likely that these acquisitions, combined with an accumulation of past and 
present R&D efforts, should see the rollout of a PC-based VoIP IM offering in the second half of 
the 2006 year (see Section 6.3.2.1.2.1). Furthermore, this is likely to be accompanied by an 
updated release of a new PC-based QQ software with integrated C2C and B2C technology 
during the same period.  
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Consideration has also been made for the R&D efforts of Tencent‟s online gaming division as 
per Section 4.1.3. It is fully expected that Tencent will acquire a gaming development company 
in 2006 to complement its R&D in this division. However, this has not been factored into 2006 
revenue forecasts as it is highly unlikely that Tencent will rollout additional games until the 2007 
and 2008 years.  
 
2007 & 2008 Forecasts 
 
The 2007 and 2008 financial years are expected to yield the second largest and largest growth in 
Tencent‟s IVAS revenues since 2004.The relevant business acquisitions undertaken by Tencent 
in the 2006 year are expected to encourage significant growth in IVAS revenues over the 2007 
and 2008 financial years. These acquisitions are expected to allow Tencent to continuously 
innovate and update its IVAS and IM service offerings.  
 
By introducing PC-based VoIP IM services and integrating both C2C and B2C components into 
its QQ IM software, it is expected that Tencent will attract more IVAS and IM users in these 
years. This is over and above the general expected growth in IVAS and QQ subscriptions in 
these years. Accounting for the historical trend in the strategic models of Tencent‟s competitors, 
it is expected that these competitors will shift focus away from their attempted IM offerings and 
continue to compete directly in the IVAS market through their web portals (see Section 4.5.3). 
This is likely to occur because it is expected that Tencent would have re-established its market 
position through the acquisition of new businesses and enhancement of its IM and IM-related 
IVAS offerings.  
 
While Tencent is likely to consistently improve its web portal IVAS services by acquiring 
additional content, the company is expected to continue following the same strategic model as 
outlined in Section 4.5.1. Considering Tencent‟s market position, it is expected that by the 2007 
financial year Western MNCs would have disinvested from China‟s IVAS market collectively. 
This is likely to be caused by a lack of understanding of Chinese internet culture and the rich 
historical background of competing Chinese companies.  
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This suggests that Tencent should regain lost market share in the IM and IVAS market to solidify 
and enhance this position throughout the 2007 and 2008 financial years. 
 
In terms of the online gaming industry, Tencent is likely to enact upon its 2006 acquisition and 
release various versions of casual, IM-enabled, RTS and MMORPG games over this two-year 
period. These game offerings are expected to make an impact on the market environment of 
China‟s online gaming industry over the 2007 and 2008 financial years. Therefore, online 
gaming will play a significant role in contributing to forecasted IVAS revenues over this period.  
 
6.3.3.2.2 Cost of Revenues 
 
Refer to Table 6.17 
 
2004 & 2005 Forecasts 
 
Based on forecasted revenues over this period, the expected increase in IVAS and QQ 
subscribers is likely to considerably increase Tencent‟s total IVAS costs over this financial 
period. To accommodate for these additional subscribers, the increased costs are likely to come 
from additional bandwidth leasing fees and server custody fees. This would ensure that Tencent 
is able to meet expected demand for its IVAS services without jeopardizing the quality and 
reliability of these services. These additional subscribers will also encourage an increase in 
imbalance fees over the 2004 and 2005 financial years, further inflating Tencent‟s cost of IVAS 
revenues over this period (see Section 6.3.2.2.2.2).  
 
It is also expected that cost increases will be realized from the additional licensing of both online 




The main cost constituents in this year are expected to replicate the same structure as 2004 and 
2005 forecasts.  




2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Revenues 7735 19 188 32 841 43 350 59 823 90 931 159 130 292 799
Year-on-Year Growth (%) - 148.1% 71.2% 32.0% 38.0% 52.0% 75.0% 84.0%
Cost of Revenue (3 020) (6 970) (10 499) (12 599) (16 000) (31 041) (67 359) (138 086)
Year-on-Year Growth (%) - 130.8% 50.6% 20.0% 27.0% 94.0% 117.0% 105.0%
As a proportion of Revenues (%) 39.0% 36.3% 32.0% 29.1% 26.7% 34.1% 42.3% 47.2%
Total Profit 4 715 12 218 22 342 30 751 43 823 59 890 91 771 154 713
Year-on-Year Profit Growth (%) - 159.1% 82.9% 37.6% 42.5% 36.7% 53.2% 68.6%
Online advertising
However, the introduction of PC-based VoIP IM and the integration of C2C and B2C 
components are expected to drive IVAS costs above previous forecasts. 
 
Tencent‟s PC-based VoIP IM should see the company having to lease a substantially larger 
amount of additional bandwidth (when compared with previous years), while having to employ 
additional development and technical staff for this division.  
This should be accompanied by an increase in user activity resulting from the integration of C2C 
and B2C platforms into Tencent‟s QQ services. This is likely to increase the amount of 
imbalance fees paid by Tencent in 2006. 
2007 & 2008 Forecasts 
 
In light of the forecasted IVAS revenue growth over this period, Tencent‟s cost structure is 
expected to replicate the 2006 financial year. Considering the expected changes in industry (see 
Section 6.3.3.2.1) these costs are likely to increase substantially in the 2007 financial year and 
again in the 2008 financial year. In addition to this, expectations surrounding Tencent‟s online 
gaming division in the 2007 and 2008 years suggest that this will further increase the company‟s 
cost of IVAS revenues over this period. 
 
6.3.3.3 Online Advertising  
(Forecasted CAGR of revenue generated for the 2003 to 2008 financial period = 54.89%) 
(Forecasted CAGR of net profit generated for the 2003 to 2008 financial period = 47.26%) 
 
Table 6.18: Forecasted Online Advertising Revenues and Cost of Revenues over the 2004 to 













The statistical inferences drawn from Section 4.5.4 show that as of the 2003 financial year, 
Chinese companies began to adopt emerging media and use online advertising as a primary 
means of promotion. 
 
2004 & 2005 Forecasts 
 
Taking China‟s infrastructural development and economic growth into account (see Section 4.4); 
this together with the expected increases in internet usage (see Section 4.5.3) suggests that 
internet penetration rates will rise in the near future. As this happens, internet is likely to become 
interwoven into the daily lives of Chinese society. This was already evident in the first quarter of 
the 2004 financial year as Tencent realized substantial growth in its IVAS and IM subscribers 
(see Section 4.5.1 and Section 4.5.3).  
 
Accounting for this, it is expected that these factors will attract a larger advertising client base 
for Tencent, translating into higher revenues generated in its online advertising division over the 
2004 and 2005 financial years.   
 
2006 Forecast  
 
As the above-mentioned trend is expected to continue in the 2006 financial year, the adoption of 
online advertising in China is likely to rise. Based on the context of Tencent‟s IM-centered 
business model and the relevant expected growth of its IM users over this period (see Section 
6.3.3.2), Tencent‟s advertising client base should be larger than its competitors.  
 
Section 4.5.4 states that by selling online advertising through their web portals, Tencent‟s local 
competitors have collectively followed the same strategic model as each other. When this is 
contrasted with Tencent‟s innovative advertising methods as outlined in Section 6.1.1.3, this 
personal IM-based approach is likely to prove more advantageous for advertising clients. This is 
because adverts are directly displayed to users and guarantee the relevant exposure required by 
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Tencent‟s clients.  This is especially relevant in the 2006 financial year as Tencent is expected to 
enhance and expand its IVAS and IM-based offerings. This is likely to encourage increased web-
based and IM user activity which will provide additional brand exposure for clients and create 
greater value in Tencent‟s advertising platforms. 
 
It is fully expected that Tencent will acquire and implement advertising rank technologies as per 
Section 4.9 in the 2006 year. This will enhance its competitive advantage and should potentially 
increase its advertising client base.  
 
Thus, Tencent‟s online advertising revenue growth in 2006 should supersede 2004 and 2005 
estimates. 
 
2007 & 2008 Forecasts 
 
With the increasing trend in IVAS and IM subscribers and the expected rollout of enhanced and 
improved web-based offerings, Tencent‟s online advertising division should reap its highest 
levels of revenue growth in the 2007 and 2008 financial years. By this time period online 
advertising is expected to become a conventional norm in China‟s advertising industry, and the 
preferred method of advertising undertaken by corporate clients. However, this is also likely to 
affect industry growth levels and Tencent‟s advertising revenues in these years. 
 
The influx of online advertising may frustrate Chinese users and detract the value placed on web-
based products and services.  In response, it is likely that users will begin to implement 
advertising blockers as mentioned in Section 6.3.2.2.3. Advertising blockers will erode the value 
in online advertising and are likely to reduce Tencent‟s advertising client base in this year.  
Therefore, this has reduced online advertising revenue forecasts over the 2007 and 2008 years. In 
addition, it is fully expected that the competitive nature and growth of China‟s online advertising 
industry will incite regulatory involvement from the Chinese government. While this is 
speculation, it has been factored into revenue growth forecasts on the basis of being prudent. 
Therefore, this is likely to shrink Tencent‟s existing pool of advertising clients and reduces the 
total expected revenue growth in this division over the 2007 and 2008 financial years.  
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6.3.3.3.2 Cost of Revenues  
 
Refer to Table 6.18 
 
2004 & 2005 Forecasts 
 
As online advertising revenues are expected to grow over this period, the increased volume of 
advertising clients will encourage increases in commissions paid to advertising agencies. These 
commissions are likely to increase in the 2004 year and again in the 2005 year. 
 
2006 Forecast  
 
Accounting for the expected growth in the volume of Tencent‟s advertising clients, agency 
commissions will increase in the 2006 year. Over and above this, the implementation of 
advertising rank technologies will encourage additional employment costs in the online 
advertising division.  
 
2007 & 2008 Forecasts 
 
The expected rise in online advertising revenues over this period should encourage additional 
sales commission costs for Tencent. This is despite the relevant concerns surrounding both 













2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Revenues 2437 4 282 5 057 6 119 7 588 10 016 13 821 20 456
Year-on-Year Growth (%) - 75.7% 18.1% 21.0% 24.0% 32.0% 38.0% 48.0%
Cost of Revenue - - (1 644) (1 841) (2 025) (2 370) (2 607) (2 920)
Year-on-Year Growth (%) - - - 12.0% 10.0% 17.0% 10.0% 12.0%
As a proportion of Revenues (%) - - 32.5% 30.1% 26.7% 23.7% 18.9% 14.3%
Total Profit - - 3 413 4 278 5 562 7 646 11 215 17 536
Year-on-Year Profit Growth (%) - - - 25.3% 30.0% 37.5% 46.7% 56.4%
Others
6.3.3.4 Other – RTX & Trademark Licensing  
(Forecasted CAGR of revenue generated for the 2003 to 2008 financial period = 32.25%) 
(Forecasted CAGR of net profit generated for the 2003 to 2008 financial period = 38.73%) 
 










Based on the information contain in Section 4.5.5 it is expected that RTX revenues will continue 
to experience slow and consistent growth in the 2004 and 2005 financial years. In light of the 
expected development of Tencent‟s MVAS, IVAS and IM offerings in the 2006 year, Tencent 
should realize increased RTX revenue growth in the 2006, 2007 and 2008 financial years.  
 
6.3.3.4.1.2 Trademark Licensing  
As per Section 4.6.4, it is likely that Tencent will continue to reduce trademark licensing efforts 
over the 2004 and 2008 years. This is to remain competitive and unique in these future years.  
 
6.3.3.4.2 Cost of Revenues 
 
Refer to Table 6.19 
 
As the adoption rate of RTX systems increase, it is expected that the cost of revenues will rise 
over the 2004 to 2008 financial period. This is disproportionate to revenue growth.  




2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Capital Expenditure (CAPEX) 11 495 28 156 59 459 71 351 122 723 613 617 276 128 237 608
Year-on-Year Growth % 145% 111% 20% 72% 400% -55% -14%
Fixed Assets - Property, Plant & Equipment (PPE) (RMB'000)
2001 2002 2003
Opening Balance - 01/01/200X 7 821          16 868 38 851        
Depreciation (2 448)         (6 155) (17 188)       
Loss on Disposal of Fixed Asset -                   (18) (983)             
CAPEX 11 495        28 156 59 459        
Closing Balance - 31/12/200X 16 868        38 851 80 139        
6.3.3.5 Terminal Growth Rate 
 
In the long-run Tencent will enter into the mature stage of the business cycle and achieve limited 
growth. As an industry standard, a company‟s terminal growth rate is typically just above the 
expected inflation rate over the forecasted time period. 
 
Based on inflation forecasts in Section 4.4 it is expected that China‟s inflation rate will average 
at 3.1% over the projected five-year period. Therefore, Tencent‟s terminal growth rate at time 
T+5 is expected to be 3.3%. 
 
T+5 = 3.3% 
 
6.3.3.6 Capital Expenditure (CAPEX) Assumptions 
 











Total forecasted CAPEX figures comprise of both Tencent‟s acquisitions and infrastructural 
expenditure over the five-year projected period. The reason for including the cost of these 
acquisitions is because the associated growth has been factored into revenue forecasts in Sections 
6.3.3.1, 6.3.3.2, 6.3.3.3, 6.3.3.4. As there is no such thing as a free lunch, this prevents an 
inconsistent CAPEX projection.  
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Historically, the IVAS division has been the largest constituent of Tencent‟s total CAPEX over 
the 2001 to 2003 period. The CAPEX spend of the MVAS and online advertising divisions have 
been considerably lower. This difference here is because Tencent has had to ensure that it meets 
the infrastructural demands of hosting its IVAS services. In contrast, MVAS services are 
distributed through China‟s mobile networks and online advertising is outsourced.   
 
This means that as Tencent‟s overall subscriber base rises, its CAPEX spend will increase. Based 
on the expected growth of this overall subscriber base in the 2004 to 2008 period, these CAPEX 
costs will substantially grow.  
It is fully expected that Tencent will utilize the entire allocated 65% of IPO proceeds to fund 
business acquisitions and expansionary projects in the 2006, 2007 and 2008 financial years (see 
Section 4.9). Majority of this allocated 65% is expected to fund acquisitions in the 2006 year 
alone. The full 25% of IPO proceeds apportioned for organic growth and business expansion is 
likely to be expensed (see Section 4.9). This will be in proportionately smaller increments over 
the 2004 and 2005 years, while majority will be expensed in the 2006, 2007 and 2008 years. 
 
This means that as Tencent‟s CAPEX spend grows over the five-year forecasted period, it will 
spend its largest levels of recorded CAPEX in the 2006 financial year alone. This will be 
accompanied by additional spend in the 2007 and 2008 financial years.   
 
6.3.3.7 Research & Development (R&D)  
 
For the purposes of this DCF model, R&D expenses have been capitalized as CAPEX. Therefore 
R&D has been accounted for in the forecasted CAPEX amounts over the five-year period.  
 
This is supported by Aswath Damodaran of NYU‟s Stern School of Business. Damodaran (1996) 
states that treating R&D as an operating expense immediately reduces and distorts a company‟s 
true operating income and net income generated over a review period. This goes against the 
accounting treatment of R&D as per „International Accounting Standard 38‟ (IAS 38) on 
intangible assets. IAS 38 states that research and development expenditure is recognized as an 




2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Capital Expenditure (CAPEX) 11 495 28 156 59 459 71 351 122 723 613 617 276 128 237 608
Year-on-Year Growth % 145% 111% 20% 72% 400% -55% -14%
Research & Development Expenditure 5 610          7 783 26 010        71 528 200 277 276 382 132 663 92 864
( Re-adjusted against IAS 38) 5 610 7 783 26 010 71 528 200 277 276 382 132 663 92 864
Year-on-Year Growth % 39% 234% 175% 180% 38% -52% -30%
Total Adjusted CAPEX 17 105 35 939 85 469 142 878 323 000 889 999 408 791 330 472
expense when incurred and is only capitalized when certain criterion are met (Cazavan-Jeny and 
Jeanjean, 2003: 02).  
 
However, considering the nature of Tencent‟s industry, the fast-changing market environment 
and accelerated pace of technological innovation; R&D expenditure plays a critical role in the 
intrinsic value placed on Chinese internet and telecommunications companies.  Therefore, by 
capitalizing R&D expenditure to CAPEX this ensures that the DCF model captures an accurate 
representation of Tencent‟s intrinsic value on its IPO date.  
 
6.3.3.7.1 Forecasted R&D Expenditure  
 
Table 6.21: Forecasted R&D and Total Adjusted CAPEX Forecasts for Tencent over the 2004 to 








In response to the intended use of IPO proceeds in Section 6.3.2.2.4, Tencent‟s R&D efforts are 
likely to increase extensively over the 2004 to 2008 financial period. 
 
The expected rollout of new PHS and VoIP technologies over the 2006, 2007 and 2008 years 
will encourage Tencent to devote large quantities of R&D expenditure leading up to these 
earmarked release years. This is amongst other R&D efforts with respect to product and service 
expansion in Tencent‟s IM and online gaming (IVAS), MVAS and RTX divisions.  Herewith 
R&D is expected to substantially grow in the 2004 year and at a greater magnitude in the 2005 
financial year. This will support and motivate Tencent‟s acquisitions in the 2006 year and 
company direction from 2006 moving forward.  
Chapter 6: A Complex Valuation of the Tencent IPO 
6:63 
 
In light of the expected rollout and expansionary plans outlined in Sections 6.3.3.1, 6.3.3.2, 
6.3.3.3, 6.3.3.4 this R&D expenditure should reach its peak in the 2006 financial year and will 
lessen in the 2007 and 2008 financial years.   
 
6.3.3.8 Depreciation, Amortization and Impairment (see Appendix D, Exhibit 6)  
 
This is forecasted as a percentage of Tencent‟s estimated net CAPEX spend over the 2004 to 
2008 financial period (see Section 6.3.3.6).  
 
Depreciation is considerably affected by the extent of acquisitions in the 2006, 2007 and 2008 
financial years.   
 
It is also likely that Tencent will incur amortization expenditure related to goodwill and other 
intangible assets incurred from these acquired businesses over this period. Impairment losses 
related to fixed assets have also been accounted for in these estimates. 
 
6.3.3.9 Selling and Marketing Expenses103  
 
Tencent‟s selling and marketing expenditure has been reported as one total figure in the 
company‟s financial statements. There is no further indication as to the apportionment of this 
expenditure between each of Tencent‟s operating segments. Therefore, these forecasts have been 
reported as one total figure.  
 
Based on revenue forecasts in Sections 6.3.3.1, 6.3.3.2, 6.3.3.3, 6.3.3.4 selling and marketing 
expenses are expected to increase considerably over the 2004 to 2008 financial periods.  
 
While the 2004 and 2005 years are not expected to see new product and service launches from 
Tencent, the company‟s selling and marketing costs will increase in each of these years. 
 This is to ensure that Tencent‟s revenue forecasts are met and that Tencent remains appealing to 
                                                          
103 These include promotional and marketing activities, third-party advertising, product launch events, printing sales brochures, staff costs, travel 
costs and entertainment costs. These are just a few of the selling and marketing activities that Tencent had undertaken by 16 June 2004.  
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new consumers as the Chinese technological adoption rate improves. Throughout this five-year 
period Tencent will be sought to enhance its market presence in response to expected industry 
competition and the estimated growth of China‟s respective MVAS, IVAS, IM, online 
advertising and online gaming segments. In doing so, Tencent‟s expected product launches in the 
2006, 2007 and 2008 financial years should cause selling and marketing expenses to experience 
a surge of growth in each of these years. This is aside from increased selling and marketing 
efforts to promote existing products and services  
 
6.3.3.10 General and Administrative Expenses (see Appendix D, Exhibit 6)  
 
These include salary and welfare expenses, office rental, travel & entertainment expenses, 
consulting fees, office maintenance, general expenditure related to R&D and other general office 
expenses.  
 
It is expected that Tencent‟s general and administrative expenditure will follow the same growth 
trend as outlined in Sections 6.3.3.1, 6.3.3.2, 6.3.3.3, 6.3.3.4.  Particularly, this expenditure 
should rise considerably from the 2006 financial year moving into the future. 
 
6.3.3.11 Other Operating (Expenses)/Incomes (see Appendix D, Exhibit 6) 
 
It is expected that Tencent‟s net finance costs will grow in accordance to forecasted company 
growth as per Sections 6.3.3.1, 6.3.3.2, 6.3.3.3, 6.3.3.4. 
 
6.3.3.11.1 Net Finance Costs  
 
This includes interest expense, interest income, exchange gains/losses and bank charges. 
 
It is expected that the growth in Tencent‟s net finance costs follow the same trend as forecasted 
company growth in Sections 6.3.3.1, 6.3.3.2, 6.3.3.3, 6.3.3.4. 
 
 





Amounts due from shareholders Not Included
Prepayments, deposits and other receivables Included
Amounts due from shareholders Not Included
Current Liabilities:
Other payables and accruals Included
Amounts due from shareholders Not Included
Amounts due from shareholders Not Included
Amounts due from shareholders Not Included
Income taxes payable Included
Other taxes payable Included
Deferred revenue Included
6.3.3.12 Working Capital Assumptions  (see Appendix D, Exhibit 7 and Exhibit 8) 
 
The constituents of Tencent‟s working capital are summarized in Table 6.22 below. 
 
Table 6.22: Composition and Predicted Movements of Tencent‟s Net Working Capital over the 












Collectively, Tencent‟s current assets are expected to exceed current liabilities over the five-year 
period. Tencent will experience positive changes in net working capital from 2004 to 2008 
except for the 2004 year whereby the net change in working capital will be negative.  
 
For a breakdown of each line item included, refer to Appendix D, Exhibit 8. 
 
6.3.3.13 Items Re-Added to Enterprise Value  
 
These amounts have not been accounted for in the DCF model. Instead they have been re-added 
to the value of the firm in order to accurately represent the true Enterprise Value (EV) of Tencent 
after discounting the relevant cash flows at the WACC of 7.57%.  
 
This provides an accurate value of Tencent‟s share price on its listing date.  
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6.3.3.13.1 Cash and Cash Equivalents 
 
As this was not captured in the DCF model and was excluded from Tencent‟s EV calculation, it 
has been re-added to reflect the total value of the company‟s equity on its listing date.  
 
6.3.3.13.2 Deposits in Connection with Shiji Kauixuan Technology 
 
As a once-off financing component this is not part of Tencent‟s daily business operations and 
was not accounted for in the DCF model. It has been re-added to reflect the total value of the 
company‟s equity on its listing date. 
 
6.3.3.13.3 Term Deposits with an Initial Term of over Three Months 
 
As a financing component, this line item represents a component of Tencent‟s cash and has been 
re-added to reflect the total value of the company‟s equity on its listing date.   
 
6.3.3.13.4 Amounts due from Shareholders 
 
These are unsecured, non-interest bearing debt contracts with no fixed payments.  
 
As money that accrues to Tencent, it is not part of Tencent‟s business operations and was 
excluded from the DCF model. It has been re-added to reflect the total value of the company‟s 
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Total Firm Value (Enterprise Value) 32 953 261.30
- Long-term Debt 0
+ Cash and Cash Equivalents 325 586
+ Deposit in Connection with the formation of Shiji Kaixuan Technology 11 000
+ Amounts due from Shareholders 82
+ Term Deposits with Initial Term Over 3 Months 23 311
Value of Equity 33 313 240
÷ # Shares 1 680 641
Share Price (RMB) 19.82
Share Price (HK$) 18.68
Actual Closing Price - 16 June 2004
Share Price (RMB) 4.40
Share Price (HK$) 4.15
(RMB'000)
6.3.3.14 Estimated Intrinsic Value (see Appendix D, Exhibit 9)  
 
Table 6.23: Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) Calculation – Estimated Intrinsic Value of Tencent on 














After applying the relevant forecasted growth rates to the existing framework of Tencent‟s 
statement of comprehensive income for the financial years ending 31 December, the respective 
net operating profit after tax (NOPAT) figures for the 2004 to 2008 period are deduced. 
 
Through the unlevered FCFF approach, the respective NOPAT amounts are adjusted for 
Tencent‟s relevant depreciation, CAPEX and changes in net working capital. This determines 
Tencent‟s yearly free cash flows for the five-year period.  
 
Each cash flow is then discounted by the WACC of 7.57% (see Section 6.3.1.5). Furthermore, 
the terminal value (growing at 3.3% over the long-run) is discounted at the same WACC of 
7.57%. Altogether this generates Tencent‟s total Enterprise Value of 32,953,261.30 RMB.  
 
In order to reflect the true value of Tencent‟s equity, all long-term debt is subtracted from 
Tencent‟s enterprise value while all financing/leveraging activities are re-added. As Tencent 
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does not possess any long-term debt this amount equates to 0 RMB. On the contrary, cash and 
cash equivalents of 325,586,000 RMB, deposits in connection with the formation of Shiji 
Kaixuan Technology of 11,000,000 RMB, term deposits with an initial term of over 3 months of 
23,311,000 RMB and amounts due from shareholders of 82,000 RMB are re-added to Tencent‟s 
enterprise value.   
 
This summates to a total firm value of 33,287,621,000 RMB, which is divisible by the 
1,680,641,260 outstanding shares to arrive at an estimated intrinsic value of 19.82 RMB per 
share. Applying the relevant CNY/HKD
104
 exchange rate on 16 June 2004, this equates to a total 
of HK$18.68 per share. 
 
This share price falls within the HK$14.40 - HK$18.72 share price range as per the relative 
valuation in Section 6.1. Thus as a reasonability check, it is highly evident that both valuation 
techniques have provided similar share price outcomes. When compared to Tencent‟s actual 














                                                          
104 1 RMB = HKD 1.0614 as at 16 June, 2004. 
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Chapter 7: Underpricing the Offer Shares 
and Post-IPO Subsequent Events 
 
7.1. Underpricing on the First Day of Listing  
 
Using the case information in Section 4.10 Tencent (HKEx 700) opened on the HKEx at a price 
of HK$4.375. The share peaked at HK$4.625 on this date before closing at HK$4.150. This 
translated into a first day‟s underpricing of 12.2%.
105
 This HK$0.45 differential effectively 
meant that Tencent left money on the table to the value of HK$217,433,025 (US$27,883,536) by 
pricing its offer shares at HK$3.70, the upper limit of its HK$2.77 – HK$3.70 offer price 
range.
106
   
 
Applying the respective IPO underpricing theories outlined in Section 3.1, there were various 
possibilities attributable to the level of underpricing experienced by Tencent on its first day of 
listing on the HKEx.  
 
7.1.1 IPO Underpricing in the Hong Kong Equity Market 
 
As per Section 4.8, Tencent‟s IPO launched approximately four years after its NASDAQ-listed 
competitors. While Qiao (2008) found that IPO underpricing on the HKEx is influenced by 
previous occurrences of IPO underpricing in industry (see Section 3.1.1), no inferences could be 
made with regards to Tencent‟s IPO. This was because four out of Tencent‟s five direct 
competitors listed on the US-based NASDAQ exchange. This meant that the overall stimulus 
behind the levels of underpricing and demand for offer shares would have differed between 
Tencent‟s IPO and its competitor‟s IPOs. Therefore, no direct link could be made between the 
levels of underpricing in the 2000 year when compared to Tencent‟s 12.2% first day‟s 
underpricing.  
                                                          
105 [( HK$4.150 – HK$3.7) / HK$3.7 ] x 100 = 12.2% 
106 483,184,500 offer shares x [(4.150 – 3.7)] = HK$ 217,433,025 




In support of Qiao‟s (2008) theory surrounding IPO industry clustering, there were two instances 
of this amongst Tencent and its competitors. The first instance of clustering was the launch of 
SINA Corp, Sohu.com and NetEase‟s IPOs in the 2000 financial year (see Table 4.5 in Section 
4.7). All three of these competitors launched their IPOs on the NASDAQ within four months of 
each other.  
 
The second instance of IPO clustering was TOM Online‟s dual-listing on the NASDAQ and 
HKGEM in March 2004 and the launch of Tencent‟s IPO in June 2004. There was a clear 
relationship between the launch of TOM Online and Tencent‟s IPOs as both companies listed 
within four months of each other and on the Hong Kong equity markets.  
 
7.1.2 Asymmetric Information Theory: The Winner‟s Curse 
 
As per Vong‟s (n.d.) findings surrounding the SEHK‟s clawback provision, it was clear that 
Rock‟s (1986) „Winner‟s Curse‟ theory as supported by Allen and Faulhaber (1989), Grinblatt 
and Hwang (1989) and Ljungqvist (2004) was not a credible reason for the occurrence of 
Tencent‟s IPO underpricing.  
 
With reference to the structure of the offering as set-out in Exhibit 1 of Appendix B, Tencent‟s 
choice to exercise its over-allotment option ensured that a greater amount of Hong Kong Public 
Offer Shares were made available to uninformed investors. This refuted Rock‟s (1986) findings 
that the „Winner‟s Curse‟ is exacerbated by an oversubscription of offer shares prior to the listing 
date. This was because the 159 times oversubscription in Hong Kong Offer Shares saw the 
reallocation of 168,064,500 shares from the International Placement to the public investment 
tranche, ensuring an equivalent amount of 210,080,500 offer shares per each placement type. 
This created an opportunity for uninformed investors to receive an allocation of the attractively 
priced IPO offer shares and ensured that markets would operate smoothly. 
 
The terms of application for offer shares in Exhibit 2 of Appendix B further guaranteed a fair and 
equal opportunity for both informed and uninformed investors to invest in Tencent‟s IPO. This 
supplemented the clawback provision. Specifically, this was because Tencent placed a restriction 




on multiple share applications from the same applicant, limited to a total maximum application 
threshold of 50% (21,008,000) of the initial Hong Kong Offer Shares made available. This was 
further evident through Tencent‟s sole right to shift share allocation ratios between investors 
within their respective pools (see 1.1, 1.1.1, 1.1.2 and 1.2 of Exhibit 2 in Appendix B). 
 
This showed that the „Winner‟s Curse‟ theory on the effects of asymmetric information on IPO 
underpricing was not applicable in the case of Tencent‟s IPO.  
 
7.1.3 Asymmetric Information Theory: Underpricing as a Signal of Firm Quality 
 
Based on Ibbotson‟s (1975) findings supported by Allen and Faulhaber (1989), Grinblatt and 
Hwang (1989), Welch (1996) and Ljungqvist (2004) the reason for underpricing Tencent‟s IPO 
was likely to be an intended result of „leaving a good taste in investors‟ mouths‟.   
 
By leaving money on the table of HK$217,433,025 (US$27,883,536) and consequently 
underpricing its shares by 12.2%, it was likely that Tencent intentionally suffered losses upfront 
to signal superior firm prospects in the future. Hence, it had signaled to the market that it was a 
high quality firm that was prepared to „suffer‟ the reduction in capital raised to sustainably 
benefit over the long-run. This boosted demand for its offer shares and created an opportunity for 
Tencent to return to the Hong Kong equity market for an SEO at some point in the future.  
 
Supplementing this argument were the additional findings of Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) and 
Ljungqvist (2004). As per Section 3.1.3 collectively they found that reputable investment 
bankers, underwriters, auditors and venture capitalists may also enhance the signaling effect of 
an IPO firm. Applying these findings to Tencent, it was evident that Tencent substantially 
signaled its firm quality through its IPO roadshow and book building process.  
 
From enlisting both Goldman Sachs (Asia) and the HSBC as its lead underwriters to using 
reputable audit firm PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) as its respected auditors; these factors alone 
were likely to signal that Tencent was a high quality firm. Furthermore, this was supported by 
Tencent‟s ability to maintain a high quality board of directors. 




Taking this into consideration, it was more likely than not that Tencent purposefully underpriced 
its IPO as a signal of firm quality. Considering that the Hong Kong Offer Shares were 159 times 
oversubscribed and the International Placement Shares were 17 times oversubscribed, it was 
clear that both informed and uninformed investors were confident in Tencent‟s quality as a firm 
and its future growth prospects.  
 
7.1.4 Institutional Theory: Price Support 
 
While Ljungqvist (2004) classified price stabilization or price support as a non-deliberate form 
of IPO underpricing; there was direct evidence of intent by Tencent to take stabilizing action 
with regards to its shares.  
 
Following the notion of Ruud (1993) Tencent entered into a 24-day stabilization period with its 
lead underwriter (Goldman Sachs (Asia)) so that it could prevent stock prices from falling below 
the original offer price of HK$3.70 per share. Expiring on 10 July 2014, this form of price 
support would have prevented negative IPO returns. While Chowdhry and Nanda (1996) showed 
that price stabilization benefits uninformed investors over informed investors and mitigates 
Rock‟s (1986) „Winner‟s Curse‟, the SEHK regulatory requirements and compulsory clawback 
provisions nullify this benefit.  
 
As events played out Goldman Sachs (Asia) did not have to partake in any form of stabilizing 
action on behalf of Tencent‟s share price. Hence, tabular data in Exhibit 1 of Appendix E shows 
that over the 24-day stabilization period Tencent‟s lowest share price was HK$3.95 per share. 
This was on Friday 18 June 2004 and repeated again on Monday 21 June 2004. Thus, the 
stabilization period could be classified as a precautionary measure to mitigate the potential risks 
of the offer, proving that there was no evidence of share price stabilization by Tencent‟s lead 
underwriters. 
 
This suggested that Tencent‟s level of underpricing could not be attributed to the institutional 
theory of price support as no stabilizing action was undertaken. It must be noted that the 
exercising of the over-allotment option on 5 July 2004 was classified as a form of stabilizing 




action undertaken by the global coordinator/underwriter (HKEx News, 2004a: 01). However, this 
was consistent with Tencent‟s company policy to ensure that the intended ratio of Hong Kong 
Offer Shares to International Placement Shares was correct (see Appendix B, Exhibit 1 and 
Exhibit 2). Overall, this action did not materially relate to the share price stabilization theories as 
outlined by Ruud (1993), Chowdhry and Nanda (1996), Asquith, Jones and Kieschnick (1996) 
and Ljungqvist (2004) above.   
 
7.1.5 Ownership & Control: Underpricing as a Means to Retain Control 
 
Applying ownership and control theories of underpricing to Tencent‟s IPO, there was 
speculatory evidence to suggest that Tencent would have artificially underpriced its offer shares 
to target specific investors and raise overall company value. This would have increased demand 
for its offer shares and attracted a diverse range of investors for the company to choose from.  
 
Upon review of Tencent‟s electronic application results together with the manual white and 
yellow application forms, this suggested that there was a possibility of bias in Tencent‟s IPO 
share allotment (HKEx News, 2004b: 5-18). This was because contrary to the general trend some 
shareholders had been allotted a larger amount of Hong Kong Offer Shares than others. When 
taking Point 1.2 of Exhibit 2, Appendix B into consideration Tencent‟s right to allocate Hong 
Kong Offer Shares on its own basis further supported this notion.  Hence, this related to Brennan 
and Franks‟s (1997) „Reduced Monitoring Hypothesis‟ in that Tencent may have done so to 
reduce the amount of scrutiny placed on its management team. 
 
In further support of Brennan and Franks‟s (1997) findings, linkages could be drawn to 
Tencent‟s use of IPO proceeds as outlined in Section 4.9. Taking the above into account, there 
was a likelihood that Tencent may have enacted upon artificial underpricing to target investors 
that were complimentary to the firm‟s future acquisitions. Juxtaposed to this, Stoughton and 
Zechner (1998) found that an IPO firm‟s investment bankers will artificially underprice to 
intentionally favor large institutional investors. This could not have been true in Tencent‟s case.  
This was because of the relevant SEHK regulatory requirements and compulsory clawback 
provision ensuring equitable share allocation between large, informed institutional investors and 




Highest Lowest Average Volume Highest Lowest Average Volume
June 4.62 3.95 374 102 200 January 4.97 4.28 32 845 100
July 4.45 3.38 55 257 800 February 5.40 4.55 38 859 600
August 4.05 3.38 22 818 900 March 5.95 4.97 24 874 300
September 3.98 3.45 20 569 700 April 5.70 5.00 17 111 300
October 4.80 3.80 46 705 400 May 5.70 5.2 23 830 600
November 6.05 4.43 44 871 500 June 6.65 5.55 29 922 900
December 6.35 4.62 38 187 000
2004 2005
Tencent's Highest and Lowest Recorded Share Price (HK$) Achieved                                                                             
over the June 2004 to June 2005 Financial Period
small, uninformed private investors. This alone refuted the possibility that Tencent could have 
used underpricing as a means to reduce agency costs.  
 
Accounting for this information, there was likelihood that Tencent‟s management may have 
underpriced its IPO shares as a means to retain control. However, due to the limited public 
information contained within the IPO application results and the lack of concrete evidence 
surrounding Tencent‟s allocation of its public tranche it was indeterminable whether this was a 
credible reason for Tencent to underprice its IPO offer shares by 12.2%.   
 
7.2 First Day’s Underpricing and Post-IPO Subsequent Events (see Appendix 
E, Exhibit 1)  
 











7.2.1 China Mobile: Sanctions in Mobile Value-Added Services 
 
9 September 2004 marked the first time that Tencent was exposed to sanctions in the MVAS 
industry. On this date China Mobile temporarily suspended all of Tencent‟s services on its 
operating platforms (Tencent, 2004c: 01). Tencent Computer (see Appendix A, Exhibit 6) was in 
contravention of China Mobile‟s content requirements pertaining to its mobile IVR services 
offered. As Tencent only recently entered the IVR market, the respective revenues and overall 




repercussion of the suspension did not prove to have a material impact on the company‟s 
operations, nor did they represent a material portion of its MVAS revenues over this period. 
 
September 2004 represented the largest decline in Tencent‟s share price performance over the 
one-year period ending 30 June 2005. As per Figure 7.1, the share‟s highest recorded price over 
the September month alone was HK$3.98 per share.   
 
Regardless of the material effects of the suspension, China Mobile‟s imposed sanctions had a 
direct effect on Tencent Computer‟s rollout of new products & services. This prohibited Tencent 
Computer from offering new services or launching joint marketing activities on China Mobile‟s 
existing platforms for a period of three months. In addition, China Mobile also imposed a six 





As Tencent‟s share price recovered over October 2004 to December 2004, Figure 7.1 shows that 
the company posted its highest overall monthly share prices of HK$6.05 in November 2004 and 
HK$6.35 in December 2004. However, as at 16 December 2004 China Mobile also changed its 
fee-sharing arrangement with Tencent over its 161 Mobile Chat value-added service offering. 
This fee-sharing arrangement (as per Section 4.6.1) was changed to a pre-determined monthly 
maintenance fee. This venture represented 10% of Tencent‟s net profits in the 2003 financial 
year, and was likely to reduce Tencent‟s monthly attributable net profits by approximately 
4,000,000 RMB or US$48,322 (Tencent, 2004a: 01).
108
   
 
This announcement saw Tencent‟s share price decline considerably over the remainder of the 
December 2004 month and through the month of January 2005. Tencent‟s shares were priced at 
HK$5.85 on 16 December before closing at HK$5.70 on the same day. By 31 January 2005 the 
share price declined by 22% to HK$4.55. This was deemed the share‟s lowest price since 




                                                          
107 This sanction commenced on 15 August, 2004.  
108 [ 4,000,000 RMB / 8.2770 RMB ] = US$48,322 
109 [(HK$4.55 – HK$5.85) / HK$5.85]  x 100 = -22.22% 




7.2.2 Google Inc and Tencent: Forming a Strategic Alliance 
 
On 2 February 2005 Tencent actively secured an alliance with Western multinational Google Inc. 
(Google) (Tencent, 2005a: 01). The synergies between the two companies ensured that Tencent 
could leverage off Google‟s search capabilities and enhance its online advertising offerings, 
while Google could penetrate into the Chinese internet and telecommunications market space.  
 
Tencent planned to incorporate Google‟s WebSearch function into its offerings across its IM 
services, RTX services and its QQ portal. This effectively ensured that Tencent could maintain 
its competitive advantage despite increasing market pressure.  Furthermore, Google AdSense 
would also enhance Tencent‟s online advertising division. This expanded Tencent‟s appeal to a 
larger, more diverse target market while concurrently providing sufficient data analytics to 
enhance its online advertising offerings.  
 
This announcement saw Tencent realize a 114% increase in daily trading volumes from the 
previous day‟s total of 24,934,000 shares to 53,495,000 shares. This was the second highest 
recorded level of trading volumes up to that point in the 2005 year. It did not significantly affect 
Tencent‟s share price as it remained within a range of HK$4.70 to HK$5.00 per share (see 
Appendix E, Exhibit 1).  
 
7.2.3 Abnormal Trading Volumes 
 
Tencent experienced abnormally large trading volumes of 208,600,000 shares on 21 2005. This 
was a 3582.3% increase from 5,665,000 shares traded on the previous day.
110
 Upon releasing a 
statement via the HKEx, Tencent publicly stated that it could not specifically attribute this 
increase in trading volumes to a specific company event (Tencent, 2005b: 01). This was the 
second largest recorded volume of trades made since Tencent launched its IPO and led to an 8% 
increase in Tencent‟s share price from HK$4.95 to HK$5.35 on this day.
 111
      
 
 
                                                          
110[(208,600,000 shares  – 5,665,000 shares) / 5,665,000 shares]  x 100 = 3582.3% 
111[(HK$5.35 – HK$4.95) / HK$4.95]  x 100 = 8.08% 
















                                                                                                                     (Google Finance, 2014)  
 
Figure 7.2 shows that Tencent‟s share price continued to recover and strengthen over the 
remainder of the period under review.  Over the four-month period between March 2005 and 
June 2005 Tencent‟s shares achieved consistent, positive growth.  
 
As at June 23, 2005 Tencent shares reached their highest recorded share price since launching 
the IPO. The share opened on the market at HK$6.40 before peaking at HK$6.65 and closing at 
HK$6.45 per share. This translated into a 74.3% growth in the share price since listing on the 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
 
This case study has focused on three important areas of concern surrounding IPOs. The first 
being the occurrence of IPO underpricing in the market. IPO underpricing theories suggest that 
there are numerous reasons why newly listed companies underprice their offer shares. These 
include deliberate underpricing to encourage uninformed investors to participate in the offering, 
non-deliberate underpricing as a form of post-IPO share price stabilization and artificial 
underpricing to avoid or encourage monitoring from public shareholders.  
 
While it was clear that IPO underpricing was a common occurrence on the HKEx, an application 
of underpricing theories surrounding asymmetric information models, institutional explanations 
and theories surrounding ownership and control indicated that the 12.2% underpricing in 
Tencent‟s IPO shares was attributable to the asymmetric information theory of underpricing as a 
signal of firm quality. This analysis showed that Tencent left money on the table to encourage 
positive market sentiment and achieved an oversubscription of demand that was 159 times its 
public tranche of offer shares available and 17 times its internationally placed tranche of offer 
shares available. This was accompanied by maintaining a high quality board of directors and 
enlisting both reputable lead underwriters and auditors to further signal its high-quality nature to 
the market. 
 
It was also discovered that it was possible that Tencent may have underpriced its shares as a 
means to retain control of the company. However, due to a lack of credible evidence this was 
indeterminable and a purely speculative finding.  
 
Most notably, it was found that Rock‟s (1986) popular „Winner‟s Curse‟ theory of IPO 
underpricing was null and void in the context of the Hong Kong equity markets. Through a 
clawback provision, the newly-introduced SEHK share allocation regulations ensured that 
uninformed investors were afforded the opportunity to purchase shares in HKEx listed IPOs. 
Chapter 8: Conclusion 
8:2 
This meant that HKEx IPOs would not need to underprice their offer shares to guarantee 
uninformed investor participation.  
The second aspect of IPOs that was investigated was Tencent‟s decision to list its IPO on the 
HKEx and go against the industry norm of listing on the NASDAQ. It was discovered that as a 
BVI incorporated company, Tencent was not permitted to list on the HKEx. This was a result of 
inadequate BVI shareholder protection rights. As such, Tencent redomiciled to the Cayman 
Islands to meet HKEx shareholder protection requirements. An analysis of the total fee structure 
of each exchange indicated that the HKEx Main Board charged total listing fees that were 
approximately 80.98% to 111.25% cheaper than the NASDAQ National Market at the time of 
Tencent‟s IPO.  
However, in this analysis it was evident that listing fees were not the predominant factor when 
choosing an exchange to list on. As a Hong Kong-based company Tencent prepared its financial 
statements in accordance with HKFRS/IFRS.  As US financial reporting standards were prepared 
according to US GAAP, all companies applying to list on the NASDAQ at the time of Tencent‟s 
IPO were to reconcile their financial statements to comply with US GAAP standards. An 
analysis showed that this would have exacerbated total listing costs incurred by Tencent and an 
associated time delay was expected to stagnate the IPO process. As a further consideration, it 
was discovered that for Tencent to comply with the NASDAQ listing requirements it would have 
had to comply with the US Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 on corporate governance, financial 
disclosure and public accounting practices. This was expected to additionally increase Tencent‟s 
NASDAQ listing costs by HK$226,182,60 in the 2004 year.  
The results of this analysis show that US GAAP standards and Sarbanes-Oxley compliance were 
expected to have a significant impact on the timing of Tencent‟s IPO launch. These factors 
would have had a direct effect on analyst‟s valuations of Tencent, market sentiment surrounding 
the IPO and the overall demand for its offer shares. Therefore, Tencent would have faced 
significantly large risk by listing on the NASDAQ National market inferring that it was better 
suited to list on the HKEx Main Board.  
Chapter 8: Conclusion 
8:3 
 
The third aspect of IPOs that was investigated was whether Tencent‟s IPO offer price was a true 
reflection of company value on its listing date. In order to value the unlisted company both a 
relative valuation and DCF valuation were performed.  
 
The relative valuation was performed by comparing the operating segments, place of 
incorporation, opportunities for international expansion, revenues, gross margins, asset structure 
and the net profit/(loss) between Tencent, SINA Corp, Sohu.com, NetEase and TOM Online. 
Based on these factors Sohu.com correlated with 71.4% of Tencent and was used as its proxy 
firm. Its P/E ratio and P/S ratio were adjusted upwards by 2 and 1.25 respectively to represent 
Tencent‟s risk and growth profile, and a price range of HK$14.40 - HK$18.72 was achieved. 
 
Using the unlevered FCFF approach, the WACC was calculated at 7.57%. It was deduced that 
Tencent‟s optimal capital structure would continue to be 100% equity-weighted in the future. 
This was because it was discovered that Tencent‟s average effective tax rate provided a low tax 
shield benefit at 10.66%, while Tencent‟s large cash piles were adequate to meet future growth 
prospects. The CAPM model was used to calculate Tencent‟s cost of equity, whereby 
Sohu.com‟s beta was unlevered to represent a proxy beta for Tencent. After applying the relevant 
forecasted growth rates, it was clear that Tencent‟s MVAS division would generate the most 
revenue over the 2004 to 2008 financial while its IVAS division would be the fastest growing 
operating segment. In the long-run it was expected that Tencent would grow at a 0.2% premium 
above the average forecasted Chinese inflation rate over the five-year period under review. This 
terminal growth rate was 3.3%.  
 
After discounting the relevant cash flows by the WACC and re-adding all cash items to 
Tencent‟s enterprise value, the estimated intrinsic value per share was HK$18.68. Combining 
this with the outcome of the relative valuation model and it was observable that the HK$18.68 
falls between the HK$14.40 - HK$18.72 price ranges. The implications of both valuation models 
show that Tencent‟s shares were five times undervalued, which proves that Tencent‟s IPO offer 
price was far below its true intrinsic value on this listing date.  
 
 
Chapter 8: Conclusion 
8:4 
 
Altogether, this shows that Tencent represents a unique IPO case. Tencent defied historical IPO 
trends in the Chinese value-added service industry, setting precedent as the first of its kind to list 
on the HKEx. Amidst negative global market sentiment Tencent underpriced its offer shares to 
effectively signal its high-quality nature to the market, pricing these shares five times below its 
intrinsic value. Tencent superseded analyst expectations by creating and achieving market 
demand exceeding 159 times and 17 times its public tranche and placing tranche of offer shares 
available. While some may say that Tencent‟s IPO was a success, others could argue the 
contrary. This is because the original shareholders lost an enormous amount of wealth to new 
shareholders. Regardless, it is clear that Tencent‟s IPO paved its road to success as China‟s 
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Appendix A: The Case Background – Tencent 
and the Chinese Internet and 
Telecommunications Industry  
 
 




Hong Kong Dollar (HK$)/Chinese Renminbi (RMB) conversion rates:  
 
2001: HK$1 = 1.061 RMB  
2002: HK$1 = 1.061 RMB 
2003: HK$1 = 1.061 RMB  
2004: HK$1 = 1.062 RMB  
 
United States Dollar (US$)/Chinese Renminbi (RMB) conversion rates: 
 
2001:  US$1 = 8.2771 RMB  
2002:  US$1 = 8.2770 RMB 
2003:  US$1 = 8.2770 RMB 
2004:  US$1 = 8.2777 RMB 
 
The United States Dollar (US$)/Hong Kong Dollar (HK$) on 16 June 2004: US$1 = HK$7.7979 
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Historical Chinese Inflation Rate between 1999 to 2003
China’s population (in millions) 1,248 1,258 1,267 1,276 1,285 1,292 0.7%
China’s GDP per capita (RMB) 6,038 6,551 7,086 7,651 8,184 9,030 8.4%
Per capital annual disposable income of city households (RMB) 5,425 5,854 6,280 6,860 7,703 8,472 9.3%
Internet users (in millions) 2.1 8.9 22.5 33.7 59.1 79.5 106.8%
Internet penetration 0.2% 0.7% 1.8% 2.6% 4.6% 6.2% -
Mobile subscribers (in millions) 25 43.2 85.3 144.8 206.6 268.7 60.8%
Mobile penetration 2.0% 3.4% 6.7% 11.3% 16.1% 20.8% -
Fixed Line – access lines in service (in millions) 87.4 108.8 144.4 179 214.4 263.3 24.7%
Fixed Line penetration 7.0% 8.6% 11.4% 14.0% 16.7% 20.4% -
Chinese  Economic and Techonlogical Penetration Statistics 
CAGR                
(1998 - 2003)
200320022001200019991998
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Month Simultaneous Online Users (Millions) Duration (Months)
May 2000 0.1 -
February 2001 1 9
March 2002 2 13
February 2003 3 11
September 2003 4 7
February 2004 5 5
March 2004 6 1
Average Daily User Hours 18.3 28.6 51.4 64.7
Average Daily Messages 413.9 386.4 681.6 848.8
(Millions)
2001 2002 2003 Q1 2004 
QQ User Statistics
2001 2002 2003 Q1 2004
Registered IM User Accounts (At End of the Period) 93.2 151.3 256.1 291.3
Active User Accounts 43.8 54.4 81.5 97.1
Peak Simultaneous Online User Accounts 1.9 2.9 4.8 6.1
Average Daily User Hours 18.3 28.6 51.4 64.7
Average Daily Messages (Between PCs Only) 413.9 386.4 681.8 848.8
Fee-based IVAS Registered Subscriptions - 1.5 6.9 7.3
Fee-based MVAS Registered Subscriptions 1.4 5.6 6.3 12.8
(Millions)
Historical Tencent User Statistics 
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Tencent’s Expanding User Base from January 2001 to March 2004  
The Growth of Tencent’s Simultaneous Online User Base                                

























27 May 2000 marked Tencent QQ online user accounts peaking at 100,000 for the first time in 
the company‟s history. Tencent was the first network in China to achieve this, serving as a 
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2001 2001 2002 2002 2003 2003
June December June December June December
Time (Hours) 8.7 8.5 8.3 9.8 13.0 13.4
Frequency (Times) 3.3 3.2 3.1 3.4 4.1 4.0
Average Chinese Internet User Usage Time and Frequency per Week
Revenues  63.0 96.0 129.5 173.8 240.5 344.0
Year-on-Year Growth (%) - 52.4% 34.9% 34.2% 38.4% 43.0%
CAGR (2003 to 2008) 40.4%
Forecasted Growth of China's Online Advertising Revenues over the 2003 to 
2008 Financial Period
2003                  
(Actual)
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Revenues  (US$) 159.7 237.7 336.1 462.1 622.0 822.9
Year-on-Year Growth (%) - 48.9% 41.4% 37.5% 34.6% 32.3%
CAGR (2003 to 2008) 38.8%
2003                  
(Actual)
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
   i '  li  Game Subscription Revenues over the 
2003 to 2008 Fin ncial Period
(US$'000)
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Revenues  (US$) 63.0 96.0 129.5 173.8 240.5 344.0
Year-on-Year Growth (%) - 52.4% 34.9% 34.2% 38.4% 43.0%
CAGR (2003 to 2008) 40.4%
2003                  
(Actual)
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Forecasted Growth of China's Online Advertising Revenues over the 2003 to 
2008 Financial Period
(US$'000)
Online Advertising as a percentage of Total Advertising Revenues 



































Exhibit 5:  Historical Operating Segment Performance Review for Tencent over the 2001 to 
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WFOE WFOE 
100% 100% 
100% 100% 100% 100% 
36.14% 27.71% 20.11% 16.04% 
Offshore PRC 
Tencent Technology 























- Voting between both MIH and Tencent‟s founders will ensure that both parties vote an equal 
number of Directors. Voting in this regard relates to both the board of Tencent, and the board of 




- It is agreed upon that MIH will nominate Tencent‟s Chief Financial Officer (CFO), while the 
Founders will nominate Tencent‟s Chief Executive Officer (CEO). 
 
- It is agreed by both parties that the Articles will be amended to ensure that a 75% majority of 
shareholders or directors must be present and voting at the relevant general meeting or board 
meeting in relation to shareholders‟ resolutions, directors‟ resolutions and Equity Controlled 
Subsidiaries. The amendment will remain in effect for three years after the 24 March 2004 
adoption date. The amendment will cease with effect from 24 March 2007. 
 
- The Shareholders Agreement will expire the third anniversary of the adoption date - 24 March 
2007. Should MIH cease to hold a minimum of 15% of Tencent‟s share capital, the founders can 
terminate the agreement prior to the above-mentioned date. Should the founders cease to hold, in 
aggregate, a minimum of 15% of the company‟s share capital, MIH may terminate the agreement 








                                                                                                                                                                                           
2 „Other Founders‟ refer to Tencent‟s remaining founders whose ownership is held through their own BVI-incorporated holding companies. 
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122 „Equity Controlled Subsidiaries‟ refer to those wholly owned subsidiaries which Tencent accounts for through the equity method. This means 
that on initial investment, Tencent would record this investment at cost and periodically adjust this to reflect the changes in value as a result of the 









HKEx Main Board listing applicants must meet one of three financial tests:  
 
1. The Profit Test  
 The listing applicant, or its group, must have management continuity for at least three years 
preceding the year in which listing will occur. 
 The listing applicant, or its group, must have ownership continuity and control for at least the 
most recent audited financial year. 
 The listing applicant, or its group, must have profits generated by activities in the ordinary 
and usual course of the business of at least HK$20 million for most recent financial year. 
 The listing applicant, or its group, must also have aggregate profits of at least HK$30 for the 
two preceding financial years.  
 Applicants listing under the profit test must also have an expected market capitalization, at the 
time of listing, of no less than HK$200 million. 
 
2.  The Market Capitalization/Revenue Test  
 The listing applicant, or its group, must have a trading record of not less than three financial 
years. 
 The listing applicant, or its group, must have management continuity for at least three years 
preceding the year in which listing will occur. 
 The listing applicant, or its group, must have ownership continuity and control for at least the 
most recent audited financial year. 
 The listing applicant, or its group, must have an expected market capitalization of at least 
HK$4 billion at time of listing. 
 The listing applicant, or its group, must yield revenue of at least HK$500 million arising from 
principal activity of the applicant in the most recent audited financial year.  
 There must be a minimum of 1,000 shareholders at the time of listing.  
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3. The Market Capitalization/Revenue/Cash Flow Test  
 The listing applicant, or its group, must have a trading record of not less than three financial 
years. 
 The listing applicant, or its group, must have management continuity for at least three years 
preceding the year in which listing will occur. 
 The listing applicant, or its group, must have ownership continuity and control for at least the 
most recent audited financial year. 
 The listing applicant, or its group, must have a market capitalization of at least HK$2 billion 
at time of listing. 
 The listing applicant, or its group, must yield revenue of at least HK$500 million for most 
recent audited financial year. 
 The listing applicant, or its group, must yield positive cash flow from the operating activities 
of the listing applicant, or its group, of at least HK$100 million in aggregate for the three 



















Appendix B: The Case Background – 
Tencent’s IPO Offer 
 






Should the number of offer shares applied for in the Hong Kong Public Offering represent ( i/ , 
ii/ , iii/ ) of the number of offer shares initially available under the Hong Kong Public Offering: 
 
i/ 15 times or more, but less than 50 times. 
ii/ 50 times or more, but less than 100 times. 
iii/ 100 times or more. 
 
Then the total number of offer shares available under the International Placement will be reduced 
according to the relative associated increase of Hong Kong Public Offering shares additionally 
made available: 
 
i/ 126,048,000 (~30% of the total number of offer shares initially available)  
ii/ 168,064,000 (~40% of the total number of offer shares initially available) 
iii/ 210,080,000 (~50% of the total number of offer shares initially available) 
 
Reduction of Offer Shares 
 
1. The global coordinator, Goldman Sachs (Asia), has complete discretion to reduce the amount 
of offer shares or offer price range as per the company prospectus.  
                                                          
124 Tencent Holdings Limited. IPO Prospectus- Hong Kong Public Offering and International Placing.Available: 




1.1. The decision to do so is based on the level of interest expressed by prospective professional 
and international investors at the time, during the book-building process. 
1.2. Discretion is granted up until the morning of the last day for lodging applications in 
specifically the Hong Kong Public Offering. 
1.3. Any event of this nature will be published in both the South China Morning Post (English) 
and the Hong Kong Economic Times (Chinese) in relation to the allocated time period as per 1.2.  
 
2. Once an application for Hong Kong Offer Shares has been submitted, it cannot be withdrawn 
whatsoever. 
 
3. Should the amount of offer shares be reduced, the global coordinator has full discretion to 
reallocate the proportional construct of offer shares available for the Hong Kong Public Offer 
and the International Placement. 
3.1. This is subject to the condition that the number of Hong Kong Offer Shares shall not be less 
























Hong Kong Public Offering 
 
1. Share applicants (or those acting on their behalf) for the Hong Kong Public Offering are 
restricted from applying for shares in the International Placement. It must be confirmed in the 
application form submitted that there is no indicated interest in this manner. Should such 
agreement be breached or untrue, such applicant‟s application will be rejected. 
 
1.1. Share applicants may only apply to either Pool A or Pool B shares. Multiple applications 
from the same applicant (or those acting on their behalf) will be rejected. 
1.1.1, Multiple applications, or suspected multiple applications, for an amount of shares that 
exceeds the total number of 21,008,000 Hong Kong Offer Shares allocated per Pool A and Pool 
B will be rejected. 
1.1.2. No single applicant may apply for more than 21,008,000 Hong Kong Offer Shares. This 
equates to 50% of the initial Hong Kong Offer Shares made available.  
 
1.2. Share applicants in either Pool A or Pool B may receive different share allocation ratios.  
1.2.1. Should the offer shares in either Pool A or Pool B be under-subscribed, the excess of the 
greater pool will be distributed to the under-subscribed pool in order to satisfy demand 
accordingly. 
 
1.3. Upon applications, all applicants are required to pay a maximum offer price of HK$3.70 per 
Hong Kong Offer Share. 
1.3.1. Should the offer price be less than the HK$3.70 threshold, the company will refund 
applicants of the difference between the two amounts i.e. HK$3.70 – final offer price. 
1.3.2 In reference to 1.3.1 a refund will only occur if the offer price is less than HK$3.70 after 
accounting for transaction costs. 
1.3.3. In reference to 1.3.2 transaction costs include brokerage (1%), an SFC transaction levy 
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(0.005%), an investor compensation levy (0.002%) and a Stock Exchange trading fee (0.005%).  
International Placement 
 
2. The company is expected to grant the over-allotment option to International investors, 
exercised by Goldman Sachs (Asia), the global coordinator, on their behalf.  
 
2.1. This is eligible up to the 30
th
 day after the Listing Date. 
2.1.1 As per the company prospectus it was estimated that the Hong Kong Public Offering would 
become unconditional at or before 08:00 am on Wednesday, 16 June 2004. 
2.1.1.1. This indicates that the over-allotment option was exercisable up until Friday, 16 July 
2004.    
2.1.1.1.1. The associated press announcement of the company exercising the over-allotment 
option occurred on 5 July 2004. 
2.1.1.1.2. The over-allotment shares were expected to be issued on 8 July 2004. 
2.1.1.1.3. This was subject to certain conditions between the company and the International 
Purchasers being met.  
2.1.1.1.4. These conditions referred to in 2.1.1.1.3. were set out in the International Purchase 
Agreement dated 01 June 2004. 
2.1.1.1.5. The Listing Committee of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange had already granted the 
listing of and permission to deal in the over-allotment shares prior to the press announcement.  
 
2.2. Should the over-allotment option occur, a press announcement would be issued by the 
company. 
2.2.1. A press announcement was released on 6 July 2004, indicating that the over-allotment 
option was exercised on 5 July 2004. 
 
2.3. Should the over-allotment option be exercised, the company will issue and allot up to an 
aggregate of 63,024,000 additional shares at the offer price. This equates to approximately 15% 
of the offer shares initially available as per the company prospectus.  
2.3.1. The confirmed offer price was at the top of the HK$2.77 – HK$3.70 price range, 




2.3.2 The additional offer shares would be sold on the same terms & conditions as per the initial 
offer shares as outlined in the company prospectus. 
 
2.4. The global coordinator, Goldman Sachs (Asia) will cover the additional shares offered 
through a stock borrowing arrangement. 
2.4.1. This stock borrowing arrangement was between Ma Huateng‟s BVI incorporated 
company, Advance Data Services Limited (Advance Data Services), and Goldman Sachs.  
2.4.2. The over-allotment shares would be returned and redelivered to Advanced Data Services at 
a later time period. 
 
2.5. Should the total number of shares on offer by the company be reduced, the over-allotment 
option will be reduced accordingly. 
2.5.1. In this instance, the over-allotment option will represent no more than 15% of such 






















Number of Shares 
Issued.
Percentage of Share 
Capital Issued 
(Approximation)
Number of Shares 
Issued.
Percentage of Share 
Capital Issued 
(Approximation)
MIH QQ (BVI) Limited 630,240,380 37.50% 630,240,380 36.14%
Advance Data Services Limited
(1)
242,483,080 14.43% 242,483,080 13.91%
Best Update International Limited 108,085,530 6.43% 108,085,530 6.20%
Public Shareholders 420,160,500 25.00% 483,184,500 27.71%
Other Shareholders
(2)
279,671,770 16.64% 279,671,770 16.04%




Issued Offer Shares                             
(Exclusive of Over-Allotment Option).
Issued Offer Shares                             
(Inclusive of Over-Allotment Option).
Table Representing the Number of Offer Shares and Percentage of Share Capital Issued by Tencent Holdings Limited 
This includes the 63,024,000 Shares lent by Advance Data Services to Goldman Sachs in 
relation to the stock borrowing arrangements in order to effectively meet the share requirments 
associated with the Over-Allotment option. 
Other Shareholders' refer to the BVI-incorporated wholly owned holding companies of  Tencent's 
remaining core founders. This excludes both Ma Huateng's Advance Data Services Limited, and 
Zhang Zhidong's Best Update International Limited as referred to seperately in this table. 
Exhibit 3: Distribution of Offer Shares Issued to Shareholders 
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  Appendix C: The Listing Decision – A 
Strategic Rationale for Tencent’s IPO 
 





National Market listing applicants must meet the following financial and liquidity requirements:  
 
1. Entry Standard 1 - The Income Standard 
 The issuer of the security must have had an annual income from continuing operations of at 
least US$1 million (before income taxes) in the most recently completed fiscal year or in two of 
the last three most recently completed fiscal years.  
 The total amount of the applicant‟s publicly held shares must equate to at least 1.1 million 
shares. 
 The market value of the applicant‟s publicly held shares must be to the value of at least US$8 
million. 
 The minimum bid price per share is US$5.  
 The shareholders‟ equity of the applicant must be to the value of at least US$15 million. 
 The applicant should have a total minimum of 400 shareholders (round lot holders). 
 The applicant must have at least 3 registered and active market makers. 
 
2. Entry Standard 2 - The Equity Standard 
 The shareholders‟ equity of the applicant must be to the value of at least US$30 million. 
 The total amount of the applicant‟s publicly held shares must equate to at least 1.1 million 
shares. 
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 The market value of the applicant‟s publicly held shares must be to the value of at least 
US$18 million. 
 The minimum bid price per share is US$5. 
 The applicant must have at least 3 registered and active market makers. 
 The applicant should have an operating history of at least 2 years.  
 The applicant should have a total minimum of 400 shareholders (round lot holders). 
 
3. Entry Standard 3 - The Market Value Standard 
 The total amount of the applicant‟s publicly held shares must equate to at least 1.1 million 
shares. 
 The market value of the applicant‟s publicly held shares must be to the value of at least 
US$20 million. 
 The minimum bid price per share is US$5. 
 The applicant must have at least 4 registered and active market makers. 
 The applicant should have a total minimum of 400 shareholders (round lot holders). 
 The applicant has: 
(1) A market value of listed securities of US$75 million (currently traded issuers must meet this 
requirement and the minimum bid price requirement of US$5 share for a consecutive 90-day 
period prior to applying for listing).
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(2) Total assets and total revenues of US$75 million each for the most recently completed fiscal 




                                                          




BVI Act Cayman Island Law
Possible alterations/changes 
to be made by BVI 
Incorporated companies in 
order to comply with the 
Provision to Rule 19.05(1)
Alteration to the constitutional 
documents may be effected by 
majority vote of resolution of 
members or the directors if 
authorised by the 
memorandum.
Alteration can only be 
made by special 
resolutions.
To specify that directors do not 
have power to amend the 
constitutional documents and that 
any alteration must be approved 
by members’ special resolution.
The concept of share capital 
no longer exists and hence no 
mechanism for increasing 
share capital.
Authorised share 
capital can be 
increased if permitted 
by a company’s 
articles and effected 
by ordinary resolution.
To state the maximum number of 
shares and provide for the 
increase of shares by majority 
vote.
The concept of share capital 
and maintenance no longer 
exist. Hence, no mechanism 
for reduction of capital.
Share capital can be 
reduced if permitted by 
the company’s articles 
and effected by 
special resolution of 
members.
In line with Cayman Island Law, to 
specify that any distribution must 
be approved by special 
resolution of members the same 
way as that in the Cayman 
Islands Law.
While the Act does not specify 
the funding sources for 
redemption and share 
repurchase, its solvency test 
provides that any company 
may only effect the repurchase 
if the value of its assets 
exceeds its liabilities and it is 
able to pay its debts.
Shares may be 
repurchased if 
permitted by the 
company’s articles 
subject to the company 
being able to pay its 
debts.
As the solvency test has limited 
the BVI company’s funding 
sources for redemption and 
share repurchase, the position in 
BVI should be comparable to that 
of Cayman Islands. The 
mechanism of repurchase could 
be done by way of amending the 
BVI company’s memorandum 
and articles of association (M&A) 
in the same way as a Cayman 
Island applicant does to its M&A.
A company can make a 
distribution from any available 
source.
Dividends may be 
paid out of profits or 
the share premium 
account.
No amendments needed as the 
BVI company cannot make a 
distribution when insolvent under 
the Solvency Test. The company 
can only make a distribution 
when its assets exceed liabilities. 
Shareholder and creditor 
protection are in place.
Exhibit 2: Table Showing the Differences in Shareholder Protection Rights between the 
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Not Exceeding - 500 million 250,000
Not Exceeding - 750 million 300,000
Not Exceeding - 1,000 million 350,000
Equity Market Listing Fees
Value of Equities Listed (HK$) Initial Fee (HK$)
Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange
Not Exceeding - 100 million 150,000
Not Exceeding - 200 million 175,000
Not Exceeding - 300 million 200,000
Not Exceeding - 400 million 225,000
Not Exceeding - 3,000 million 550,000
Not Exceeding - 4,000 million 600,000
Not Exceeding - 5,000 million 600,000
Not Exceeding - 1,500 million 400,000
Not Exceeding - 2,000 million 450,000
Not Exceeding - 2,500 million 500,000
NASDAQ National Market
Up to 30 million shares 100,000
Between 30 to 50 million shares 125,000
5,000 million + 650,000
Number of Shares Made Available Initial Fee (US$)
Over 50 million shares 150,000
Exhibit 3: Initial Listing Fees and Annual Listing Fees Associated with Listing on the 
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Hong Kong Stock Exchange
Between 25 to 50 million shares
Between 50 to 75 million shares
Between 75 to 100 million shares






Not Exceeding - 400 million 198,000
Not Exceeding - 500 million 224,000
Not Exceeding - 750 million 290,000
Value of Equities Listed (HK$) Annual Listing Fee (HK$)
Not Exceeding - 200 million 145,000
Not Exceeding - 300 million 172,000
1,188,000
Not Exceeding - 2,500 million 634,000
Not Exceeding - 3,000 million 726,000
Not Exceeding - 4,000 million 898,000
Not Exceeding - 1,000 million 356,000
Not Exceeding - 1,500 million 449,000
Not Exceeding - 2,000 million 541,000
Annual Exchange Fees
Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange
Total Number of Shares Outstanding Annual Listing Fee (US$)
Up to 10 million shares 24,500
Between 10 to 25 million shares 30,500
Not Exceeding - 5,000 million 1,069,000
5,000 million +
Hong Kong Stock Exchange Not Applicable
























Appendix D: A Complex Valuation of the 
Tencent IPO 
 
Exhibit 1: Competitor History  
 




Incorporated in the Cayman Islands on 9 July 1997, SINA Corporation (SINA Corp) is a leading 
online media outlet and value-added information services (VAS) provider in China. Since 20 
April 2000 the company has been publicly listed on the US-based NASDAQ Stock Market 
(NASDAQ: SINA). SINA Corp serves both a local Chinese target market while encompassing 
the Greater China region and emigrating Chinese citizens. SINA Corp‟s head office is located in 
Shanghai, PRC, and is the company‟s only office to date. 
 
 As at financial year-end 31 December 2003 the company employed 785 employees. It was the 
first Chinese website allowed to publish public news online, while being the first Chinese 
technology company to offer double-zero convertible bonds valued at US$100 million.  
 
SINA Corp has five principal lines of business:  
 
- SINA.com: Online news and content 
- SINA Mobile: Mobile value-added services  
- SINA Online: Community-based services and games  
- SINA.net: Search and enterprise services  
- SINA E-commerce: Online shopping & auctions 
 
Out of its five principal lines of business, SINA Mobile is the largest overall contributor to 
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revenue, followed by SINA.com. Furthermore, of these total revenues, the company achieves its 
turnover primarily through non-advertising operations. Each business segment‟s offerings are 
tailored in accordance with the geographic location of each user. This means that the relevant 
content displayed is specifically relevant to the region as per the user‟s location. By the end of 
2003, SINA Corp was considered as the most recognized internet brand name in the PRC and by 
the global Chinese community. Overall the company had approximately 94.8 million registered 
worldwide users in 2003 upon which its value-added service offerings boasted an active user 
base exceeding 10 million users during this period. 
 
Geographically SINA Corp has significant market presence in China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, the 
United States and the rest of the world. Its product portfolio includes online web portals, MVAS, 
search and directory, interest-based and community-building channels, free and premium email, 
online games, virtual ISP, classified listings, fee-based services, e-commerce and enterprise e-
solutions.  
 
The company‟s primary MVAS offering is its short messaging service (SMS). It additionally 
offers multi-media messaging services (MMS), interactive voice response services (IVRS) and 
wireless application protocol (WAP). In its enterprise service department, SINA Corp appeals to 
corporate clients through its paid search and directory listings, corporate email services, 
classified listings, e-learning and enterprise solutions. As at the end of the 2003 financial year, 
SINA began the phasing out process of its „Software revenue‟ division. This division did not 
prove feasible for the company and was removed.  
 
To secure its MVAS offerings SINA Corp has established cooperation arrangements with 
China‟s largest mobile phone operators, China Mobile and China Unicom. The company has also 
partnered with a variety of multinational companies in a diverse set of industries by entering into 
various joint ventures, acquisition agreements and sponsorship contracts. SINA Corp has been 










Incorporated in the Cayman Islands in August 1996, Sohu.com Inc. (Sohu) is a leading provider 
of online products and services to consumers and businesses in China. Since 21 July 2000 the 
company has been publicly listed on the NASDAQ Stock Market (NASDAQ: SOHU).The 
company is considered as the pioneer of China‟s internet industry, deemed as the first internet 
portal in China. The company has offices in Hong, Kong, Shanghai and Guangzhou while its 
head office is in Beijing, PRC. As at financial year-end 31 December 2003 it employed 1016 
employees.  
 
Sohu.com‟s business model accommodates both corporates and consumers, upon which it holds 
competitive positions in both market segments. Sohu boasts a retail client-base of 55,000 lending 
to its early mover advantage in the sponsored search space through its „Search Fox‟ offering.  
Sohu was also considered one of the top two Chinese web portals in 2003, yielding a strong 
competitive advantage in industry. The company believes this position makes it an attractive 
brand-advertising platform for its corporate clients and will yield strong revenues for the firm as 
online advertising transforms the traditional Chinese advertising space in the near future. 
 
Sohu has five principal lines of business:  
 
- Sohu.com: Mass portal & online media destination 
- Sms.sohu.com: E-subscriptions & Wireless services for mobile phone users. 
- Chinaren.com: Youth community 
- 17173.com: Games information portal 
- Focus.cn: Real estate 
 
The company generates its revenues by offering advertising and non-advertising content. Non-
advertising content includes specifically e-subscription and e-commerce services, wireless, 
internet access and multiplayer online game services.   
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Geographically Sohu.com focuses solely on China upon which its product and services have 
been carefully constructed to cater for the unique viewing habits of Chinese internet users. The 
company‟s product portfolio consists of providing sophisticated Chinese language web 
navigational and search capabilities, 20 main content channels, web-based communications, 
alumni club, community services, an e-commerce platform, wireless and multiplayer online 
game services. In addition to this, Sohu also attracts users through its free web-based email 
offering, while also providing a paid-for email service along with additional perceived benefits. 
These channels encompass a diverse nature of aggregated content amidst the likes of news, sport, 
women, information technology, business & finance, entertainment, music, automobile, real 
estate, dating, health, travel, learning, career, going abroad, lifestyle, games, auction and 
recruitment. 
 
Sohu has entered into a variety of online partnerships with top, reputable multinational brands of 
both an Eastern and Western nature. The company has entered into contracts with China‟s largest 
mobile operators, China Mobile and China Unicom to ensure it can effectively offer its MVAS 
services. Furthermore, it has entered into a joint marketing campaign with China Mobile and 
















NetEase Inc. (NASDAQ: NTES)
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Incorporated in the Cayman Islands on 6 July 1997, NetEase Inc (NetEase) is a major provider of 
Chinese language content and services through its online games, wireless value-added services 
and internet portal. The company operates a leading interactive and online wireless community 
in China. Since 7 July 2000 NetEase has been publicly listed on the NASDAQ Stock Market 
(NASDAQ: NTES). NetEase is among the first of its kind to offer e-mail, virtual communities 
and free web hosting in China. It is also considered as one of the founding contributors of 
China‟s online gaming industry, developing and introducing one of the first large-scale Chinese 
online games „Westward Journey Online‟ in August 2002.  
The company has offices in Shanghai and Guangzhou while its Head Office is in Beijing, PRC.  
As at financial year-end 31 December 2003, NetEase had approximately 167 million registered 
user accounts, with average daily page views exceeding 290 million for the month ending 31 
December 2003. On this date the company employed 620 employees. 
NetEase has three principal lines of business: 
- MMORPG Online Game Services
- Advertising Services
- Wireless value-added services & other fee-based premium services
As at 31 December 2003 NetEase boasted an average of 171,000 concurrent online game users 
and a total of 1.7 million unique paying visitors for the December month alone. By the end of the 
2003 financial year it was expected that NetEase‟s online gaming services would become the 
industry leader in China‟s online gaming industry.  
Wireless value-added services include providing news, stock quotes, email, ringtone & logo 
downloads, matchmaking and interactive games. Primarily wireless value-added services are in 
the form of short messaging services (SMS), providing news and information subscription 
133 NetEase. 2003. NetEase Annual Report 2003.Available: http://media.corporate ir.net/media_files/IROL/12/122303/docs/netease_2003.pdf 




services, interactive and community services, internet-related services and media downloading 
services. While relatively new technologies, NetEase did offer multi-media messaging services 
(MMS), interactive voice response services (IVRS) and wireless application protocol (WAP) at 
this time.  
 
NetEase‟s internet portal focusses on three main areas, providing Chinese language online 
services in content, community & communication and commerce. Content is distributed through 
21 channels and includes news, entertainment, sports, finance, information technology, 
automobiles, astrology and cartoons. In addition, region-based content is provided in accordance 
with a user‟s geographic location. Geographically NetEase only operates within China itself, 
ensuring region-based content is relevant only to users in the cities of Guangdong and Shanghai.  
 
Other web services include free and paid-for email, instant messaging, personal advertising, 
matchmaking, alumni directories, personal homepages, clubs, e-cards, chat rooms, community 
forums, web directories, web search services, classified advertisements, banner advertising, e-
mail advertising, interactive media-rich advertising, special event advertising, games & contest 
advertising as well as an online shopping and e-commerce platform. 
 
NetEase has entered into arrangements with China‟s largest mobile phone operators, China 
Mobile and China Unicom to ensure it offers an expansive range of MVAS offerings. NetEase‟s 
Internet portal content is both user-generated and in-house developed, ensuring that the 
company‟s content is relevant and suitable to meet the needs and tastes of its users in such a fast-














Founded in June 1997 and incorporated in the Cayman Islands  on 28 August 2001, TOM Online 
Inc (TOM) is a leading wireless internet company in China, specializing in value-added 
multimedia products and services. Since March 2004 TOM has been publicly dual-listed on both 
the US-based NASDAQ Stock Market and the Hong Kong Stock Exchange Growth Enterprise 
Market (GEM). TOM was initially listed on the NASDAQ Stock Market on 10 March 2004 
(NASDAQ: TOMO) and the GEM on 11 March 2004 (GEM Stock Code: 8282). The company 
was the first in industry to dual-list. 
 
Tom Online is a subsidiary of the TOM Group, representing the group‟s internet sector amongst 
its outdoor media, publishing, sports and television & entertainment segments. The TOM Group 
is one of the leading Chinese language media groups in the Greater China region, and is solely 
operable in this geographic space only. Within this region, it aims to attract the young and trendy 
Chinese consumer through its product offerings. TOM Online has offices in Hong Kong while its 
head office is in Beijing, PRC. As at financial year-end 31 December 2003 the company 
employed 440 employees.  
 
TOM Online has four principal lines of business: 
 
- Wireless value-added internet services 
- Commercial enterprise solutions  
- Advertising (Online & Offline) 
- Internet Access 
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TOM Online‟s primary operating segment was its IVAS/MVAS division.This was followed byits 
commercial enterprise solutions, advertising and internet access. This is the result of its 
partnership with China‟s largest mobile networks, China Mobile and China Unicom. The 
platforms offered by these companies ensure that TOM is able to provide short messaging 
services (SMS) and the likes of multi-media messaging services (MMS), interactive voice 
response services (IVRS), wireless application protocol (WAP) and ringback tone services in the 
future. 
 
The company‟s commercial enterprise solutions are centered on providing retail clients with 
internet-related technical and consulting services while offering direct access to purchase and 
installation of computer hardware. As at the beginning of the 2004 financial year this segment 
was in the process of being phased out. This was in addition to its internet access segment which 
ceased operations in the fourth quarter of 2002. Additional company offerings include 
distributing entertainment, sport and music content to mobile phones, online search functionality, 
online classifieds, content channels and both free and fee-based advanced email services. The 
company began to explore the online gaming space with its „Karma Online‟ offering; however 
this has not proved fruitful. 
Tom Online has formed strategic partnerships with mobile handset manufacturers Nokia and 
Motorola, while ranked as the fourth most popular internet portal in China. It is also ranked as 






2003 2002 2001 2003 2002 2001
USD'000 USD'000 USD'000 RMB'000 RMB'000 RMB'000
Revenues:
Mobile and telecommuncation value-added services 56 466      24 021      4 586             467 369   198 818        37 960           
Internet value-added services 27 750      4 932        114                229 690   40 819          944                
Online advertising 3 968        2 318        935                32 841      19 188          7 735             
Others 611            517            294                5 057        4 282             2 437             
88 795      31 788      5 929             734 957   263 107        49 076           
Cost of revenues (27 733)     (8 659)       (2 180)            (229 548)  (71 674)         (18 044)          
Gross profit 61 062      23 128      3 749             505 409   191 433        31 032           
Other operating (expenses)/income, net (148)          (29)             (10)                 (1 226)       (242)               (82)                 
Selling and marketing expenses (6 762)       (2 348)       (521)               (55 967)    (19 437)         (4 312)            
General and adminsitrative expenses (13 533)     (3 487)       (1 969)            (112 011)  (28 860)         (16 297)          
Operating Profit 40 619      17 264      1 249             336 205   142 894        10 341           
Net Finance Costs 242            105            (15)                 2 004        871                (125)               
Profit before taxation 40 861      17 369      1 234             338 209   143 765        10 216           
Taxation (1 935)       (369)          -                      (16 013)    (3 058)           -                      
Profit for the year/period 38 927      17 000      1 234             322 196   140 707        10 216           
Earnings per share
basic (cents) 0.029        0.013        0.001             0.244 0.104 0.009
diluted (cents) 0.029        0.013        0.001             0.244 0.104 0.008
- - -
Proposed dividends 3 496        1 249        - 28 935      10 334          -                      
Proposed dividends per share (RMB) - 0.001        - 0.023 0.008 -                      
Tencent Holdings Limited - Consolidated Statement of Operations for the year ended 31 December 200X
Exhibit 2: Consolidated Statement of Operations & Consolidated Statement of Financial Position of Tencent Holdings 






2003 2002 2001 2003 2002 2001
USD'000 USD'000 USD'000 RMB'000 RMB'000 RMB'000
Assets
Non-current assets
Fixed assets 9,682        4,694        2,038             80,139      38,851          16,868           
1,329        - -
11,011      4,694        2,038             91,139      38,851          16,868           
Current assets
Accounts receivable 12,049      7,140        1,027             99,726      59,094          8,500             
Amounts due from shareholders 10              10              10                   82             82                  82                   
Prepayments, deposits and other receivables 4,334        356            45                   35,872      2,945             369                
Term deposits with initial term of over three months 2,816        8,148        23,311      67,440          -
Cash and cash equivalents 39,336      5,467        4,799             325,586   45,254          39,723           
58,545      21,121      5,881             484,577   174,815        48,674           
Total assets 69,556      25,814      7,918             575,716   213,666        65,542           
Equity and liabilities
Current liabilities
Other payables and accruals 7,165        437            637                59,301      3,615             5,273             
Amounts due to shareholders -                 -                 1,078             -                 -                     8,919             
Amounts due to related parties -                 181            -                      -                 1,499             -                      
Dividends payable -                 -                 -                      -                 -                     -                      
Income taxes payable 860            -                 -                      7,115        -                     -                      
Other taxes payable 3,948        848            366                32,679      7,021             3,026             
Deferred revenue 444            63              -                      3,676        523                -                      
12,416      1,529        2,080             102,771   12,658          17,218           
Non-current liabilities -                 -                 -                      
Deferred tax liabilities 119            369            -                      988           3,058             -                      
Total liabilities 12,536      1,899        2,080             103,759   15,716          17,218           
Shareholders' equity -                 -                 -                      
Share capital 17              18              18                   138           149                146                
Reserves 57,004      23,898      5,821             471,819   197,801        48,178           
Total shareholders' equity 57,020      23,916      5,838             471,957   197,950        48,324           
Total liabilities and shareholders' equity 69,556      25,814      7,918             575,716   213,666        65,542           
11,000      - -
Tencent Holdings Limited - Consolidated Statement of Financial Position as at 31 December 200X
 Deposit in connection with the formation of                                       





























Advertising 41,173            24,703            23,393            
Non-advertising 73,112            14,191            3,290               
114,285          38,894            26,683            
Cost of revenues:
Advertising 14,001            11,267            13,771            
Non-advertising 20,405            4,140               1,169               
Stock-based compensation 31                    102                  414                  
(34,437)           (15,509)           (15,343)           
Gross profit 79,848            23,385            11,329            
Operating expenses:
Sales and marketing 21,741            12,419            21,694            
Product development 6,340               5,916               9,648               
General and administrative 11,551            8,896               8,918               
Stock-based compensation* 523                  1,692               7,097               
Amortization of intangible assets 1,749               1,777               6,765               
Write-off intangible assets 903                  - -
Total operating expenses (42,807)           (30,700)           (54,122)           
Operating profit/(loss) 37,041            (7,315)             (42,793)           
Other (expenses)/income:
Interest income 2,757               2,819               7,336               
Other expenses (162)                 - -
Amortization of convertible debt issuance cost (341)                 - -
Impairment of investments in Sun Media Group (6,063)             - -
Loss on equity investments (914)                 (453)                 (894)                 
Net profit/(loss) before taxes 32,318            (4,949)             (36,351)           
Income tax expense (895)                 - -
Net profit (loss) 31,423            (4,949)             (36,351)           
Basic net income (loss) per share 0.66                 (0.11)                (0.91)                
Diluted net income (loss) per share 0.58                 (0.11)                (0.91)                
                  523                1,692 7,097               
Sales and marketing 16                    51                    -
Product development 168                  541                  -
General and administrative 339                  1,100               -
Note  The 2001 financial year ended on 30 June, 2001. The 
2002 financial year has been restated in accordance with 
the new financial period ending 31 December each year.  
SINA Corporation - Consolidated Statement of Operations for the year ended 31 December 200X
 *Stock-based compensation was related to the associated expense 









Cash and cash equivalents 158,148          53,262            52,505            
Short-term investments 69,016            43,474            57,284            
Accounts receivable, net 17,606            5,847               4,262               
Deferred tax assets 907                  -
Prepaid expenses and other current assets 4,579               2,323               1,350               
Total current assets 250,256          104,906          115,401          
Non-current assets
Investment in Sun Media Group 6,793               16,637            
Property and equipment, net 8,646               7,599               11,911            
Long-term investments 2,085               - -
Intangible assets, net 569                  993                  5,063               
Goodwill 18,091            - 556                  
Other assets 3,457               344                  191                  
Total assets 289,897          130,479          133,122          
Liabilities and Shareholder's Equity
Current liabilities
Accounts payable 1,147               1,345               1,613               
Accrued liabilities 27,442            11,747            11,542            
Incomes taxes payable 1,801               - -
Total current liabilities 30,390            13,092            13,155            
Non-current liabilities
Convertible debt 100,000          - -
Total liabilities 130,390          13,092            13,155            
Commitments and contingencies (Note 16)
Shareholder's equity
Additional paid-in capital 236,222          223,358          220,671          
Notes receivable from shareholders - (1,050)             (1,479)             
Deferred stock compensation - (554)                 (5,423)             
Accumulated deficit (83,054)           (114,477)         (99,301)           
Accumulated other comprehensive income (loss):
Cumulative translation adjustments 29                    (8)                     (5)                     
Total shareholders' equity 159,507          117,387          119,967          
Total liabilities and shareholders' equity 289,897          130,479          133,122          
Note
4,004               
 The 2001 financial year ended on 30 June, 2001. The 
2002 financial year has been restated in accordance with 
the new financial period ending 31 December each year.  
-
-                       
SINA Corporation - Consolidated Statement of Financial Position as at 31 December 200X
 Ordinary Shares: US$0.133 par value; 75,000,000 shares authorized; 
48,627,000 and  45,946,000 shares issued and outstanding 
               6,471                6,114                5,504 
 Ordinary shares subject to subsequent issuance: 177,000 shares 
1,349               -
 Unrealized gain (loss) or investment in marketable securities 









29,503      13,852      9,245        
Non-advertising:
47,053      10,132      1,252        
3,787        4,201        1,703        
Other 82             544           800           
Subtotal of non-advertising revenues 50,922      14,877      3,755        
Total revenues 80,425      28,729      13,000      
Cost of revenues:
7,459        5,943        6,644        
Non-advertising:
14,336      3,655        587           
3,411        3,546        1,529        
Other - 280           653           
Subtotal of non-advertising cost of revenues 17,747      7,481        2,769        
Total cost of revenues 25,206      13,424      9,413        
Gross profit 55,219      15,305      3,587        
Operating Expenses:
Product development 7,542        5,508        5,365        
General and administrative 5,029        3,908        4,792        
Amortization of intangibles 57             - 12,607      
Impairment of intangibles - - 17,676      
Total operating expenses 23,198      17,389      48,846      
Operating profit/(loss) 32,021      (2,084)       (45,259)    
Other income (expenses):
Other expense (964)          (217)          (594)          
Interest income 1,950        1,265        2,176        
Net profit/(loss) before taxes 33,007      (1,036)       (43,587)    
Income tax expense (6,650)       - -
Net profit (loss) 26,357      (1,036)       (43,587)    
Basic net income/(loss) per share 0.74          (0.03)         (1.22)         
Shares used in computing basic net income/(loss) per share 35,483      35,420      35,626      
Diluted net income/(loss) per share 0.66          (0.03)         (1.22)         
Shares used in computing diluted net income/(loss) per share 40,351      35,420      35,626      
10,570      7,973        8,406        
 E-commerce (including US$1,899 , US$3,546 and US$1,529 of related party services) 
 E-commerce (including US$1,899 , US$3,546 and US$1,529 of related party services) 
 Sales and marketing                                                                                                                                                                  
(including US$0, US$0 and US$44,3 related party services) 
 Advertising (including US$72, US$145, and US$181 from related parties) 
 E-subscription (including US$6,193 , US$3,655 and US$587 from related parties) 
Sohu.com - Consolidated Statement of Operations for the year ended 31 December 200X
 Advertising (including US$0, US$0, and US$962 from related parties) 











Cash and cash equivalents 99,109      18,929      29,263      
Accounts receivable, net 12,381      1,992        2,710        
Accounts receivable from a related party - 1,962        -
Prepaid and other current assets 5,040        2,009        2,168        
Total current assets 144,785   27,374      34,141      
Non-current assets
Long-term investments in marketable debt securities 14,216      22,800      16,973      
Fixed assets, net 6,846        6,012        7,953        
Long-term loans to related parties - 4,827        1,815        
Goodwill 31,664      - -
Intangible assets, net 4,082        - -
Other assets, net 3,462        959           1,076        
Total Assets 205,055   61,972      61,958      
Liabilities and Shareholder's Equity
Current liabilities
Accounts payable 1,101        977           366           
Payable to related parties - 1,455        1,208        
Accrued liabilities 22,315      4,309        2,803        
Total current liabilities 23,416      6,741        4,377        
Zero coupon convertible senior notes -
Total liabilities 113,416   6,741        4,377        
Commitments and contingencies (Note 10)
Shareholder's equity
              36 35             36             
Treasury Stock (2,003)       (2,003)       -
Additional paid-in capital 140,218   129,881   129,852   
Deferred compensation (14)            (42)            (156)          
Accumulated other comprehensive income 232           547           -
Accumulated deficit (46,830)    (73,187)    (72,151)    
Total shareholders' equity 91,639      55,231      57,581      
Total liabilities and shareholders' equity 205,055   61,972      61,958      
Sohu.com - Consolidated Statement of Financial Position as at 31 December 200X
 Common Stock: US$0.001 par value per share (75,400 authorized, 36,101                                                               
and 34,611 shares issued and outstanding at  December 31, 2003 and 
2002) 
 Current portion of long-term investments in marketable debt securities 
29,245      2,482        -




2003 2002 2001 2003 2002 2001
USD'000 USD'000 USD'000 RMB'000 RMB'000 RMB'000
Revenues:
Online game services 24,556         4,475           - 203,246      37,053         -
Wireless value-added and other fee-based premium services 33,789         19,481         1,706          279,659      161,306      14,136        
Advertising services 10,413         4,132           1,711          86,184         34,209         14,164        
68,758         28,088         3,417          569,089      232,568      28,300        
Business tax (3,257)          (1,404)          (275)            (26,955)       (11,627)       (2,275)         
Net revenues 65,501         26,684         3,142          542,135      220,941      26,026        
Cost of revenues (10,326)       (8,659)          (7,256)         (85,463)       (71,678)       (60,058)       
Gross profit (Loss on revenues) 55,176         18,025         (4,114)         456,672      149,264      (34,033)       
Operating expenses:
Selling, general and administrative expenses (13,383)       (11,206)       (21,937)      (110,770)     (94,308)       (181,765)     
Research and development expenses (2,310)          (1,668)          (1,350)         (19,121)       (14,185)       (13,323)       
Asset impairment loss - (90)               (334)            - (747)             (2,767)         
Class action settlement - (4,348)          - - (36,005)       -
Total operating expenses (15,694)       (17,542)       (23,905)      (129,891)     (145,245)     (197,854)     
Operating profit (loss) 3,948           483              (28,019)      326,781      4,019           (231,887)     
Other income (expenses):
Investments impairment loss - - (1,078)         - - (8,924)         
Investment income 65                - - 538              - -
Interest income 1,362           913              2,123          11,274         7,562           17,571        
Interest expenses - (169)             (1,194)         - (1,401)          (9,883)         
Other, net 654              450              (5)                5,410           3,725           (41)               
Profit (Loss) before tax 41,563         1,677           (28,173)      344,003      13,906         (233,164)     
Income tax benefit (expense) (2,553)          289              - (21,130)       2,396           -
Net profit (loss) 39,010         1,966           (28,173)      322,873      16,302         (233,164)     
Other comprehensive income (loss)
Currency translation adjustments (2)                 1                   68               (18)               12                566              
Comprehensive income (loss) 39,008         1,970           (28,105)      322,855      16,313         (232,598)     
Net earnings (loss) per share, basic 0.01             0.01             (0.01)           0.10             0.01             (0.08)           
Net earnings (loss) per ADS, basic 1.25             0.06             (0.93)           10.34           0.53             (7.74)           
Net earnings (loss) per share, diluted 0.01             0.01             (0.01)           0.10             0.01             0.08             
Net earnings (loss) per ADS, diluted 1.18             0.06             (0.93)           9.78             0.52             7.74             
Weighted average number of ordinary shares outstanding, basic 3,122,258   3,051,395   3,013,419  3,122,258   3,051,395   3,013,419   
Weighted average number of ADS outstanding, basic 31,223         30,514         30,134        31,223         30,514         30,134        
Weighted average number of ordinary shares outstanding, diluted 3,301,311   3,127,838   3,013,419  3,301,311   3,127,838   3,013,419   
Weighted average number of ADS outstanding, diluted 33,013         31,278         30,134        33,013         31,278         30,134        
Share compensation cost included in:
Cost of revenues - (230)             - - (1,908)          -
Selling, general and administrative expenses -18 19/72 (184)             (24,699)      (151)             (1,522)          (204)            
Research and development expenses (11)               (45)               (260,171)    (88)               (376)             (2,153)         
(29)               (459,766)     (284,870)    (29)               (3,807)          (2,358)         




2003 2002 2001 2003 2002 2001
USD'000 USD'000 USD'000 RMB'000 RMB'000 RMB'000
Assets
Current assets
Cash 163,841.81     67,641.27      57,947.53      1,356,070      560,070         479,609         
Restricted cash - 146                 10,911.30      - 1,208              90,308           
Held-to-maturity investments 40,123.91       - 332,094         -
Temporary cash investments - - 5,500.00        - - 45,521           
Prepayments and other current assets            2,386.14             738.01          1,103.88 19,749           6,111              9,136              
 Due from related parties, net of allowance for doubtful accounts  
 of RMB8,703,307 and RMB10,157,789 (US$1,227,275) at  
 December 31, 2002 and 2003, respectively.  
Deferred tax assets 1,168.28         - - 9,670              - -
Total current assets 209,354.52     71,236.38      75,739.42      1,732,765      589,837         626,865         
Non-current assets
Rental deposit 172.84            128.73           131.39           1,431              1,066              1,087              
Investment in convertible preference shares - 1,172.14        - - 9,701              
Property, equipment and software, net 4,882.41         3,185.89        4,392.64        40,410           26,379           36,356           
Deferred tax assets - 289.36           - - 2,396              -
Deferred assets 1,460.33         - 94.65              12,087           - 783                 
Total non-current assets 6,515.58         3,603.98        5,790.81        (53,928)          29,841           47,931           
Total assets 215,870.10     74,840.36      81,530.23      1,786,692      619,678         674,793         
Liabilities and Shareholders' Equity
Current liabilities
Short-term bank loans - - 10,149           - 84,000           
Accounts payable 1,297               461                 1,585              10,738           3,815              13,116           
Salary and welfare payable 2,103               1,935             1,201              17,406           16,023           1,201              
Taxes payable 1,930               997                 214                 15,976           8,253              214                 
Deferred revenue - 20                   - - 165                 -
Accrued liabilities 1,413               1,256             1,322              11,699           10,398           1,322              
Due to a related party, net 2,652               - - 21,947           - -
Total current liabilities 9,396               4,668             14,470           77,766           38,654           14,470           
Non-current liabilities
Zero Coupon Convertible Subordinated Notes due July 15, 2023 100,000          - - 827,670         - -
Other long-term payable 28                    - - 231                 - -
Total long-term payable 100,028          - - 827,901         - -
Total liabilities 109,424          4,668             14,470           905,668         38,654           14,470           
Commitments and contingencies
Shareholders' equity
Ordinary shares, US$0.0001 par value:
1,000,300,000,000 shares authorized,
3,100,162,537 shares issued and outstanding
as of December 31, 2002 and 3,128,958,189
shares issued and outstanding as of  December 31, 2003
Additional paid-in capital 120,006          126,769         126,246         993,255         1,049,651      1,044,890      
Less: Subscriptions receivable - (3,999)            (4,241)            - (33,114)          (35,101)          
Statutory reserves 4,072               - - 33,700           - -
Deferred compensation (8)                     (57)                  (404)                (69)                  (475)                (3,345)            
Translation adjustments 25                    28                   26                   211                 229                 217                 
Accumulated deficit (17,961)           (52,879)          (54,870)          (148,662)        (437,834)        (454,136)        
Total shareholders' equity 106,446          70,172           67,060           881,024         581,024         555,030         
Total liabilities and shareholders' equity 215.87            74,840           81,530           1,786,692      619,678         674,793         
NetEase - Consolidated Statement of Financial Position as at 31 December 200X
15,183           22,449           2,290                        1,834.38             276.71               2,711 





























Wireless internet services 55,843   9,958     30           
Advertising 5,845     4,228     2,950     
Commercial enterprise solutions 13,825   11,244   1,479     
Internet access 1,590     4,545     1,974     
Total revenues 77,073   29,975   6,433     
Cost of revenues:
Cost of services (32,794)  (16,731)  (10,849)  
Cost of goods sold (11,291)  (8,143)    (59)         
Total cost of revenues (44,085)  (24,874)  (10,908)  
Gross profit 32,988   5,101     (4,475)    
Operating expenses:
Selling and marketing expenses (2,772)    (3,069)    (5,755)    
General and administrative expenses (9,133)    (7,356)    (8,808)    
Product development expenses (689)       (692)       (1,085)    
Amortization of intangibles (629)       (88)         (8)            
Provision for impairment of goodwill - (1,949)    -
Provision for impairment of intangibles - (266)       -
Provision for impairment of property and equipment - - (2,960)    
Total operating expenses (13,223)  (13,420)  (18,616)  
Operating profit/(loss) 19,765   (8,319)    (23,091)  
Other (expenses)/income:
Net interest (expenses)/income (320)       (408)       (347)       
Net profit/(loss) before taxes 19,445   (8,727)    (23,438)  
Income tax expense 254        (16)         -
Net profit (loss) 19,699   (8,743)    (23,438)  
Minority interests (127)       389        294        
Net (loss)/income attributable to shareholders 19,572   (8,354)    (23,144)  
(Loss)/earnings per ordinary share basic (cents) 0.699 (0.298) (0.827)
(Loss)/earnings per ordinary share diluted (cents) - - -




























Cash and cash equivalents 22,636      6,752        5,320            
Accounts receivable, net 14,689      8,003        5,370            
Deferred costs 15,000      - -
Restricted cash - - 4,030            
Prepayments 1,405        1,909        2,545            
Deposits and other receivables 935           416           337                
Due from related parties 124           460           1,447            
Inventories 29             1,522        226                
Total current assets 54,818      19,062      19,275          
Non-current assets
Long-term prepayments and deposits 565           994           1,088            
Property and equipment, net 7,094        5,518        2,960            
Deferred tax assets 274           - -
Goodwill, net 214           - 1,949            
Intangibles, net 4,411        - 354                
Total assets 67,376      25,574      25,626          
Liabilities and shareholders' equity
Current liabilities
Accounts payable 3,241        2,926        2,819            
Other payables and accruals 22,195      3,838        5,198            
Income tax payable 401           - -
Deferred revenues 414           1,734        2,813            
Consideration payables 6,580        - -
Due to related parties- short term -                 - 3,615            
Total current liabilities 32,831      8,498        14,445          
Non-current liabilities
Due to related parties- long term 19,983      26,316      11,801          
Total liabilities 52,814      34,814      26,246          
Minority interests 152           224           613                
52,966      35,038      26,859          
Commitments
Shareholders' equity
Share capital 3,590        3,590        3,590            
Paid-in capital 75,551      93,184      93,018          
Accumulated other comprehensive losses (55)            (55)            (12)                 
Accumulated deficit (64,676)    (106,183)  (97,829)         
Total shareholders' equity 14,410      (9,464)       (1,233)           
Total liabilities and shareholders' equity 67,376      25,574      25,626          









INCOME STATEMENT (ACTUAL) (RMB '000)
as at 31 December 2001 Year-on-Year 2002 Year-on-Year 2003
Continuing operations: RMB'000 Growth (%) RMB'000 Growth (%) RMB'000
Mobile and telecommuncation value-added services 37,960      423.76% 198,818  135.07% 467,369    
Internet value-added services 944           4224.05% 40,819    462.70% 229,690    
Online advertising 7,735        148.07% 19,188    71.15% 32,841      
Others 2,437        75.71% 4,282       18.10% 5,057        
Total Revenues 49,076      436.12% 263,107  179.34% 734,957    
Cost of revenues (18,044)     297.22% (71,674)   220.27% (229,548)  
Gross profit 31,032      516.89% 191,433  164.01% 505,409    
Other operating (expenses)/income, net (82)            195.12% (242)         406.61% (1,226)       
Selling and marketing expenses (4,312)       350.77% (19,437)   187.94% (55,967)     
General and adminstrative expenses (16,297)     77.09% (28,860)   288.12% (112,011)  
Operating profit 10,341      1281.82% 142,894  135.28% 336,205    
Net finance costs (125)          -796.80% 871          130.08% 2,004        
Profit before tax 10,216      1307.25% 143,765  135.25% 338,209    
Taxation -                 - (3,058)     423.64% (16,013)     
Profit for the year from continuing operations 10,216      1277.32% 140,707  128.98% 322,196    
Exhibit 3: Discounted Cash Flow - Income Statement Showing Percentage Growth per Line Item of Tencent Holdings Limited 
























INCOME STATEMENT (FORECAST) (RMB '000)
as at 31 December 2003 Year-on-Year 2004 Year-on-Year 2005
Continuing operations: RMB'000 Growth (%) RMB'000 Growth (%) RMB'000
Mobile and telecommuncation value-added services 467,369    35% 630,948 40% 883,327
Internet value-added services 229,690    39% 319,269 45% 462,940
Online advertising 32,841      32% 43,350 38% 59,823
Others 5,057        21% 6,119 24% 7,588
Total Revenues 734,957    36% 999,686 41% 1,413,678
Cost of revenues (229,548) 58% (363,435) 56% (567,106)
Gross profit 505,409    636,251 846,572
Other operating (expenses)/income, net (1,226)       (3,457) (10,545)
Selling and marketing expenses (55,967)     (68,839) (86,738)
General and adminsitrative expenses (112,011)  (143,374) (169,181)
Operating profit 336,205    420,580 580,108
Net finance costs 2,004        2,708 2,915
Profit before tax 338,209    423,288 583,023
Taxation (10.66%) (16,013)     (45,123) (62,150)
Profit for the year from continuing operations 322,196    17% 378,166 38% 520,873

























INCOME STATEMENT (FORECAST) (RMB '000)
as at 31 December 2005 Year-on-Year 2006 Year-on-Year 2007 Year-on-Year 2008
Continuing operations: RMB'000 Growth (%) RMB'000 Growth (%) RMB'000 Growth (%) RMB'000
Mobile and telecommuncation value-added services 883,327 42% 1,254,325 60% 2,006,920 76% 3,532,179
Internet value-added services 462,940 54% 712,928 77% 1,261,882 95% 2,460,671
Online advertising 59,823 52% 90,931 75% 159,130 84% 292,799
Others 7,588 32% 10,016 38% 13,821 48% 20,456
Total Revenues 1,413,678 46% 2,068,200 66% 3,441,753 83% 6,306,104
Cost of revenues (567,106) 97% (1,117,326) 75% (1,955,887) 86% (3,637,114)
Gross profit 846,572 950,873 1,485,866 2,668,990
Other operating (expenses)/income, net (10,545) (24,253) (65,483) (95,606)
Selling and marketing expenses (86,738) (145,719) (269,581) (539,161)
General and adminsitrative expenses (169,181) (247,005) (276,645) (298,777)
Operating profit 580,108 533,896 874,157 1,735,446
Net finance costs 2,915 3,182 3,792 4,600
Profit before tax 583,023 537,078 877,949 1,740,046
Taxation (10.66%) (62,150) (57,252) (93,589) (185,489)


























Cost of Revenues (18,044)   (71,674)   (229,548)  (363,435) (567,106) (1,117,326) (1,955,887) (3,637,114)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
RMB'000 RMB'000 RMB'000 RMB'000 RMB'000 RMB'000 RMB'000 RMB'000
Mobile and telecommuncation value-added services (10,801)   (49,856)   (141,916)  (232,742) (360,750) (660,173) (1,089,286) (1,982,501)
Internet value-added services (4,223)     (14,856)   (75,489)     (116,253) (188,330) (423,742) (796,636) (1,513,608)
Online advertising (3,020)     (6,970)     (10,499)     (12,599) (16,000) (31,041) (67,359) (138,086)
Others - - (1,644)       (1,841) (2,025) (2,370) (2,607) (2,920)
5% 22% 62% 64% 64% 59% 56% 55%
2% 6% 33% 32% 33% 38% 41% 42%
1% 3% 5% 3% 3% 2.78% 3.44% 3.80%
0% 0% 1% 0.51% 0.36% 0.21% 0.13% 0.08%
Percentage Contribution of Total Costs
Revenues 49 076    263 107  734 957    999 686 1 413 678 2 068 200 3 441 753 6 306 104
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
RMB'000 RMB'000 RMB'000 RMB'000 RMB'000 RMB'000 RMB'000 RMB'000
Mobile and telecommuncation value-added services 37960 198 818 467 369 630 948 883 327 1 254 325 2 006 920 3 532 179
Internet value-added services 944 40 819 229 690 319 269 462 940 712 928 1 261 882 2 460 671
Online advertising 7735 19 188 32 841 43 350 59 823 90 931 159 130 292 799
Others 2437 4 282 5 057 6 119 7 588 10 016 13 821 20 456
77% 76% 64% 63% 62% 61% 58% 56%
2% 16% 31% 32% 33% 34% 37% 39%
16% 7% 4% 4% 4% 4% 5% 5%
5% 2% 1% 1% 1% 0.48% 0.40% 0.32%
Percentage Contribution of Total Costs
Exhibit 5: Discounted Cash Flow - Forecasted Revenues and Cost of Revenues of Tencent Holdings Limited for the 2004 to 
























2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
RMB'000 RMB'000 RMB'000 RMB'000 RMB'000 RMB'000 RMB'000 RMB'000
Selling & Marketing Expenses (4,312) (19,437) (55,967) (68,839) (86,738) (145,719) (269,581) (539,161)
Year-on-Year Growth % 351% 188% 23% 26% 68% 85% 100%
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
RMB'000 RMB'000 RMB'000 RMB'000 RMB'000 RMB'000 RMB'000 RMB'000
General and Administrative Expenses (16,297)   (28,860)   (112,011)  (143,374) (169,181) (247,005) (276,645) (298,777)
Year-on-Year Growth % 77% 288% 28% 18% 46% 12% 8%
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
RMB'000 RMB'000 RMB'000 RMB'000 RMB'000 RMB'000 RMB'000 RMB'000
Other Operating (Expenses)/Incomes (82)          (242)        (1,226)       (3,457) (10,545) (24,253) (65,483) (95,606)
Year-on-Year Growth % 195% 407% 182% 205% 130% 170% 46%
Net Finance Costs (125)        (242)        (1,226)       2,708 2,915 3,182 3,792 4,600
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
RMB'000 RMB'000 RMB'000 RMB'000 RMB'000 RMB'000 RMB'000 RMB'000
Interest Income 395         936         2,572        2,881 3,284 3,809 4,495 5,394
Interest Expenses (617)        - -  -  -  -  -  - 
Bank Charges (16)          (34)          (154)          (172) (369) (627) (703) (794)
77% 76% 64% 106% 113% - - -
2% 16% 31% - - - - -
16% 7% 4% - - - - -
5% 2% 1% 6.37% 12.66% 19.72% 18.53% 17.26%
Percentage Contribution of Total Revenue
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Depreciation, Amortization & Impairment (2,448) (6,155) (17,188) (24,259) (39,271) (276,128) (218,141) (192,462)
As a Percentage of CAPEX (%) 21% 22% 29% 34% 32% 45% 79% 81%
























2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Other Payables and Accruals 5,273 3,615 59,301 68,196 81,835 102,294 132,982 179,526
Year-on-Year Growth % - -31% 1540% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35%
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Deferred Revenue - 523 3,676 11,837 22,490 42,281 61,730 76,545
Year-on-Year Growth % - - 603% 222% 90% 88% 46% 24%
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Income Tax Payable - - 7,115 20,049 27,615 25,439 41,584 82,418
Year-on-Year Growth % - - - 182% 38% -8% 63% 98%
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Other Taxes Payable 3,026 7,021 32,679 41,502 61,838 56,891 97,853 156,565
Year-on-Year Growth % - 132% 365% 27% 49% -8% 72% 60%
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Mobile & Telecommuncation Value-Added Service Revenues 37,960 198,818 467,369 630,948 883,327 1,254,325 2,006,920 3,532,179
Accounts Receivable 8,500 59,094 99,726 139,616 195,463 342,060 632,811 1,202,342
% of Mobile & Telecommuncations Value-Added Service Revenues 22% 30% 21% 22% 22% 27% 32% 34%
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Total Revenues 49,076 263,107 734,957 999,686 1,413,678 2,068,200 3,441,753 6,306,104
Accounts Receivable 8,500 59,094 99,726 139,616 195,463 342,060 632,811 1,202,342
% of Total Revenues 17% 22% 14% 14% 14% 17% 18% 19%
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Prepayments, Deposits and Other Receivables 369 2,945 35,872 7,174 8,035 9,241 10,904 13,194
Year-on-Year Growth % - 698% 1118% -80% 12% 15% 18% 21%
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Current Assets 8,869 62,039 135,598 146,791 203,498 351,301 643,715 1,215,535
Current Liabilities (8,299) (11,159) (102,771) (141,584) (193,779) (226,905) (334,150) (495,054)
Working Capital 570 50,880 32,827 5,206 9,720 124,396 309,565 720,481
Net Change in Working Capital - 50,310 (18,053) (27,621) 4,513 114,676 185,170 410,916
Exhibit 7: Discounted Cash Flow - Forecasted Changes in Net Working Capital of Tencent Holdings Limited for the 2004 to 





















Exhibit 8: Discounted Cash Flow - Working Capital Assumptions  
 
In assessing and forecasting the expected changes in Tencent‟s net working capital the following 




Tencent‟s trade debtors are expected to increasingly grow over the 2004 to 2008 financial period. 
In light of Tencent‟s expansionary measures and revenue forecasts (see Section 6.3.3), this is 
expected to lead to further delays in the transfer of revenues from mobile and telecommunication 
operators to Tencent.  
 
This is especially pertinent surrounding the 2006, 2007 and 2008 years upon the release of 
additional VoIP and PHS value-added services.  As such, Tencent‟s accounts receivable will 
grow significantly in these years.  
 
Other Payables and Accruals 
 
These include staff costs and welfare accruals, prepayments received from customers and 
professional fee accruals. 
 
These costs are likely to collective increase with the growth in company revenues as outlined in 
Section 6.3.3.1, 6.3.3.2, 6.3.3.3, 6.3.3.4. 




These include VAT refunds receivable, rental deposits, travelling advances to employees, 
interest receivable, rental prepayments and other payments.   
 
Considering Tencent‟s growth prospects, these are expected to follow the same growth trend in 
the 2004 to 2008 financial period 
                                                          




1.1 VAT Refund Receivable  
 
Tencent‟s VAT refund is more than likely a once-off, non-recurring company event of Tencent 
Technology (see Appendix A, Exhibit 6). This transaction involved Tencent Technology selling 
three sets of its self-generated computer software to Tencent Computer in 2003. This was a 
strategic move by the company to transfer surplus cash from Tencent Computer to Tencent 
Technology, so that Tencent Technology could meet its working capital requirements.  
 
VAT was levied in accordance with PRC Government standards at 17%. 
 
Accounting for VAT at 17%, the total amount of VAT owed translated into an amount in excess 
of 3% of the total sales consideration. As Tencent Technology developed and sold the software 
in its personal capacity, these factors entitled the company to a tax rebate in the form of a 
government grant. This was in accordance with Chinese Tax legislation, „Caishui [2000] 
Document No 25‟.  
 
Based on this sequence of events it is assumed that this is a non-recurring, once-off event. Thus 
it has not been factored into the forecast model.  
 
Deferred Revenues  
 
This represents the sale of prepaid Tencent point cards that are used to purchase IVAS services.  
 
It is expected that these will increase in alignment with forecasted company growth. In effect, 
this will increase Tencent‟s portion of current liabilities in future years of operation.  
 
Income Taxes Payable & Other Taxes Payable 
 
With an increase in expected company growth, Tencent‟s overall taxes will increase over the 




Tencent Holdings Limited 
Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) Calculation - Unlevered FCFF Approach
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Terminal 2009 - 200X
RMB'000 RMB'000 RMB'000 RMB'000 RMB'000 RMB'000 Growth Rate RMB'000
Net Operating Profit After Tax (NOPAT) 322,196 378,166 520,873 479,825 784,359 1,554,557
+ Depreciation, Amortization & Impairment 17,188 24,259 39,271 276,128 218,141 192,462
+ Interest (After Tax @ 2.29%) 0 0 0 0 0 0
- Capex (85,469) (142,878) (323,000) (889,999) (408,791) (330,472)
- / + Δ NWC (18,053) (27,621) 4,513 114,676 185,170 410,916
Free Cash Flow 235,862          231,926    241,657    (19,370)    778,879    1,827,463     
Terminal Value 3.3% 1,887,769.23
Total Cash Flows 231,926    241,657    (19,370)    778,879    1,827,463     
DCF @ 7.57% 215,604.70 208,841.17 -15,561.85 581,706.03 1,268,792.25 30,693,879.01
Total Firm Value (Enterprise Value) 32,953,261.30
- Long-term Debt 0
+ Cash and Cash Equivalents 325,586
+ Deposit in Connection with the formation of Shiji Kaixuan Technology 11,000
+ Amounts due from Shareholders 82
+ Term Deposits with Initial Term Over 3 Months 23,311
Value of Equity 33,313,240
÷ # Shares 1,680,641
Share Price (RMB) 19.82
Share Price (HK$) 18.68
Actual Closing Price - 16 June 2004
Share Price (RMB) 4.40
Share Price (HK$) 4.15


















Date Open High Low Close Volume Adj Close
6/16/2004 4.38 4.63 4.07 4.15 2,198,875,000 0.76
6/17/2004 4.15 4.38 4.12 4.23 419,007,500 0.77
6/18/2004 4.2 4.25 3.95 4.03 182,990,000 0.73
6/21/2004 4.1 4.12 3.95 4 114,085,000 0.73
6/23/2004 4.05 4.45 4.03 4.42 275,080,000 0.81
6/24/2004 4.47 4.52 4.33 4.45 173,615,000 0.81
6/25/2004 4.47 4.55 4.35 4.4 106,062,500 0.8
6/28/2004 4.4 4.4 4.25 4.33 73,730,000 0.79
6/29/2004 4.3 4.42 4.3 4.33 75,407,500 0.79
6/30/2004 4.38 4.42 4.3 4.3 61,085,000 0.78
7/2/2004 4.28 4.38 4.17 4.35 65,130,000 0.79
7/6/2004 4.38 4.45 4.35 4.4 77,145,000 0.8
7/7/2004 4.38 4.38 4.25 4.28 65,675,000 0.78
7/8/2004 4.25 4.25 4.07 4.1 105,745,000 0.75
7/9/2004 4.1 4.12 4.03 4.07 46,880,000 0.74
7/12/2004 4.07 4.12 3.98 4 59,850,000 0.73
7/13/2004 4 4.05 3.98 4.03 54,670,000 0.73
7/14/2004 4.03 4.03 3.75 3.8 98,190,000 0.69
7/15/2004 3.82 3.82 3.55 3.68 56,595,000 0.67
7/16/2004 3.65 3.75 3.63 3.7 20,632,500 0.67
7/19/2004 3.7 3.77 3.6 3.77 26,605,000 0.69
7/20/2004 3.73 3.77 3.7 3.75 17,180,000 0.68
7/21/2004 3.8 3.87 3.75 3.77 52,475,000 0.69
7/22/2004 3.75 3.75 3.5 3.55 69,155,000 0.65
7/23/2004 3.55 3.57 3.5 3.52 23,340,000 0.64
7/26/2004 3.45 3.5 3.38 3.4 37,195,000 0.62
7/27/2004 3.38 3.73 3.38 3.73 89,530,000 0.68
7/28/2004 3.73 3.75 3.63 3.68 21,025,000 0.67
7/29/2004 3.63 3.77 3.6 3.75 17,490,000 0.68
7/30/2004 3.8 3.87 3.73 3.85 50,325,000 0.7
8/2/2004 3.85 3.87 3.7 3.87 26,760,000 0.71
8/3/2004 3.9 3.98 3.87 3.95 63,695,000 0.72
8/4/2004 3.9 3.93 3.82 3.85 14,245,000 0.7
8/5/2004 3.9 4.03 3.9 3.98 33,925,000 0.73
8/6/2004 3.93 4.05 3.93 4 21,670,000 0.73
8/9/2004 4 4 3.95 4 22,485,000 0.73
8/10/2004 4.05 4.05 3.87 3.87 21,045,000 0.71
8/11/2004 3.93 3.93 3.68 3.68 32,825,000 0.67
8/12/2004 3.68 3.75 3.63 3.75 25,865,000 0.68
8/13/2004 3.68 3.75 3.68 3.75 4,885,000 0.68
8/16/2004 3.7 3.77 3.6 3.75 13,325,000 0.68
8/17/2004 3.75 3.75 3.68 3.7 4,467,500 0.67
Over the One-Year Period Dating 16 June 2004 to 30 June 2005
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Appendix E: Tencent’s Post-IPO Share Price 
Performance  
 
Exhibit 1: Tencent’s Share Price Performance over the One-Year Period 16 June 2004 to 
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Date Open High Low Close Volume Adj Close
10/19/2004 4.6 4.68 4.47 4.58 10,985,000 0.83
10/20/2004 4.55 4.58 4.33 4.38 18,675,000 0.8
10/21/2004 4.38 4.38 4.28 4.3 22,575,000 0.78
10/25/2004 4.3 4.3 4.17 4.17 19,560,000 0.76
10/26/2004 4.15 4.2 4.12 4.17 20,075,000 0.76
10/27/2004 4.33 4.47 4.33 4.45 48,090,000 0.81
10/28/2004 4.52 4.8 4.52 4.65 108,195,000 0.85
10/29/2004 4.55 4.68 4.52 4.6 22,935,000 0.84
11/1/2004 4.55 4.6 4.52 4.6 4,610,000 0.84
11/2/2004 4.6 4.8 4.58 4.77 37,255,000 0.87
11/3/2004 4.7 4.75 4.63 4.7 21,795,000 0.86
11/4/2004 4.7 4.7 4.42 4.42 34,965,000 0.81
11/5/2004 4.52 4.58 4.45 4.5 22,260,000 0.82
11/8/2004 4.5 4.52 4.45 4.5 12,465,000 0.82
11/9/2004 4.55 4.65 4.52 4.55 24,255,000 0.83
11/10/2004 4.63 4.63 4.55 4.58 10,645,000 0.83
11/11/2004 4.58 4.58 4.5 4.5 11,540,000 0.82
11/12/2004 4.63 4.68 4.55 4.63 32,650,000 0.84
11/15/2004 4.63 4.77 4.63 4.65 59,820,000 0.85
11/16/2004 4.63 4.68 4.58 4.68 31,800,000 0.85
11/17/2004 4.65 5.15 4.65 5.05 143,400,000 0.92
11/18/2004 5.05 5.25 4.68 4.68 157,915,000 0.85
11/19/2004 4.7 4.93 4.68 4.93 63,425,000 0.9
11/22/2004 4.93 5.25 4.88 5.1 60,730,000 0.93
11/23/2004 5.1 5.5 5.1 5.4 48,910,000 0.98
11/24/2004 5.45 5.45 5.15 5.25 31,350,000 0.96
11/25/2004 5.2 5.35 5.1 5.25 29,065,000 0.96
11/26/2004 5.15 5.55 5.15 5.45 49,240,000 0.99
11/29/2004 5.5 5.95 5.5 5.8 58,280,000 1.06
11/30/2004 5.75 6.05 5.75 5.9 20,400,000 1.08
12/1/2004 5.9 5.9 5.7 5.75 22,470,000 1.05
12/2/2004 5.95 6.1 5.85 6.05 36,315,000 1.1
12/3/2004 6.15 6.35 5.85 5.85 28,845,000 1.07
12/6/2004 5.9 6 5.85 5.9 4,615,000 1.08
12/7/2004 5.9 5.9 5.45 5.55 52,670,000 1.01
12/8/2004 5.55 5.55 5.4 5.4 22,775,000 0.98
12/9/2004 5.5 5.55 5.4 5.45 19,700,000 0.99
12/10/2004 5.5 5.75 5.45 5.55 23,960,000 1.01
12/13/2004 5.7 5.75 5.6 5.7 15,830,000 1.04
12/14/2004 5.7 5.7 5.5 5.55 52,860,000 1.01
12/15/2004 5.55 5.8 5.55 5.75 40,060,000 1.05
12/16/2004 5.85 5.85 5.65 5.7 6,275,000 1.04
Over the One-Year Period Dating 16 June 2004 to 30 June 2005








Date Open High Low Close Volume Adj Close
12/17/2004 5.7 5.7 5.55 5.55 8,705,000 1.01
12/20/2004 5.55 5.6 5.25 5.3 40,420,000 0.97
12/21/2004 5.4 5.65 5.4 5.55 42,825,000 1.01
12/22/2004 5.55 5.6 5.05 5.1 85,435,000 0.93
12/23/2004 5 5 4.68 4.85 128,610,000 0.88
12/24/2004 4.85 4.98 4.85 4.98 20,875,000 0.91
12/28/2004 4.98 4.98 4.77 4.88 32,205,000 0.89
12/29/2004 4.88 4.88 4.63 4.75 41,795,000 0.87
12/30/2004 4.72 4.75 4.63 4.65 35,200,000 0.85
12/31/2004 4.65 4.72 4.63 4.63 38,835,000 0.84
1/3/2005 4.7 4.75 4.63 4.63 42,585,000 0.84
1/4/2005 4.68 4.8 4.65 4.8 82,450,000 0.88
1/5/2005 4.75 4.75 4.65 4.7 48,495,000 0.86
1/6/2005 4.7 4.72 4.65 4.7 41,089,000 0.86
1/7/2005 4.7 4.75 4.65 4.7 37,435,000 0.86
1/10/2005 4.75 4.98 4.75 4.82 36,060,000 0.88
1/11/2005 4.9 4.9 4.72 4.75 41,505,000 0.87
1/12/2005 4.8 4.8 4.72 4.75 24,300,000 0.87
1/13/2005 4.75 4.77 4.63 4.68 20,535,000 0.85
1/14/2005 4.65 4.8 4.65 4.75 29,595,000 0.87
1/17/2005 4.75 4.75 4.7 4.75 18,455,000 0.87
1/18/2005 4.77 4.77 4.65 4.7 19,800,000 0.86
1/19/2005 4.72 4.77 4.58 4.68 16,615,000 0.85
1/20/2005 4.6 4.6 4.42 4.52 40,875,000 0.83
1/21/2005 4.5 4.5 4.28 4.33 31,335,000 0.79
1/24/2005 4.3 4.45 4.28 4.45 39,025,000 0.81
1/25/2005 4.45 4.5 4.3 4.5 22,405,000 0.82
1/26/2005 4.58 4.58 4.4 4.42 13,940,000 0.81
1/27/2005 4.47 4.52 4.45 4.45 23,495,000 0.81
1/28/2005 4.45 4.52 4.42 4.52 24,525,000 0.83
1/31/2005 4.5 4.55 4.45 4.55 17,615,000 0.83
2/1/2005 4.55 4.7 4.55 4.68 24,934,000 0.85
2/2/2005 4.75 4.85 4.7 4.85 53,495,000 0.88
2/3/2005 4.82 4.93 4.75 4.8 11,154,000 0.88
2/4/2005 4.8 5.2 4.8 5 77,120,000 0.91
2/7/2005 5.1 5.1 4.95 4.95 17,265,000 0.9
2/8/2005 4.95 4.98 4.75 4.82 29,890,000 0.88
2/14/2005 4.88 5 4.85 5 33,305,000 0.91
2/15/2005 5 5 4.82 4.9 21,540,000 0.89
2/16/2005 4.93 4.95 4.8 4.85 9,360,700 0.88
2/17/2005 4.9 4.98 4.85 4.9 11,493,500 0.89
2/18/2005 4.9 4.93 4.85 4.93 5,665,000 0.9
Over the One-Year Period Dating 16 June 2004 to 30 June 2005




Date Open High Low Close Volume Adj Close
2/21/2005 4.95 5.4 4.95 5.35 208,600,000 0.98
2/22/2005 5.35 5.35 5.2 5.25 28,412,000 0.96
2/23/2005 5.3 5.3 5.05 5.2 47,290,000 0.95
2/24/2005 5.3 5.3 5.15 5.15 13,200,000 0.94
2/25/2005 5.25 5.3 5.2 5.3 14,110,000 0.97
2/28/2005 5.3 5.35 4.98 5.1 26,890,000 0.93
3/1/2005 5.15 5.15 5.05 5.15 5,000,000 0.94
3/2/2005 5.15 5.15 5.05 5.05 5,941,500 0.92
3/3/2005 5.05 5.1 5 5.1 9,486,500 0.93
3/4/2005 5.15 5.35 5.15 5.2 26,275,000 0.95
3/7/2005 5.3 5.35 5.25 5.3 20,345,000 0.97
3/8/2005 5.3 5.45 5.3 5.3 19,895,000 0.97
3/9/2005 5.3 5.3 5.2 5.2 7,490,000 0.95
3/10/2005 5.2 5.4 5.15 5.35 19,775,000 0.98
3/11/2005 5.3 5.3 5.15 5.3 14,820,000 0.97
3/14/2005 5.2 5.25 5.2 5.2 5,380,000 0.95
3/15/2005 5.2 5.2 5.05 5.1 12,380,000 0.93
3/16/2005 5.05 5.15 4.98 5.05 12,450,000 0.92
3/17/2005 5 5.2 4.98 5.15 31,675,000 0.94
3/18/2005 5.2 5.3 5.1 5.25 24,460,000 0.96
3/21/2005 5.3 5.7 5.15 5.55 80,050,000 1.01
3/22/2005 5.5 5.55 5.4 5.5 19,405,000 1
3/23/2005 5.4 5.6 5.4 5.55 24,195,000 1.01
3/24/2005 5.55 5.95 5.55 5.8 73,505,000 1.06
3/29/2005 5.75 5.85 5.75 5.8 28,100,000 1.06
3/30/2005 5.7 5.8 5.65 5.75 25,398,500 1.05
3/31/2005 5.75 5.8 5.65 5.65 28,167,500 1.03
4/1/2005 5.7 5.7 5.45 5.65 12,650,000 1.03
4/4/2005 5.65 5.65 5.45 5.5 17,835,000 1
4/6/2005 5.5 5.55 5.45 5.55 14,110,000 1.01
4/7/2005 5.6 5.6 5.5 5.55 18,300,000 1.01
4/8/2005 5.6 5.6 5.5 5.5 13,320,000 1
4/11/2005 5.55 5.55 5.4 5.45 9,470,000 0.99
4/12/2005 5.5 5.6 5.5 5.55 14,560,000 1.01
4/13/2005 5.55 5.55 5.4 5.5 4,066,700 1
4/14/2005 5.45 5.45 5.3 5.4 14,250,000 0.98
4/15/2005 5.3 5.3 5.15 5.2 12,130,000 0.95
4/18/2005 5.1 5.15 5.05 5.05 22,460,000 0.92
4/19/2005 5.05 5.15 5 5.1 24,904,500 0.93
4/20/2005 5.15 5.2 5.1 5.1 10,915,000 0.93
4/21/2005 5.1 5.1 5.05 5.1 10,390,000 0.93
4/22/2005 5.2 5.35 5.2 5.35 22,020,000 0.98
Over the One-Year Period Dating 16 June 2004 to 30 June 2005




Date Open High Low Close Volume Adj Close
4/25/2005 5.3 5.3 5.2 5.25 13,990,000 0.96
4/26/2005 5.3 5.4 5.2 5.35 19,595,000 0.98
4/27/2005 5.35 5.5 5.3 5.45 46,517,900 0.99
4/28/2005 5.5 5.6 5.5 5.6 11,073,000 1.02
4/29/2005 5.6 5.6 5.3 5.4 14,835,000 0.98
5/3/2005 5.4 5.55 5.4 5.5 17,340,000 1
5/4/2005 5.5 5.5 5.45 5.5 3,105,000 1
5/5/2005 5.5 5.7 5.5 5.65 18,455,000 1.03
5/6/2005 5.65 5.7 5.55 5.6 9,470,000 1.02
5/9/2005 5.6 5.65 5.5 5.6 13,220,000 1.02
5/10/2005 5.7 5.7 5.6 5.65 20,260,000 1.03
5/11/2005 5.6 5.6 5.45 5.45 14,030,000 0.99
5/12/2005 5.5 5.55 5.4 5.5 9,090,000 1
5/13/2005 5.5 5.5 5.25 5.25 20,340,000 0.96
5/17/2005 5.3 5.35 5.2 5.35 4,460,000 0.98
5/18/2005 5.35 5.4 5.2 5.3 10,905,000 0.97
5/19/2005 5.25 5.65 5.2 5.6 54,335,000 1.02
5/20/2005 5.6 5.65 5.5 5.5 16,980,000 1
5/23/2005 5.5 5.5 5.4 5.5 11,182,000 1
5/24/2005 5.5 5.5 5.4 5.45 11,370,000 0.99
5/25/2005 5.5 5.55 5.4 5.45 22,150,000 0.99
5/26/2005 5.45 5.6 5.35 5.55 22,060,000 1.01
5/27/2005 5.6 5.65 5.45 5.6 37,780,000 1.02
5/30/2005 5.6 5.6 5.5 5.5 13,570,000 1
5/31/2005 5.55 5.55 5.5 5.55 73,255,000 1.01
6/1/2005 5.55 5.6 5.55 5.55 21,665,000 1.01
6/2/2005 5.6 5.9 5.6 5.8 98,985,000 1.06
6/3/2005 5.85 6 5.65 5.65 29,927,500 1.03
6/6/2005 5.7 5.85 5.7 5.75 29,265,000 1.05
6/7/2005 5.8 5.85 5.75 5.8 12,145,000 1.06
6/8/2005 5.8 6 5.8 5.95 49,503,100 1.09
6/9/2005 5.95 6 5.85 5.95 13,635,000 1.09
6/10/2005 5.95 6.05 5.85 5.85 10,516,000 1.07
6/13/2005 5.9 5.95 5.8 5.9 9,447,500 1.08
6/14/2005 5.9 6.1 5.9 6 30,285,400 1.09
6/15/2005 6 6.05 5.95 6 4,640,000 1.09
6/16/2005 6 6 5.75 5.95 8,940,000 1.09
6/17/2005 5.9 6.3 5.9 6.25 41,840,000 1.14
6/20/2005 6.2 6.25 6.15 6.25 22,705,000 1.14
6/21/2005 6.2 6.2 6.15 6.15 8,035,000 1.12
6/22/2005 6.2 6.5 6.15 6.4 24,765,000 1.17
6/23/2005 6.4 6.65 6.4 6.45 46,162,200 1.18
Over the One-Year Period Dating 16 June 2004 to 30 June 2005




Date Open High Low Close Volume Adj Close
6/24/2005 6.5 6.5 6.35 6.45 52,702,400 1.18
6/27/2005 6.4 6.45 6.35 6.4 18,065,000 1.17
6/28/2005 6.3 6.3 6.05 6.1 52,325,000 1.11
6/29/2005 6.2 6.2 6.15 6.15 9,460,000 1.12
6/30/2005 6.15 6.2 5.85 5.9 31,645,000 1.08
Over the One-Year Period Dating 16 June 2004 to 30 June 2005
Share Price Performance of Tencent Holdings (HKEx: 700)
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